Saint Louis University School of Law

Scholarship Commons
All Faculty Scholarship

2010

Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment:
Lessons in Ensuring Presidential Continuity
Joel K. Goldstein
Saint Louis University School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.slu.edu/faculty
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the President/Executive Department Commons
Recommended Citation
Goldstein, Joel K., Taking from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Lessons in Ensuring Presidential Continuity. Fordham Law Review,
Vol. 79, p. 959, 2010; Saint Louis U. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2010-36.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in All Faculty Scholarship by an
authorized administrator of Scholarship Commons. For more information, please contact erika.cohn@slu.edu, ingah.daviscrawford@slu.edu.

No. 2010-36

Taking from the TWENTY-FIFTH Amendment:
Lessons in Ensuring Presidential Continuity

Joel K. Goldstein
Saint Louis University School of Law

79 Fordham Law Review 959 (2010)

This paper can be downloaded without charge from
the Social Science Research Network electronic library at:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1805794

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1805794

TAKING FROM THE TWENTY-FIFTH
AMENDMENT: LESSONS IN ENSURING
PRESIDENTIAL CONTINUITY
Joel K. Goldstein*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 102
I. TO THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT AND WHAT IT BROUGHT .......... 105
A. The Context of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment ........................... 105
B. Presidential Inability ................................................................ 108
C. Vice Presidential Vacancy ........................................................ 110
D. First Implementations .............................................................. 111
1. Presidential Succession ...................................................... 111
2. Filling Vice Presidential Vacancy...................................... 112
3. Presidential Inability .......................................................... 117
II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT.................. 122
A. Constitutional Principles .......................................................... 123
1. Presidential Continuity....................................................... 123
a. A Prepared Successor .................................................. 124
b. Harmony Breeds Preparation ...................................... 125
c. Party Continuity ........................................................... 126
2. A Presidential Vice President ............................................ 127
3. A New Vice Presidential Vision ........................................ 127
4. Separation of Powers/Checks and Balances ...................... 129
5. Democratic Pedigree .......................................................... 133
6. Accountable Decision Making ........................................... 134
7. Deliberative Decision Making ........................................... 135
8. Preferring Procedures......................................................... 136
* Vincent C. Immel Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. I am grateful
to John D. Feerick and James Fleming for their helpful comments; to Colin Luoma and
Margaret McDermott, Esq. for research assistance; to Stephanie Haley for administrative
help; and to a number of my colleagues at Saint Louis University School of Law who made
suggestions during a workshop I presented as part of its faculty workshop series.
Conversations with Akhil Reed Amar, Birch Bayh, John Feerick, Jim Fleming, Ned Foley,
John Fortier, Bob Gilbert, Rose McDermott, Norman Ornstein, and Bill Treanor at the
Fordham Law School Symposium, and in some cases over a period of years, have given me
a better understanding of these issues. I am particularly grateful to John Feerick for such
discussions (and friendship) over a period now spanning thirty-five years.

101

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1805794

102

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

9. A Government of Laws ...................................................... 137
10. A Government of People Within Those Laws ................. 138
11. Conclusion ....................................................................... 140
B. Legislative Principles ............................................................... 140
1. Seize the Moment .............................................................. 142
2. Sticking with the Conventional .......................................... 143
3. Something Is Better Than Nothing .................................... 145
4. Compromise ....................................................................... 147
5. Dedicated Leadership......................................................... 148
6. Percolating Ideas ................................................................ 149
7. Mobilized Support ............................................................. 150
8. Something for Everyone .................................................... 151
9. Navigating Around Personal Sensitivities ......................... 152
10. Building Momentum ........................................................ 153
11. Conclusion ....................................................................... 154
III. THE MODERN CONTEXT ..................................................................... 155
A. Exceeding Expectations: The Vice Presidency Transformed .. 155
B. Twenty-Fifth Amendment Precedents ....................................... 157
C. Wake Up Calls .......................................................................... 157
IV. AFTER THE VICE PRESIDENT .............................................................. 159
A. Introduction: Succession After the Vice President .................. 159
B. Who Should Be Two (or Three) Heartbeats Away? Some
Constitutional Considerations ................................................ 161
1. The Perils of Cross-Party Succession ................................ 169
2. Succession of the President Pro Tempore: An
Unpresidential Acting President ....................................... 171
C. Mass Catastrophe Problems: The Need for and Perils of a
Long Line ................................................................................ 173
D. The Disability Gap ................................................................... 174
E. Failure To Qualify .................................................................... 176
F. Changing the Line..................................................................... 178
CONCLUSION: THE TEACHINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT ... 182
INTRODUCTION
When the United States has a vigorous and apparently healthy President,
as it generally does, its arrangements for ensuring presidential continuity
receive little scrutiny. The absence of a current or recent succession crisis
focuses attention on more immediate concerns. The ordinary indifference
to presidential continuity issues finds further justification in the common
belief that the system has always proven adequate to deal with whatever
circumstances history has presented, a perception which encourages
confidence that it will also handle those contingencies the future imposes.
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For a variety of reasons, some academics and activists who study
presidential continuity reject this popular consensus.1 They point to gaps in
the system and the number of times the nation has narrowly avoided some
continuity crises and discount as naive and optimistic the conclusion that
these past escapes predict future deliverance. They imagine that disaster, if
not just around the corner, lurks somewhere in the future and, absent
corrective action, will someday leave the nation without a functioning
President.
Discussions of America’s arrangements for ensuring presidential
continuity tend to proceed in one of two general directions. Some criticize
various aspects of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment as inadequate to deal with
the topics they address. More recent complaints have targeted the
provisions for declaring a President disabled,2 although the method for
filling a vice presidential vacancy has not entirely escaped criticism.3
Alternatively, another body of work views the Twenty-Fifth Amendment as
a step forward but identifies troubling gaps in areas it does not regulate,
such as the lack of procedures to declare a President disabled in the absence
of a Vice President, the lack of a method to declare a Vice President
disabled, the problematic line of succession after the Vice President, and a
host of contingencies which could prevent the electoral system from
producing an appropriate and functioning President by inauguration day.4
In fact, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment constituted a major advance that
remedied some of the most glaring problems regarding presidential
continuity. It operates in an area made complex by a number of factors
including the variety of continuity crises which may arise, the difficult
context in which they typically occur, the demands they impose for quick
human decision, and the impediments to adequate preparation for that
response. At its most basic level, the Amendment added several new
1. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Address, Applications and Implications of the TwentyFifth Amendment, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 2, 7–9 (2010); see also John C. Fortier & Norman J.
Ornstein, Presidential Succession and Congressional Leaders, 53 CATH. U. L. REV. 993,
993–94 (2004); Joel K. Goldstein, Commentary, Akhil Reed Amar and Presidential
Continuity, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 67, 69–70 (2010).
2. See, e.g., Herbert L. Abrams, Can the Twenty-Fifth Amendment Deal with a
Disabled President? Preventing Future White House Cover-Ups, 29 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q.
115, 129 (1999).
3. See, e.g., Examination of the First Implementation of Section Two of the TwentyFifth Amendment: Hearing on S.J. Res. 26 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional
Amendments of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. 67–70 (1975) [hereinafter 1975
Senate Hearings] (statement of Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., presidential historian and
scholar); Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., What to Do About a Nonjob, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 1974, at
39 (calling for repeal of Section 2 and ultimately abolition of Vice Presidency); Editorial,
Vice President Ford, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 1973, at 40 (criticizing implementation of Section
2); Warren Weaver, Jr., Law Experts Critical of 25th Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20,
1974, at 16 (quoting scholars and legislators criticizing aspects of Section 2); Tom Wicker,
Why Rush to Change the 25th?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1974, at 43 (calling for special
presidential election if Section 2 Vice President becomes President).
4. See, e.g., CONTINUTITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, PRESERVING OUR INSTITUTIONS: THE
CONTINUITY
OF
THE
PRESIDENCY
39–43
(2009),
available
at
http://www.continuityofgovernment.org/SecondReport.pdf; Goldstein, supra note 1, at 71–
83.
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provisions to the Constitution to govern presidential succession and
inability and vice presidential vacancy. It constructively addressed the two
most pressing problems regarding presidential continuity in a manner that
made prudent accommodations between different principles. Although its
initial applications during its first forty-three years have been limited, it has
worked quite well in diverse contexts, and there is no reason it should not
do so in the future.
Yet the alarmists are also right. Reason for concern remains. Existing
arrangements to ensure presidential continuity are inadequate to address a
number of foreseeable contingencies. The remaining shortcomings do not
represent failings of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Even if its ambition
had been to solve every continuity problem, such an outcome was well
beyond the reach of any single measure. That it did not eliminate every gap
does not diminish the substantial contributions it made.
Nonetheless, gaps remain, some of which create an unacceptable risk that
the United States will find itself without a functioning Chief Executive
whose exercise of presidential powers and duties is seen as legitimate.
These defects include those relating to the line of succession after the Vice
President. They require attention. Soon.
Yet reform in this area comes slowly (or not at all) and with great
difficulty. Invariably, interest in the topic peaks when a crisis occurs “but
subsides once the emergency has passed.”5 Decision makers tend to be
preoccupied by more immediate concerns, an understandable orientation
which relegates continuity problems, contingent by nature, to future
agendas. When decision makers do consider these issues, familiar obstacles
often stymie reform. Some problems seem intractable. Some preferred
remedies offend interested parties. The range of proposals makes
consensus elusive. The political payoff is small,6 and accordingly, public
officials lack the requisite incentive to invest the necessary resources to
convert ideas into law.
Recent events confirm this sorry pattern. The attacks of 9/11 could have
presented the greatest threat to governmental continuity in American
history. Surely that assault should have prompted policy makers to act to
reinforce vulnerable parts of our system. Although the Continuity of
Government Commission produced insightful studies7 and a few disparate

5. Presidential Inability: Hearings on H.R. 836 et al. Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 89th Cong. 1 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 House Hearings] (statement of Rep.
Emanuel Celler).
6. Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President: Hearings on
S.J. Res. 13 et al. Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 149–50 (1964) [hereinafter 1964 Senate Hearings] (statement of
John D. Feerick, scholar on presidential succession) (“Inability and succession are not
election issues. Few votes will turn on whether or not this committee or the Congress does
anything about these issues.”).
7. See CONTINUTITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, PRESERVING OUR INSTITUTIONS: THE
CONTINUTITY
OF
CONGRESS
(2003),
available
at
http://www.continuityofgovernment.org/report/FirstReport.pdf; CONTINUTITY OF GOV’T
COMM’N, supra note 4.
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hearings were held, more than nine years have passed yet public officials
have taken no action to close easily observable gaps in our system for
assuring presidential continuity.
This combination, of known persistent continuity gaps without a
corresponding impulse to reform, makes this an auspicious occasion to
reexamine the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. It remains the most successful
effort to address those continuity problems inherent in the original
Constitution or which subsequently developed.
Lessons from that
experience may help reformers act to resolve at least some of the remaining
shortcomings. In addition to its provisions, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
represents certain implicit constitutional values that should guide responses
to remaining problems. Moreover, it was the product of successful
legislative strategies in an area that generally resists such measures.
Although all of these principles and lessons do not point in the same
direction and some have limited application to the remaining issues, others
should inform efforts to close existing gaps in the system to ensure
presidential continuity.
Part I of this Article briefly outlines the context in which the TwentyFifth Amendment was proposed and ratified, describes the contributions it
has made, and argues that it has worked well. Part II identifies
constitutional and legislative principles associated with it. Part III sketches
the modern context. Part IV assesses the current line of successors after the
Vice President, identifies problems with it, and suggests how some of the
principles relating to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment might help remedy
some of the remaining problems.
I. TO THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT AND WHAT IT BROUGHT
In 1965 Congress proposed, and in 1967 the states ratified, the TwentyFifth Amendment, thereby addressing the two most conspicuous and
significant dilemmas relating to presidential continuity as they existed in
the mid-1960s. These problems were the absence of constitutional clarity
regarding, or procedures to handle, presidential inability, and the possibility
that someone other than a Vice President might become President.
A. The Context of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
The constitutional gaps just mentioned had existed since the earliest days
of the Republic.8 Five developments during the middle of the twentieth
century created the political context that contributed to the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment.
First, in 1947, Congress changed the line of succession following the
Vice President to begin with the Speaker of the House of Representatives
and then the President pro tempore of the Senate before continuing through

8. See generally JOHN D. FEERICK, FROM FAILING HANDS: THE STORY OF PRESIDENTIAL
SUCCESSION (1965).
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the Cabinet.9 When Harry S. Truman succeeded to the Presidency in April
1945, upon the death of Franklin D. Roosevelt, Secretary of State Edward
R. Stettinius, Jr. stood a heartbeat away from the Presidency. Inasmuch as
Stettinius was a businessman, federal bureaucrat, and diplomat but lacked
any political experience, Truman named former U.S. Supreme Court Justice
James F. Byrnes, who was thought to be a presidential figure, to replace
him,10 and Congress, at Truman’s suggestion, placed the Speaker atop the
line of succession. Truman did not believe he should have power to appoint
his successor and argued that the Speaker had an electoral pedigree
surpassed only by those of the President and Vice President.11
Second, the advent of the nuclear age and of the Cold War added
importance to the Presidency and accordingly lent urgency to the subject of
presidential succession and inability. Those threatening conditions made
more perilous the prospect of a hiatus in executive power or the presence of
a Chief Executive not equipped to exercise it. In an earlier age of “carrier
pigeons” when the Army depended on “horse-drawn caissons,” presidential
continuity had lacked such urgency, Senator Birch Bayh, the principal
author of the Amendment, suggested.12 But by 1965, “with the awesome
power at our disposal,” when armies could be moved “half way around the
world in a matter of hours” and civilization could be destroyed in a matter
of minutes, it was “high time” to heed history to “make absolutely certain”
that there would always be a functioning President.13
Third, President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s three illnesses, especially his
heart attack in 1955 and his stroke in 1957, focused the attention of policy
makers and the public on the problem of presidential inability.14 Defects in
the existing legal regime were readily apparent. It provided no procedures
for determining the existence or duration of a presidential disability nor did
it make clear whether the President could subsequently resume the exercise
of presidential powers and duties. Committees in each house began looking
at the topic in the mid-1950s,15 as did the executive branch.16 Attorneys
General Herbert Brownell and William P. Rogers presented administration
proposals for constitutional amendments in 1957 and 1958, respectively.17
Eisenhower and Vice President Richard M. Nixon entered into a letter
agreement that provided for Eisenhower or Nixon to initiate a transfer to
Nixon of presidential powers on a temporary basis with Eisenhower
9. See Presidential Succession Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-199, 61 Stat. 380 (codified
as amended at 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006)).
10. DAVID MCCULLOUGH, TRUMAN 368 (1992).
11. Special Message to the Congress on the Succession to the Presidency, PUB. PAPERS
128, 129 (June 19, 1945).
12. 111 CONG. REC. 15,595 (1965) (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh).
13. Id.
14. See FEERICK, supra note 8, at 211–29; see also HERBERT BROWNELL WITH JOHN P.
BURKE, ADVISING IKE: THE MEMOIRS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL HERBERT BROWNELL 273–78
(1993); RICHARD M. NIXON, SIX CRISES 131–81 (1962).
15. FEERICK, supra note 8, at 238–42.
16. BROWNELL, supra note 14, at 277–78; FEERICK, supra note 8, at 227–29.
17. FEERICK, supra note 8, at 239–41; John D. Feerick, The Problem of Presidential
Inability—Will Congress Ever Solve It?, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 113–15 (1963).
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retaining the right to resume those powers on his simple declaration that he
was ready to do so.18 John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson, Johnson
and Speaker of the House of Representatives John McCormack, and
Johnson and Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey later entered into the
same agreement.19
Fourth, the Nixon and Johnson Vice Presidencies contributed to a
perception that the Vice Presidency had assumed new importance. The
office was attracting more able public figures who were being given roles
within the executive branch and were becoming more visible.20
Finally, the Kennedy assassination generated new interest in the topic. It
suggested that even the presence of a young and ostensibly healthy
President21 did not immunize America from continuity issues. Johnson’s
history of a serious heart attack made his health seem precarious. The
vision of McCormack and Senate President pro tempore Carl Hayden
behind him when he addressed Congress did not inspire confidence.
Neither had ever been considered presidential timber nor did they project
any sense of vigor as they slumped in their chairs.22
The time was ripe for reform. Inadequacies in existing arrangements
stood revealed. The risks of inaction were apparent, based in part on a
recognition that the world had changed and that America could not assume
that it would inevitably escape continuity problems as it had in the past. As
President Johnson put it,
Our escape has been more the result of Providence than of any prudence
on our part. For it is not necessary to conjure the nightmare of nuclear

18. Agreement Between the President and the Vice President as to Procedures in the
Event of Presidential Disability, PUB. PAPERS 196 (Mar. 3, 1958).
19. Statement of Procedures for Use in the Event of Presidential Inability, 2 PUB. PAPERS
1044 (Oct. 5, 1965); The President’s News Conference of December 18, 1963, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 65–66 (Dec. 18, 1963) (reporting that Johnson and McCormack had made the same
disability agreement as Kennedy and Johnson); White House Statement and Text of
Agreement Between the President and the Vice President on Procedures in the Event of
Presidential Inability, PUB. PAPERS 561 (Aug. 10, 1961) (describing the agreement between
Kennedy and Johnson); Charles Mohr, Johnson Reaches Disability Accord, N.Y. TIMES, Jan.
28, 1965, at 13 (reporting that Johnson and Humphrey had adopted the Eisenhower-Nixon
agreement).
20. See JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN, THE MODERN AMERICAN VICE PRESIDENCY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF A POLITICAL INSTITUTION 151–54, 190–93 (1982).
21. See generally ROBERT DALLEK, AN UNFINISHED LIFE: JOHN F. KENNEDY 1917–1963,
at 397–99, 471–73 (2003) (discussing Kennedy’s health problems as President); ROSE
MCDERMOTT, PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP, ILLNESS, AND DECISIONMAKING 118–56 (2008)
(documenting Kennedy’s precarious health).
22. Cf.; Arthur Krock, In the Nation: The Cart Is Getting Ahead of the Horse, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 1963, at 38 (noting preoccupation with succession, rather than inability,
owing to the “advanced ages” of McCormack and Hayden); Arthur Krock, Succession
Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1963, at E9 (noting Johnson’s precarious health and the age of
McCormack and Hayden); James Reston, Washington: The Problem of Succession to the
Presidency, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 1963, at 34 (stating McCormack unqualified to be
President); Editorial, The Succession, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 10, 1963, at 20 (noting questions
regarding McCormack and Hayden); Two Old Timers Next in Line for Presidency of U.S.,
CHI. TRIB., Dec. 1, 1963, at 30 (discussing the fact that McCormack and Hayden were well
beyond the age of Presidents).
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holocaust or other national catastrophe to identify these omissions as
chasms of chaos into which normal human frailties might plunge us at any
time.23

B. Presidential Inability
The Constitution, as originally ratified was ambiguous regarding
presidential inability, and subsequent developments compounded that
uncertainty. The Constitution simply provided that “[i]n Case of the
Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or
Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same
shall devolve on the Vice President.”24 The text did not make clear whether
“the same” referred to the presidential powers and duties or the office itself.
After William Henry Harrison became the first President to die in office in
1841, Vice President John Tyler claimed that he was President, not simply
the Vice President acting as President.25 Although Tyler’s claim probably
contradicted the Framers’ intent, later Vice Presidents who found
themselves in that situation embraced his position and ultimately the Tyler
Precedent became accepted as constitutional reality. Whether the successor
became President or acting President made no formal difference if the
vacancy was permanent (i.e. death, resignation, or removal) but that
distinction had significant impact in the case of presidential inability, the
one event in which the President’s departure could be temporary. If the
presidential office devolved on the Vice President in case of the President’s
“[i]nability to discharge the Powers and Duties of [his] Office,”26 that
transfer would displace the President. The Constitution provided for one
President at a time and offered no way for an ousted President to return to
office other than through the electoral system. If, however, only the
presidential powers and duties devolved on the Vice President, the office
remained with the President, and he could presumably reclaim its powers
and duties.
The constitutional ambiguity, compounded by the Tyler Precedent,
complicated matters when presidential disabilities arose, primarily during
the Garfield,27 Wilson,28 and Eisenhower29 administrations. Presidents and
those around them were often not anxious to consider transferring power to
the Vice President in part for fear that so doing might permanently displace

23. Special Message to the Congress on Presidential Disability and Related Matters, 1
PUB. PAPERS 100, 101 (Jan. 28, 1965); see also 111 CONG. REC. 7937 (1965) (statement of
Rep. Emanuel Celler) (“Fate has been most kind to Americans, but we should not continue
to tempt it.”); id. at 7945 (statement of Rep. Robert Stafford) (“We have trifled with fate too
long.”); id. at 7952 (statement of Rep. Harold Donohue) (“It may well be considered among
our greatest blessings that, as yet, no confounding catastrophe has erupted out of vacancies
in the vice-presidency or presidential incapacity.”).
24. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
25. FEERICK, supra note 8, at 92–94.
26. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
27. See FEERICK, supra note 8, at 118–39.
28. See id. at 162–80.
29. See id. at 211–29.
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the Chief Executive. Vice Presidents were reluctant to act.30 Vice
President Chester A. Arthur took no action during the eighty days during
which President James A. Garfield lay in a coma between the assassination
attempt and his death in 1881.31 Garfield and Arthur were from rival
factions of the Republican party, and their political enmity further
complicated the situation.32 Vice President Thomas Marshall did not
discharge presidential powers during the seven months when a stroke
largely incapacitated Woodrow Wilson.33 Wilson and Marshall were both
progressive Democrats, but Marshall, like virtually all other Vice Presidents
of his era, had relatively little involvement in the executive branch. Vice
President Richard M. Nixon participated more fully in the Eisenhower
Administration but presidential power remained with Eisenhower during his
1955 heart attack, his 1956 surgery under anesthesia following an ileitis
attack, and his 1957 stroke and period of convalescence.34
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment addressed presidential inability indirectly
in Section 1 and directly in Sections 3 and 4. Section 135 simply performed
constitutional housekeeping. It imported into the text of the Constitution
the Tyler Precedent with respect to the three situations in which an event
ended the president’s claim to the office—death, resignation, and
removal—thereby separating those events from that of inability. Section
336 provided a means whereby the President could voluntarily transfer
powers and duties to the Vice President, subject to the right to reclaim
them. Section 437 provided a mechanism whereby the Vice President and
30. The structure of political institutions gave further reason for inaction. For much of
American history, Vice Presidents often came from rival wings of the President’s political
party. Until 1940, the presidential nominee had little input in the choice of his running mate.
Finally, Vice Presidents functioned primarily in the legislative branch as President of the
Senate and had relatively little involvement in the business of the executive branch.
31. See FEERICK, supra note 8, at 125.
32. See id. at 120–21.
33. See id. at 166–79 (summarizing the period between Wilson’s stroke on September
25, 1919 and the first Cabinet meeting on April 13, 1920).
34. See id. at 217–20; NIXON, supra note 14, at 144–49, 167–68, 174–75.
35. Section 1 provides: “In case of the removal of the President from office or of his
death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.” U.S. CONST. amend. XXV,
§ 1.
36. Section 3 provides:
Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and
the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to
them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be
discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.
id. amend. XXV, § 3.
37. Section 4 provides:
Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the
executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide,
transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately
assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that
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the principal officers of the executive branch or such replacement body as
Congress might create could remove presidential powers and duties from
the Chief Executive. The President could reclaim those powers and duties
but, if the moving parties contested his or her fitness, Congress would
decide the issue.
C. Vice Presidential Vacancy
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment also addressed the problem of vice
presidential vacancy, a contingency which had occurred sixteen times
before 1967, eight times following presidential deaths (and vice presidential
successions),38 seven times following vice presidential deaths,39 and once
following a vice presidential resignation.40 The Constitution provided no
means to fill a vice presidential vacancy prior to the next quadrennial
election. Instead, it covered the Vice President’s constitutionally prescribed
functions by empowering the Senate to choose a President pro tempore in
his absence41 and authorizing Congress to identify an officer to act as
President in case of a double vacancy.42 The absence of a procedure to fill
a vice presidential vacancy had two related consequences—the Vice
no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the
Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive
department or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within
four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House
of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide
the issue, assembling within forty eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If
the Congress, within twenty one days after receipt of the latter written declaration,
or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty one days after Congress is required
to assemble, determines by two thirds vote of both Houses that the President is
unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall
continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall
resume the powers and duties of his office.
id. amend. XXV, § 4.
38. The Presidents who died in office, the Vice Presidents who succeeded them, and the
dates of the Presidents’ deaths are as follows: William Henry Harrison (John Tyler, April 4,
1841), Zachary Taylor (Millard Fillmore, July 9, 1850), Abraham Lincoln (Andrew Johnson,
April 15, 1865), James A. Garfield (Chester A. Arthur, September 19, 1881), William
McKinley (Theodore Roosevelt, September 14, 1901), Warren G. Harding (Calvin Coolidge,
August 2, 1923), Franklin D. Roosevelt (Harry S. Truman, April 12, 1945), and John F.
Kennedy (Lyndon B. Johnson, November 22, 1963). See FEERICK, supra note 8, at 315.
39. Vice Presidents George Clinton (April 20, 1812), Elbridge Gerry (November 23,
1814), William Rufus King (April 18, 1853), Henry Wilson (November 22, 1875), Thomas
A. Hendricks (November 25, 1885), Garret A. Hobart (November 21, 1899), and James S.
Sherman (October 30, 1912) died in office. See FEERICK, supra note 8, at 316.
40. John C. Calhoun resigned in the last few months of his term (December 28, 1832) to
accept election as senator from South Carolina. See JOHN NIVEN, JOHN C. CALHOUN AND THE
PRICE OF UNION: A BIOGRAPHY 192–93 (1988).
41. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 5 (“The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a
President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the
Office of President of the United States.”).
42. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (“[T]he Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal,
Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what
Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability
be removed, or a President shall be elected.”).
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Presidency would remain unoccupied until the end of the term, and during
that time some other government figure would be next in line to the
Presidency. Congress had passed three succession laws adopting different
strategies—in 1792, placing the President pro tempore and Speaker of the
House of Representatives in line with provision for a special election of a
President;43 in 1886, placing the Cabinet members beginning with the
Secretary of State in line;44 and in 1947, placing the Speaker, then the
President pro tempore, then the Cabinet.45 Following the Kennedy
assassination, the enhanced significance of the Vice Presidency, coupled
with the concerns regarding alternative lines of succession, created interest
for the first time in providing a means to fill vice presidential vacancies.
Section 246 provided a procedure to fill a vice presidential vacancy
whereby the President would nominate a Vice President subject to
confirmation by both houses of Congress. As is suggested below, the
provision reflected a new vision of the Vice Presidency which saw that
office as an important advisor and assistant to the President. It also flowed
from an appreciation of the virtues of the Vice Presidency as the first
successor and the relative disadvantages of alternative successors.
D. First Implementations
Developments since 1967 have tested the provisions of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment. Events to date do not cover the landscape of possibilities, and
the response, in some instances, was not optimal. Nonetheless, the first
implementations of several provisions of the Amendment provide evidence
that it works well and encourage confidence in its further application.
1. Presidential Succession
Not too much should be made of the successful application of Section 1,
which governed the succession of Gerald R. Ford to the Presidency upon
Nixon’s resignation on August 9, 1974. Section 1, after all, simply
confirmed that the Tyler Precedent applied to death, resignation, and
removal of the President. Ford succeeded to the Presidency as had eight
Vice Presidents before him, although this time following resignation, not
death, of his predecessor, and at the end, not near the beginning, of a
national trauma.

43. See Act of Mar. 1, 1792, ch. 8, §§ 9, 10, 1 Stat. 239, 240–41 (repealed 1886)
(relating to “the Election of a President and Vice President of the United States, and
declaring the Officer who shall act as President in case of Vacancies in the offices both of
President and Vice President”).
44. See Act of Jan. 19, 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1 (repealed 1947).
45. See Presidential Succession Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-199, 61 Stat. 380 (codified
as amended at 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006)).
46. Section 2 provides: “Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice
President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon
confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.” U.S. CONST. amend. XXV,
§ 2.
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2. Filling Vice Presidential Vacancy
Section 2, however, did work quite well in 1973 and 1974 when Ford,
and then Nelson A. Rockefeller, were nominated and confirmed as Vice
President. The first implementation of the Amendment was occasioned by
unforeseen circumstances; a President under cloud of criminal behavior
nominated a potential Vice President to fill a vacancy created by the
resignation of a Vice President charged with criminal behavior. The
vacancy was created by the resignation of Vice President Spiro T. Agnew
as part of a plea agreement to avoid prosecution for bribery,47 only the
second time a Vice President had resigned and the first in circumstances
that suggested unfitness to hold office. Nixon, who was subject to
impeachment proceedings for obstruction of justice in connection with the
Watergate offenses, nominated Agnew’s successor. In the heightened
ethical environment following Watergate and Agnew’s resignation due to
alleged criminal improprieties, an intense investigation of Ford was to be
expected. Some 350 FBI agents spent three weeks investigating Ford and
produced 1700 pages of new data; some fifty agents from the Internal
Revenue Service, General Accounting Office, and the Senate Rules
Committee staff also participated.48
Although the bizarre scenario that led to the vacancy was not anticipated,
those who wrote the Twenty-Fifth Amendment had foreseen the possibility
of a second complicating factor—a Congress controlled by the President’s
opposing party.49 When Nixon nominated Ford in October 1973 and when
Ford nominated Nelson A. Rockefeller ten months later, the Democratic
party held majorities in both the House of Representatives and Senate.50
Divided control had two implications for the proceedings. The Democratic
Speaker of the House stood next in line so that Nixon’s removal would
change party control of the White House. Moreover, the Democrats would
run the confirmation process in both houses and could defeat the
nomination.
The first implementations of Section 2 ran remarkably well and made a
historic contribution to the American constitutional system. Circumstances
did not allow Nixon to select his first choice, former Texas Governor and
Secretary of the Treasury John B. Connally. Members of both parties
opposed his selection. Other high risk potential nominees—Governors
Ronald Reagan and Nelson Rockefeller—also provoked opposition in both

47. See generally RICHARD M. COHEN & JULES WITCOVER, A HEARTBEAT AWAY: THE
INVESTIGATION AND RESIGNATION OF VICE PRESIDENT SPIRO T. AGNEW 341–53 (1974).
48. JOHN D. FEERICK, THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT: ITS COMPLETE HISTORY AND
EARLIEST APPLICATIONS 135–36 (2d ed. 1992); Marjorie Hunter, Senate Committee to Begin
Hearings Today on Ford Nomination as Vice President, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 1973, at 32.
49. See, e.g., 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 48 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh).
50. See Party Division in the Senate, 1789–Present, U.S. SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited
Oct. 15, 2010); Party Divisions of the House of Representatives (1789 to Present), OFFICE OF
CLERK
OF
THE
U.S.
HOUSE
OF
REPRESENTATIVES,
THE
http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/house_history/partyDiv.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2010).
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parties.51 But the idea that the Democrats could impose a mere caretaker,
although suggested by some,52 was quickly rejected by Senator Birch Bayh,
the principal author of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, as inconsistent with
its intent.53 Ultimately, Nixon nominated House Minority Leader Gerald R.
Ford, who commanded broad support on both sides of the aisle.54 Ford had
never been a presidential prospect but he had been considered as a possible
vice presidential candidate and had served as the House leader for eight
years.
Ford’s confirmation in less than two months was impressive especially
when the surrounding circumstances are considered. Since it constituted
the first application of Section 2, government officials involved had no
precedents from which to draw. Neither the Senate Rules Committee nor
the House Judiciary Committee had ever before held hearings on a
nominee. The opposition party had large majorities in both the House and
Senate. Nixon, the President who nominated Ford, was facing a likely
impeachment inquiry. That proceeding became inevitable after Nixon
ordered the firing of Archibald Cox, the independent counsel investigating
high officials in the Nixon Administration, only eight days after Ford’s
nomination, in the “Saturday Night Massacre.”55 That dramatic and
shocking episode worsened the temper of American politics, further
undermined Nixon’s legitimacy, and presented another obstacle for Ford’s
confirmation.56 The “national turmoil” that ensued pushed Nixon’s
approval rating below thirty percent,57 a precipitous decline for a President
re-elected in a forty-nine state landslide less than one year earlier.
Moreover, circumstances mandated a full inquiry. Ironically, Ford’s
popularity in Congress, especially in the House, provided reason to proceed
deliberately. Speaker Carl Albert worried that too speedy a confirmation
might appear to reflect cronyism that would undermine Ford’s legitimacy
and that of the Section 2 process.58 The Agnew debacle made even more
51. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 131; Congress to Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 1973, at 1
(quoting Democratic leaders predicting opposition to certain high profile choices).
52. See John Herbers, All Rumors, and None of Them Are Very Good, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
23, 1973, at E1 (reporting Democratic sentiment against nomination of presidential
possibility).
53. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 131 (quoting Sen. Bayh).
54. See generally JAMES CANNON, TIME AND CHANCE: GERALD R. FORD’S APPOINTMENT
WITH HISTORY (1994); RICHARD NIXON, RN: THE MEMOIRS OF RICHARD NIXON 925–27
(1978) (stating that Ford was the first choice of Congressmen); BARRY WERTH, 31 DAYS:
THE CRISIS THAT GAVE US THE GOVERNMENT WE HAVE TODAY 37 (2006) (stating that Nixon
felt precluded from selecting his preference, Connally, due to Watergate and bipartisan
political opposition).
55. See FEERICK, supra note 48, at 136.
56. Douglas E. Kneeland, Bork Takes Over, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 1973, at 1; Warren
Weaver, Jr., Court Rebuffed, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 1973, at 1, 16 (reporting possible
problems for Ford’s confirmation from Nixon’s conduct).
57. Nixon Plan on Prosecutor is Opposed by Mansfield, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1973, at 1.
58. Marjorie Hunter, A Congress Delay on Ford Expected, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1973, at
27 (stating Congressmen from both parties believe a quick confirmation would be a
mistake); Marjorie Hunter, Ford and Albert Deal with Deep Problems, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,
1973, at 12.
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necessary a careful examination of Ford’s record insofar as it reflected on
his character.59 Ford was widely perceived not simply as a Vice President
but as a likely President given Nixon’s increasingly perilous political
situation.60 Bayh recognized that the Ford confirmation process would
establish a precedent and accordingly urged against a perfunctory
consideration.61 Nixon’s nomination of Ford was viewed positively by
47% and negatively by 34%; by contrast, in late October 1973, Nixon’s
handling of the Presidency was viewed negatively 64% to 32%.62
Ultimately, Ford was approved, 92 to 3, in the Senate and 387 to 35 in the
House.63 Although all who voted against the nomination were Democrats,
the overwhelming number of Democrats supported Ford’s confirmation.64
The existence of Section 2 played a critical role in extricating America
from the unique circumstance created by the concurrent criminal and
constitutional proceedings against Agnew and Nixon. The presence of a
procedure to install a new Republican Vice President, and accordingly a
Republican successor to Nixon, minimized the role of partisan
considerations. The Nixon Justice Department could work to remove
Agnew without fear of placing, for a prolonged period of time, the
Democratic Speaker of the House, Carl Albert, next in line behind a
President who was facing an increasingly serious impeachment proceeding.
Those proceedings against Nixon could go forward without fear that his
removal would shift party control. Republican leaders could ultimately
encourage Nixon to resign, a move that did not jeopardize their party’s
control of the White House for the remainder of the term but strengthened
its chances to retain it.
The Rockefeller confirmation took four months from nomination to
confirmation, more than twice the length of Ford’s. Ford consulted widely
and vetted a number of candidates for more than ten days before
determining that Rockefeller was his first choice.65 A desire of some
congressional Democrats to sideline Rockefeller from participating in the
1974 midterm elections may have played some part in the delay,66 but
other, legitimate and nonpartisan factors also contributed and were the

59. Editorial, Action on Mr. Ford, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1973, at 32.
60. Approval on Floor is Expected, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1973, at 1; Editorial, A Future
President?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1973, at 30; Ford Tells Rumor of Oil Release, CHI. TRIB.,
Nov. 17, 1973, at S4 (quoting Congressman that Ford would be President within a year);
Michael J. Harrington, Opposes Ford for V.P., CHI. TRIB., Nov. 17, 1973, at S12; Marjorie
Hunter, 1 Man Being Interviewed for 2 Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 1973, at E2; Marjorie
Hunter, Senate Unit Backs Ford, 9 to 0; McGovern Predicts Nixon Ouster in Year, CHI.
TRIB., Nov. 12, 1973, at 13; see FEERICK, supra note 48, at 142 (quoting predictions Ford
would be President).
61. Richard L. Madden, Choice is Praised by Both Parties, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 1973,
at 1.
62. Louis Harris, Nixon’s Rating Still at Bottom, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 12, 1973, at 26.
63. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 141, 149–50.
64. Id. at 129–52.
65. WERTH, supra note 54, at 61–63, 93–95, 100–03, 107–09, 114–16, 119, 138–40.
66. See GERALD R. FORD, A TIME TO HEAL 224 (1979) (blaming the delay on partisan
politics).

2010] LESSONS IN ENSURING PRESIDENTIAL CONTINUITY

115

major reason the Rockefeller proceedings were so much more protracted.
The enormous Rockefeller family wealth introduced new issues, raised
questions regarding conflicts of interest, and required additional research.67
During the course of hearings, a number of disclosures required further
investigation and additional hearings. For instance, Rockefeller had made
substantial cash gifts to various state and national officials including
members of Congress.68 He had also denied involvement with financing a
book disparaging a serious opponent in the 1970 gubernatorial campaign; in
fact, Rockefeller’s brother had largely financed the effort and Rockefeller
had been advised of the project.69 An IRS audit found Rockefeller owed
more than $900,000 in additional taxes.70 The complexity of Rockefeller’s
record juxtaposed with the heightened focus on public ethics in the
Watergate era made it predictable that Congress would move deliberately.
Rockefeller’s nomination required seventeen days of public hearings. John
D. Feerick later observed that “serious questions” imposed a need for
further investigation and examination as a predicate for public confidence in
Rockefeller’s public support declined during the
the process.71
proceedings,72 and some original supporters, like Senator Barry M.
Goldwater, were publicly acknowledging second thoughts by late
October.73
The normal congressional interlude incident to the midterm campaigns
also delayed consideration. Congress was in recess for the elections from
mid-October to mid-November. In mid-November, the Senate Rules
Committee reconvened to question Rockefeller regarding some newly
released information including his gifts and loans to public officials and his
involvement with the Goldberg book; House hearings began in late
November and concluded after the Thanksgiving recess.74 Some suggested
that Rockefeller’s confirmation should be deferred until the new Congress
met in January, 1975, but Albert rejected that request.75 Ultimately,
Rockefeller was confirmed 90 to 7 in the Senate,76 and 287 to 128 in the
67. James Cannon, Gerald R. Ford and Nelson A. Rockefeller: A Vice Presidential
Memoir, in AT THE PRESIDENT’S SIDE: THE VICE PRESIDENCY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
135, 139 (Timothy Walch ed., 1997).
68. See FEERICK, supra note 48, at 169–70.
69. See id. at 172–73.
70. See id. at 174–75.
71. 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 3, at 146 (statement of John D. Feerick, scholar on
presidential succession); see also Editorial, Rockefeller Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1974,
at 18E (arguing that “lengthy” proceedings were justified if they produced a “higher standard
of ethical conduct” for public officials). See generally FEERICK, supra note 48, at 166–84
(describing the Rockefeller confirmation process).
72. See Rockefeller Support Fell in September, Poll Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1974,
at 21.
73. Linda Charlton, Goldwater Now Undecided on Rockefeller Nomination, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 25, 1974, at 1.
74. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 176–82.
75. See Linda Charlton, Rockefeller Vote Faces Delay Plea, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 1974,
at 27.
76. Three conservative Republicans—Senators Barry M. Goldwater (Arizona), Jesse
Helms (North Carolina), and William Scott (Virginia)—and four liberal Democrats—James
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House.77 A coalition of conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats
opposed Rockefeller.78 House Democrats voted to confirm Rockefeller 134
to 99; House Republicans did so, 153 to 29.79 Rockefeller praised Congress
for its “thoroughness” in acting as a surrogate for the American people,
which he said spoke to the Constitution’s “enduring strength and vitality.”80
Republican Minority Leader Senator Hugh Scott commended the operation
of the Amendment.81
The success of the Ford and Rockefeller experiences, of course, carries
no guarantee that Section 2 will always work well. Shortcomings could
occur in two opposite directions. Congress, particularly if controlled by the
opposite party from the President, could use the Section 2 process to score
political points rather than act expeditiously to fill the vacancy as intended.
In the Senate, the filibuster would allow this sort of partisan abuse even by
a substantial group from the minority party. And members of the
president’s own party might act to prevent the promotion to Vice President
of a rival within their own party. Although confirmation in a highly visible
process would seem likely to encourage the nomination of highly
credentialed and respected figures, it is possible to imagine these sorts of
pressures inducing a President to bypass presidential figures.
Alternatively, Congress might be too deferential in reviewing a nominee.
This danger would seem most likely to occur if the vacancy arose from
some national trauma, such as the succession of a Vice President following
a presidential assassination. Inasmuch as Section 2 was conceived
following the assassination of President Kennedy, Congress had that
contingency very much in mind. The aftermath of tragedy might also lead a
new President to make an improvident selection, for instance by nominating
the spouse or family member of the deceased President.
The possibility of unhappy outcomes does not, however, distinguish
Section 2 from any other procedure that depends on human implementation.
Yet the track record from the Ford and Rockefeller confirmations provides
reason for optimism. In each case, a President nominated a well-respected
person who was among the leading political figures of his generation. In
each case, the nominee was confirmed with a minimum of partisan delay
even though the opposition party controlled both houses of Congress. That
one nominator was facing likely impeachment proceedings and the other
had himself achieved office through Section 2 did not preclude them from
having their nominees considered and confirmed. These successful
implementations should help establish norms to govern subsequent uses.

Abourezk (South Dakota), Birch Bayh (Indiana), Howard Metzenbaum (Ohio), and Gaylord
Nelson (Wisconsin)—voted against Rockefeller. Linda Charlton, Ford is Pleased, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 11, 1974, at 1.
77. Linda Charlton, Rockefeller Sworn in as Vice President After Confirmation by
House, 287 to 128, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1974, at 1.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Transcript of Senate Inaugural Ceremony, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 1974, at 16.
81. Id.
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In addition to functioning well, Section 2 greatly strengthened
arrangements to assure presidential continuity. By providing a mechanism
to fill a vice presidential vacancy, Section 2 diminished the significance of
the line of successors after the Vice President. During the 178 years before
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was ratified, the Vice Presidency was vacant,
and accordingly, a legislative leader or Cabinet officer stood first in line of
succession for thirty-seven of those years or twenty-one percent of the
time.82 During the forty-three years since it has been in effect, someone
other than the Vice President has been the first successor for only about one
percent of the time.83
Of course, all of that reduction cannot be traced to Section 2. Perhaps a
more accurate measure of the impact of Section 2 comes from looking
simply at the presidential term from January 20, 1973 to January 20, 1977
during which both implementations of Section 2 occurred. Without Section
2, the Vice Presidency would have been vacant for thirty-nine months
instead of six months, nearly an eighty-five percent reduction. That
presidential term was, of course, an anomaly since it was the only time
when two vacancies occurred in one term. Had Nixon completed his term,
the period of vice presidential vacancy would have shrunk from thirty-nine
months to two months, a ninety-five percent reduction.
Finally, a third measure of the anticipated impact of Section 2 might
involve applying an average expected vacancy period under Section 2
retrospectively across American history. If one assumes that filling a vice
presidential vacancy will normally require three months, the average of the
Ford and Rockefeller experiences, Section 2, had it been in place since 1789
would have allowed filling the Vice Presidency all but four years, instead of
nearly thirty-eight, a reduction of nearly ninety percent. Under any
measure, Section 2 greatly minimizes the defects of alternative lines of
succession by making much more remote the chance they will be used.
3. Presidential Inability
The history under the inability provisions, though not without some
controversy, also reflects successful resort to Section 3 and some positive
developments regarding it and Section 4. Presidential power has been
transferred on three occasions under Section 3 when Presidents underwent
medical procedures under anesthesia. President Reagan transferred power
to Vice President Bush for about eight hours on July 13, 1985 when he
underwent surgery to remove a cancerous polyp from his intestine.84
Reagan, Bush, and other top officials had discussed the possibility of a

82. See FEERICK, supra note 8, at 316.
83. During this forty-three year period, the Vice Presidency has been vacant for only six
months: almost two months during Ford’s confirmation as Vice President and just over four
months relating to Rockefeller’s nomination and confirmation. See FEERICK, supra note 48,
at 215, 255, App. D.II.
84. FEERICK, supra note 48, at xv–xvi.
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transfer during the week leading up to Reagan’s surgery.85 Reagan did not
wish to set a precedent that would bind his successors when they underwent
surgery under anesthesia.86 Although the letter Reagan signed obfuscated
what legal norm authorized the transfer, Section 3 provided the only basis
for action, he followed its procedures perfectly,87 and he and his close
associates later acknowledged it as the basis for his action.88 Reagan may
have reclaimed power too soon, and there has been some suggestion that he
may have approved important overtures incident to the Iran-Contra debacle
while in the hospital a few days after the surgery.89 Reagan certainly could,
and should have done a better job implementing Section 3, but he at least
deserves some credit for transferring presidential powers and duties.
President George W. Bush twice transferred power to Vice President Dick
Cheney under Section 3 during brief periods when he was undergoing or
recovering from minor surgery.90
On at least two other occasions, Presidents were prepared to delegate
their power under Section 3 incident to anticipated anesthesia. In May
1991, George H.W. Bush planned to transfer powers to Vice President Dan
Quayle when it appeared that he would have a procedure under anesthesia
to shock his heart back into its normal rhythm.91 Medicine brought Bush’s
heart back to its normal rhythm, thereby averting the transfer.92

85. MILLER CTR. COMM’N NO. 4, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PRESIDENTIAL
DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT 7–8 (1988), available at
http://web1.millercenter.org/commissions/comm_1988.pdf.
86. Letter to the President Pro Tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House on
the Discharge of the President’s Powers and Duties During His Surgery, 2 PUB. PAPERS 919–
20 (July 13, 1985).
87. FEERICK, supra note 48, at xvi; Joel K. Goldstein, First Test for the 25th
Amendment, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 21, 1985, at 3B.
88. See, e.g., RONALD REAGAN, AN AMERICAN LIFE: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY 500 (1990);
NANCY REAGAN WITH WILLIAM NOVAK, MY TURN: THE MEMOIRS OF NANCY REAGAN 274
(1989); see also FEERICK, supra note 48, at xvi–xvii.
89. See generally HERBERT L. ABRAMS, “THE PRESIDENT HAS BEEN SHOT”: CONFUSION,
DISABILITY, AND THE 25TH AMENDMENT IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE ATTEMPTED
ASSASSINATION OF RONALD REAGAN 209–14 (1992); MCDERMOTT, supra note 21, at 28.
90. Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Temporary Transfer of the Powers and
Duties of the President of the United States, 43 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1003–04 (July
21, 2007); Letter to Congressional Leaders on the Temporary Transfer of the Powers and
Duties of President of the United States, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1083 (June 29, 2002). Bush claimed
that he was the first President to transfer power for a routine colonoscopy and that he did so
“because we’re at war, and I just want to be super—you know, super cautious.” Exchange
with Reporters on Departure for Camp David, Maryland, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1080 (June 28,
2002).
91. Marlin Fitzwater, White House Press Sec’y, Statement on the Health of President
George
Bush
(May
5,
1991),
in
THE
AM.
PRESIDENCY
PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=19549&st=bush&st1= (“During the short
time that the President would be under anesthesia, the Vice President would be Acting
President under the 25th amendment.”); see also MARLIN FITZWATER, CALL THE BRIEFING!
286–90 (1995).
92. Marlin Fitzwater, White House Press Sec’y, Statement on the Health of President
George
Bush
(May
6,
1991),
in
THE
AM.
PRESIDENCY
PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=19550&st=&st1=.
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When President Clinton had knee surgery in March 1997, his doctors
avoided general anesthesia and administered an epidural that only affected
the lower part of his body.93 At that time, press secretary Mike McCurry
announced, “We have a procedure that is in place and a plan if anything
about the 25th Amendment is indicated.”94 McCurry said that Chief of
Staff Erskine Bowles had been in close contact with Vice President Gore’s
staff and that “it would be irresponsible for us not to at least anticipate that
situation. If that need arises, we can very quickly act—deal with the
situation, but that’s not anticipated at this time.”95 White House physician
Dr. E. Connie Mariano had recommended that Section 3 be invoked if a
general anesthesia was used.96
On at least two other occasions a President or those close to him have
contemplated the use of Section 3 or perhaps Section 4. When Reagan was
shot on March 30, 1981, two different groups of aides thought about
whether to invoke the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Reagan’s triumvirate,
consisting of chief of staff James Baker, counselor Edwin Meese, and
deputy chief of staff Mike Deaver, were with Reagan at the hospital and
decided not to transfer power.97 White House counsel Fred Fielding had
papers to effectuate a transfer related to the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
available in the White House Situation Room, where some of the central
Cabinet figures had gathered.98 Attorney General William French Smith, a
close friend of Reagan’s, and Fielding briefed those in the Situation Room
about the provision.99 Another aide, Richard Darman, confiscated the
papers from Fielding and reported that action to James Baker who approved
it.100 Ultimately, Baker, Meese, and Deaver decided against invoking the
Amendment, and no one else acted to force the issue.
The episode produced some troubling events regarding the disability
provisions of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Reagan was clearly unable to
discharge his powers and duties from the time he was wounded and rapidly
losing blood until sometime after he came out of recovery following
surgery under anesthesia. There was some reason to fear the Soviet Union
might try to exploit the situation to invade Poland.101 Moreover, the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment vests constitutional power in the Vice President
and principal heads of the executive departments, not in a triumvirate of
93. Mike McCurry, White House Press Sec’y, & David Wade, M.D., Press Briefing at
the National Naval Medical Center (Mar. 14, 1997), in THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=48584&st=surgery&st1=.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. E. Connie Mariano, In Sickness and in Health: Medical Care for the President of
the United States, in MANAGING CRISIS: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH
AMENDMENT 83, 93 (Robert E. Gilbert ed., 2000).
97. ABRAMS, supra note 89, at 180.
98. JAMES A. BAKER, III WITH STEVE FIFFER, WORK HARD, STUDY . . . AND KEEP OUT OF
POLITICS! ADVENTURES AND LESSONS FROM AN UNEXPECTED PUBLIC LIFE 146 (2006);
FEERICK, supra note 48, at xiii.
99. ABRAMS, supra note 89, at 180.
100. BAKER, supra note 98, at 146.
101. See ABRAMS, supra note 89, at 40–41, 100–02.
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White House aides accountable only to the President. The Twenty-Fifth
Amendment should have been invoked.
As a practical matter, three factors justify somewhat softening criticism
of the administration’s handling of the episode. First, Vice President Bush
was on Air Force Two en route from Texas to Washington, D.C. during
much of the time Reagan was unconscious.102 The communications with
his aircraft were apparently difficult and not secure. It is not at all clear that
transferring power to the Vice President while he was en route under those
circumstances would have enhanced national security. Shortly after Bush
arrived at the White House, Reagan emerged from surgery. The completion
of the surgery did not effectively end the period of time during which a
transfer of presidential powers might have been appropriate. Having
undergone the trauma of the shooting and surgery, experiencing the
disorientation associated with the accompanying regime of medicine, and
suffering subsequent infection and significant fever, Reagan’s capacity to
act as President was surely compromised for some period of time. He
remained in the hospital for twelve days and did not return to the Oval
Office for three and a half weeks.103 Once Reagan regained consciousness,
however, his close associates may have plausibly concluded that a
temporary transfer of powers could be accomplished when, and if, needed.
Second, the Reagan assassination attempt constituted the first occasion
when decision makers seriously contemplated invoking the disability
provisions due to presidential injury or sudden illness. There were no
precedents to guide them. The issue was unanticipated and it arose amidst a
host of other concerns, both personal and professional.
These circumstances interacted with a third complicating factor—the
assassination attempt occurred early in the administration before it was
prepared to respond. There were at least two problems. The administration
had not considered how to handle various contingencies relating to the
president’s health. White House counsel Fred Fielding was preparing, but
had not finished, a manual regarding the subject. When he briefed Cabinet
officers regarding the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in the Situation Room,
Fielding “could see eyes glazing over” among officials who were ignorant
of the Amendment.104
Moreover, the assassination attempt occurred before relationships had
solidified and before central figures had developed mutual credibility.
Divisions existed between longtime Reagan loyalists and those identified
with Vice President Bush and his close friend (but also Reagan’s surprise
choice as Chief of Staff) James Baker. Long-time Reagan supporters were
suspicious of Bush, Baker, and others who had not initially supported

102. See id. at 83–84; ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR., CAVEAT: REALISM, REAGAN AND
FOREIGN POLICY 151–52 (1984).
103. See generally ABRAMS, supra note 89, at 57–74 (summarizing Reagan’s schedule).
104. See MILLER CTR. COMM’N NO. 4, supra note 85, at App. C (quoting Fielding’s
testimony).
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Reagan.105 These figures, in turn, were anxious to demonstrate their
loyalty. Those on all sides acted more cautiously and more hesitantly than
they might have had the episode occurred later in Reagan’s Presidency.
High ranking presidential advisers briefly considered the disability
provisions of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in 1987 when Howard Baker
replaced Donald Regan as Reagan’s third Chief of Staff. Baker was
advised, based on interviews with White House aides, that consideration
should be given to whether Reagan was able to discharge the powers and
duties of his office.106 These aides claimed Reagan was inattentive and
disengaged and spent his time watching television and movies in the
residence rather than working in the Oval Office.107 Baker was dubious
about these reports; after meeting Reagan and seeing him in action, Baker
and his associates concluded that Reagan was able to act as President.108
Despite Reagan’s reluctance to establish a precedent, since 1985
administrations have followed a practice of transferring presidential powers
and duties to the Vice President whenever the President undergoes a
medical procedure under anesthesia. Two different administrations have
done so and two others were prepared to do so. This practice seems a
prudent safeguard of the nation’s security.109
The more difficult problems relate to situations in which Section 4 might
be considered. These fall into two general categories—situations in which
a President is unconscious due to a sudden injury or illness and situations in
which a President is or may be no longer physically or mentally able to
discharge presidential functions yet denies that incapacity.
The
unconscious President scenario presents a clear case in which to transfer
power. A Vice President is unlikely to take dramatic steps while acting as
President for a short time absent an emergency,110 yet it would seem more
prudent for presidential powers and duties to be transferred from a
comatose to a conscious figure. The common sense of this conclusion may
105. See BAKER, supra note 98, at 145–46; see also JULES WITCOVER, FROM ADAMS AND
JEFFERSON TO TRUMAN AND QUAYLE: CRAPSHOOT—ROLLING THE DICE ON THE VICE
PRESIDENCY: FROM ADAMS AND JEFFERSON TO TRUMAN AND QUAYLE 319–20 (1992).
106. JANE MAYER & DOYLE MCMANUS, LANDSLIDE: THE UNMAKING OF THE PRESIDENT,
1984–1988, at x (1988).
107. Id. at ix.
108. Id. at x–xi; Interview by Stephen Knott et al. with Howard Baker, former Reagan
Chief of Staff, in Wash., D.C., 3–4 (Aug. 24, 2004) (on file with the Miller Center of Public
Affairs, Ronald Reagan Oral History Project), available at http://web1.millercenter.org/
poh/transcripts/ohp_2004_0824_baker.pdf.
109. Quite clearly, some issues regarding presidential inability remain to be considered.
Could the provisions have been used, as some have suggested, for Presidents Richard M.
Nixon or William J. Clinton to have transferred powers during their impeachment
proceedings? Although the Amendment clearly was not designed as a political noconfidence remedy, presumably Section 3 could be used by a President who found that the
stress of defending against removal precluded him or her from discharging the executive
power, unlikely as that scenario is. For discussions of the range of possible applications, see
FEERICK, supra note 48, at 197–200; Goldstein, supra note 1, at 98–102.
110. See Joel K. Goldstein, The Vice Presidency and the Twenty-Fifth Amendment: The
Power of Reciprocal Relationships, in MANAGING CRISIS: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND
THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 96, at 165, 198–201.
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sometimes yield to other considerations. If the President could have, but
did not, transfer power under Section 3 before losing consciousness, the
Vice President and Cabinet may hesitate to invoke Section 4. If the loss of
consciousness is brief, the Cabinet may not have time to act. Having not
transferred power while the President was unconscious, it may be difficult
to do so once the President wakes up even though there may be a period
before the President can truly resume the powers and duties of the office.
The mishandling of disability issues incident to the Reagan assassination
attempt focused attention on some of those issues and some remedial
actions have been taken. Administrations now have contingency plans in
place and White House counsels, presidential physicians, and other
important personnel are schooled in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
President George H.W. Bush met with Vice President Dan Quayle and
other interested parties in April 1989, early in their term, to discuss the
matter and responses to possible disability scenarios.111 Their successors
have also taken positive steps.112 Each administration should adopt
appropriate contingency plans prior to inauguration and make sure central
figures are familiar with them. Moreover, Presidents need to make clear, to
the Vice President, Cabinet members, key White House aides, and their
families, their wish that powers and duties should be transferred to the Vice
President when the President is unable to exercise presidential powers and
duties.
The most difficult predicament, from a medical and political perspective,
arises when a President clings to power despite being disabled. No
procedure can guarantee results here.113 Alternative approaches carry their
own risks. For reasons discussed below, the architects of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment designed Sections 3 and 4 as they did, and they provide a
foundation to address this inherently complicated problem.
II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment offers more than the sum of its provisions.
In addition to the rules and procedures it provides, its design and history
should shape discussion of further reform in two distinct ways. First, a
number of constitutional principles animated, and are implicit in, its
provisions. As such, it introduces certain ideas into the structure of the
Constitution and reinforces (or mitigates) others. Moreover, the story of the
Amendment offers strategic and tactical lessons regarding how to achieve
meaningful reform regarding presidential continuity. Ratification of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment was not serendipitous. It was accomplished due
111. FITZWATER, supra note 91, at 286; DAN QUAYLE, STANDING FIRM: A VICEPRESIDENTIAL MEMOIR 251–52 (1994).
112. See, e.g., Mariano, supra note 96, at 92–93.
113. See ROBERT E. GILBERT, THE MORTAL PRESIDENCY: ILLNESS AND ANGUISH IN THE
WHITE HOUSE 277–78 (2d ed. 1998) (suggesting that the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is
unlikely to handle well many psychological illnesses); GEORGE E. REEDY, THE TWILIGHT OF
THE PRESIDENCY 160–70 (1970) (discussing the difficulty of handling a psychologically
disturbed President).
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to wise choices its architects made. Even though the modern context
introduces some novel considerations, the story of the Amendment offers
valuable lessons regarding achieving reform in a difficult area.
Accordingly, studying the principles and choices that provided the
foundation for the Twenty-Fifth Amendment serves a retrospective and a
prospective purpose. Looking backward, a review provides insight into the
ideas and objectives of the Amendment and the constraints and choices its
proponents made. Looking forward, such a study may help address
remaining problems, both by suggesting constitutional principles which
may inform the effort as well as presenting lessons regarding legislative
strategy which may enhance prospects of success for future reform efforts.
The retrospective survey confirms that the framers of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment struck prudent balances among basic, yet often competing,
principles and achieved success through skillful political behavior. The
prospective discussion suggests that some of these principles might prove
helpful in addressing remaining problems.
A. Constitutional Principles
1. Presidential Continuity
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment reflected the conviction that having a
functioning Chief Executive at all times is mandatory. That commitment
flowed from the Constitution’s vesting of the executive power in a
President of the United States114 and from historical change that had
increased the importance of that office in a nuclear age. “There can be no
doubt in anybody’s mind that this Nation cannot permit the Office of the
President to be vacant even for a moment,”115 said Representative Emanuel
Celler. Those who drafted the Twenty-Fifth Amendment urged that
resolution of issues relating to presidential inability was “imperative if
continuity of Executive power is to be preserved with a minimum of
turbulence at times when a President is disabled. Continuity of executive
authority is more important today than ever before” due to the increased
importance of the Presidency.116
114. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of
the United States of America.”).
115. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 2 (statement of Rep. Celler); see also id. at 3
(statement of Rep. William M. McCulloch) (referring to the constant need for “capable,
dynamic, and certain leadership” from the President); 111 CONG. REC. 7938 (1965)
(statement of Rep. Celler) (“We are thus assured of the continuity of Executive authority,
which is highly important, the continuity of Executive authority.”); id. at 7954 (statement of
Rep. Don Fuqua) (“More important than ever before is the continuity of the powers of the
Executive Office and it is imperative that this continuity be maintained with the least
possible disturbance at the time of a President’s disability.”).
116. H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 8 (1965); S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 8 (1965); S. REP. NO. 881382, at 6 (1964); see also 111 CONG. REC. 7942 (1965) (statement of Rep. William M.
McCulloch) (speaking of the increased importance of executive continuity); id. at 7956
(statement of Rep. William Randall) (discussing the importance of presidential continuity);
id. at 7957 (statement of Rep. Herbert Tenzer) (discussing importance of Presidency); id. at
3168 (statement of Sen. George Smathers); id. at 3264 (statement of Sen. Hugh Scott).

124

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

“Continuity of executive authority” was used in two different senses.
Most basically, it meant that there should always be someone authorized to
exercise presidential powers and duties and capable of doing so.117 In an
age in which “it is possible to destroy civilization as we know it in a manner
of minutes,” national security “demands a President who is always capable
The
of making rational decisions and rational determinations.”118
Amendment pursued this objective by establishing a means to transfer
power and duties from a disabled President to a Vice President and by
providing a mechanism to fill the Vice Presidency whenever it fell vacant.
Although Sections 3 and 4 reflected a bias in favor of a President’s
entitlement to the office to which she was elected, the belief in the
importance of presidential continuity was sufficiently strong that Section 4
allowed the Vice President to continue to act as President during the period
in which the Vice President and Cabinet decided to challenge her
declaration of fitness and during the period in which Congress had to
referee a dispute.119
Yet the framers of the Amendment were not indifferent regarding who
the presidential pinch hitter should be. They associated “continuity of
executive authority” with certain qualities they identified with the Vice
President. Accordingly, they concluded it was essential to have a Vice
President “at all times.”120 Section 2 would “assure that the person
nominated was a member of the President’s own party, of compatible
temperament and views, and someone with whom [the President] could
work effectively.”121
a. A Prepared Successor
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment identified the Vice President as the
optimal first successor for three interrelated reasons. It saw the Vice
117. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 40 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (emphasizing the
importance of executive continuity); 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 214 (statement
of Clinton Rossiter, Professor of American Institutions, Cornell University) (“Perhaps the
most pressing requirement of good Government in the United States today is an
uninterrupted, unchallengeable exercise of the full authority of the Presidency. We need a
man in the Presidency at all times who is capable of exercising this authority, and we need
one, moreover, whose claim to that authority is undoubted.”).
118. 110 CONG. REC. 22,990 (1964) (statement of Sen. Bayh); see 1965 House Hearings,
supra note 5, at 3 (statement of Rep. McCulloch) (rejecting permissibility of gap in
presidential power in “space age”); 111 CONG. REC. 7951 (1965) (statement of Rep. William
Cahill) (“In this day and age with immediate decisions required on a myriad of subjects, it is
inconceivable that this country should continue without the full service of a chief
executive.”); 110 CONG. REC. 23,060 (1964) (statement of Sen. Bayh); id. at 22,994
(statement of Sen. Alan Bible).
119. John D. Feerick, The Twenty-Fifth Amendment: Its Origins and History, in
MANAGING CRISIS: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra
note 96, at 1, 14–15.
120. 111 CONG. REC. 3252 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh); Memorandum from John D.
Feerick, scholar on presidential succession, to Sen. Birch Bayh, Section 2 of the TwentyFifth Amendment (Sept. 24, 1973) in Selected Materials on the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, S.
DOC. NO. 93-42, at 279, 281 (1973) [hereinafter Feerick Memorandum].
121. Feerick Memorandum, supra note 120, at 281.
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President as well suited to function in an understudy role. This experience
would position the Vice President “to become familiar with the problems he
will face should he be called upon to act as President.”122 Succession of a
Vice President would allow “no break in the informed exercise of executive
authority” in the event of tragedy.123 The Vice President could assume the
Presidency “on a moment’s notice.”124 Someone who held another office
would be hard-pressed to achieve the desired familiarity that the understudy
role could offer while discharging duties attached to another demanding
position.
b. Harmony Breeds Preparation
The framers thought it essential that the successor be someone with
whom the President could work well.125 Such a harmonious relationship
between the President and Vice President would protect the operation of the
executive branch and would encourage vice presidential involvement. The
Vice President, as someone who was chosen by the President,126 would be
more likely to receive confidential information from the President than
someone outside the Administration.127
122. H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 11–12 (1965); S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 11–12 (1965); S. REP.
NO. 88-1382, at 10 (1964); see also 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 26 (statement of
Sen. Kenneth Keating) (noting impediments to the Speaker serving as understudy); 111
CONG. REC. 7953 (1965) (statement of Rep. Jacob H. Gilbert) (discussing need for
“presidential successor fully conversant with domestic and world affairs” and prepared for
succession “on short notice”); 110 CONG. REC. 23,059 (1964) (statement of Sen. Bayh); id. at
22,996 (Vice President in “training”); John D. Feerick, The Vice Presidency and the Problem
of Presidential Succession and Inability, 32 FORDHAM L. REV. 457, 489 (1964) (speaking of
the importance of “‘on the job training’” purpose of the Vice Presidency).
123. H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 15; S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 14; S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 13;
see also 111 CONG. REC. 7949 (1965) (statement of Rep. Jeffery Cohelan) (stating that the
Vice President must be prepared to succeed on a moment’s notice).
124. 111 CONG. REC. 7961–62 (1965) (statement of Rep. John V. Lindsay).
125. See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 89 (statement of Sen. Bayh)
(emphasizing need for harmony between the President and Vice President); 110 CONG. REC.
23,060 (1964) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
126. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 81 (statement of Sen. Frank Church) (stating
that the Vice President “would have the President’s full confidence”); id. at 93–95 (statement
of Lewis F. Powell, Jr., president-elect, American Bar Association) (noting the importance
of “harmonious relations and mutual confidence”); id. at 130–31 (statement of Paul A.
Freund, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School) (noting the need for “harmony” between the
President and Vice President); 111 CONG. REC. 7941 (1965) (statement of Rep. Richard
Poff) (“[A] man originally chosen by the President . . . .”).
127. See, e.g., Presidential Inability and Vacancies in the Office of Vice President:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Amendments of S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong. 11 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Senate Hearings] (statement of Nicholas deB.
Katzenbach, acting Att’y Gen. of the United States); 111 CONG. REC. 15,591 (1965)
(statement of Sen. Everett Dirksen) (stating the importance of a working relationship
between the President and Vice President); id at 7941 (statement of Rep. Poff) (describing
the Vice President as “a man who knows what great decisions of state are waiting to be made
. . . .”); id. at 3262 (statement of Sen. Hiram Fong) (stating that a close relationship between
the President and Vice President will promote vice presidential preparation); 110 CONG.
REC. 23,060 (1964) (statement of Sen. Bayh); id. at 22,992 (statement of Sen. Leverett
Saltonstall); id. at 22,993–94 (statement of Sen. Fong); id. at 22,994 (statement of Sen.
Bible); Feerick, supra note 122, at 489.
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c. Party Continuity
Finally, the Vice President was likely to be ideologically compatible with
the President. The framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment noted that the
“importance of this compatibility is recognized in the modern practice of
both major political parties in according the presidential candidate a voice
in choosing his running mate subject to convention approval” and that it
was critical that the procedure for filling a vice presidential vacancy
replicate that model.128 Since proposed Section 2 would allow the
President to nominate a Vice President subject to congressional approval,
“the country would be assured of a Vice President of the same political
party as the President, someone who would presumably work in harmony
with the basic policies of the President.”129 That arrangement “would
assure a reasonable continuity of Executive policy, should the Vice
President become President.”130 By contrast, a Speaker of the House, the
person who was next in line, might belong to the opposite party. “What
implications would that have for the continuity of Executive policy?” Bayh
asked rhetorically.131 “The people, by voting in an election, should be the
ones to decide a change of policy and a change of direction in our
Government, and not some illness, some assassin’s bullet, or some other
unfortunate situation which would remove a President from the scene.”132
Section 2’s strong emphasis on party continuity introduced an important
concept into the Constitution. In short, presidential succession should not
shift party control of the executive branch. Whereas previously this idea
simply made good sense, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment elevated it to a
constitutional concept.
128. H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 15; S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 15; S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 13.
129. H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 15; S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 15; S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 13.
This language borrowed from the testimony of former Attorney General Herbert Brownell
before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments in 1964. See 1964 Senate
Hearings, supra note 6, at 137–38; see also 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 245
(statement of Herbert Brownell, former Att’y Gen. of the United States); 1965 Senate
Hearings, supra note 127, at 45 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh); 1964 Senate Hearings,
supra note 6, at 26 (statement of Sen. Keating) (noting the importance of party continuity
and the possibility of a Speaker from the other party); id. at 28 (criticizing proposal for
congressional election of the Vice President due to the possibility of cross-party result); 111
CONG. REC. 7941 (1965) (statement of Rep. Poff) (“The Vice President, a man of the same
political party . . . .”); id. at 7953 (statement of Rep. Gilbert) (discussing the importance of
the Vice President having “harmonious relations and mutual confidences” with the
President); id. at 7954 (statement of Rep. Fuqua) (discussing the increased importance of the
relationship between the President and Vice President); id. at 7962 (statement of Rep.
McCulloch) (criticizing proposal for special election for the Vice President which might
choose a member of the opposition party); id. at 3262 (statement of Sen. Fong) (noting the
importance of party identity between the President and Vice President); 110 CONG. REC.
22,992 (1964) (statement of Sen. Saltonstall); id. at 22,994 (statement of Sen. Bayh).
130. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 4 (statement of Sen. Birch Bayh); 111 CONG.
REC. 3256 (1965) (statements of Sens. Samuel Ervin, Jr. and Bayh).
131. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 2; see also id. at 59–60, 65 (statement of Sen.
Frank Moss); 111 CONG. REC. 7956 (1965) (statement of Rep. Randall) (calling the fact that
Section 2 avoids succession of someone of “a different political faith” “one of the strong
arguments” in its favor).
132. 110 CONG. REC. 22,988 (1964) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
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2. A Presidential Vice President
The framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment thought that the Vice
President needed to be a presidential figure. They attributed to the founders
the intent that the Vice President be a person “equal in stature to the
President” and someone who was “qualified and able” to be President.133
They shared that aspiration for the caliber of Vice Presidents and thought
the recent development of the office had brought it to that standard.134
They rejected the proposal to create a second Vice President in part because
they thought it would attract people whose qualifications were insufficient
to be a heartbeat or two from the Presidency.135 The prime qualification to
be Vice President, Bayh said, was fitness to be President.136 The Vice
President should be “the best possible man to serve in that post.”137
Presidential scholar Clinton Rossiter thought the President would have “a
clear burden” to choose someone “of the highest stature and abilities.”138
Congressional confirmation would furnish “an added safeguard that only
fully qualified persons of the highest character and national stature” would
be nominated to be Vice President.139
3. A New Vice Presidential Vision
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment was premised on and reflected a new
appreciation of the Vice Presidency as it was then perceived.140 Its text
manifested this new attitude. Section 2 provided a method to fill a vice
presidential vacancy to substantially reduce periods when that position was
unoccupied. That innovation was a striking departure from the original
Constitution, which viewed the Vice President primarily as an expedient to
facilitate the presidential election system but as superfluous once that
mission was completed.141 Moreover, Sections 3 and 4 made the Vice
President a necessary participant in disability determinations.
Numerous comments during hearings and floor debates underscored this
new appreciation of the Vice Presidency.142 Those who framed the
133. S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 8–9.
134. See id.
135. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 5 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (arguing that two
Vice Presidents would “invite men of small political stature and questionable
qualifications”).
136. 110 CONG. REC. 22,987 (1964) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
137. Id. at 22,996 (statement of Sen. Bayh); see also 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5,
at 90 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (predicting the President would have the incentive “to get the
very best possible man”); id. at 91 (stating the electorate would insist on an “extremely well
qualified” Vice President); id. at 256 (statement of former Att’y Gen. Brownell) (stating the
President would have “very strong self-interest” to choose “the best possible man”).
138. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 218 (statement of Professor Rossiter).
139. 111 CONG. REC. 7955 (1965) (statement of Rep. Peter Rodino).
140. Joel K. Goldstein, The New Constitutional Vice Presidency, 30 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 505, 508 (1995); see Feerick Memorandum, supra note 120, at 279 (“In recognition of
the growing importance of the Vice Presidency . . . .”).
141. See Goldstein, supra note 140, at 511–13.
142. See, e.g., 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 1–2 (statement of Sen. Bayh)
(arguing for the need for a Vice President at all times and broad consensus to that effect).

128

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

Amendment saw the Vice Presidency as a useful institution in the executive
branch. They believed the officer, if utilized by the President, could
enhance the operation of that branch.143 They recognized that Presidents
had discretion whether, and how much, to involve their Vice Presidents.
They reasoned that Presidents would be most likely to involve the Vice
President if the two were compatible and were bound together by feelings
of loyalty and responsibility. To nurture those attitudes, they provided that
the President would nominate the Vice President subject to approval by
each house of Congress, thereby simulating the selection process whereby
the party standard bearer chooses the running mate.144
They saw the development of the Vice Presidency as a virtue in
American government, one which should be protected. Accordingly, they
rejected the proposal of Senator Kenneth Keating to create two Vice
Presidents, a reform many thought would check the growth of the office in
addition to presenting other problems.145 The design of Section 4 also
reflected a concern for the Vice President; the addition of the Cabinet as a
partner in disability determinations was largely motivated by a desire to
protect the Vice President from the perception that he or she was trying to
usurp power.
Section 2 rested on the promise that the Vice President was the optimal
presidential successor. The Kennedy assassination and Johnson succession
“pointed up once again the abyss which exists in the executive branch when
there is no incumbent Vice President.”146 On sixteen occasions, then
totaling more than thirty-seven years, the Vice Presidency had been vacant.
“In any one of those years something could have happened to the President.
This would have required an officer other than the Vice President to act as
President,”147 said Bayh in his opening remarks at the 1964 hearings to
consider proposed constitutional amendments two months after the
Kennedy assassination. The implication was clear: it was better if
succession did not extend beyond the Vice President. Section 2 was
designed to address the problem of presidential succession after the Vice
President by minimizing the instances when someone other than a Vice
President would stand a heartbeat from the Presidency. It sought to route
succession away from those other than the Vice President by creating a
mechanism to fill that position. The Committee Reports that accompanied
the legislation in both houses confessed that “Section 2 is intended to
virtually assure us that the Nation will always possess a Vice President.”148
143. Id. at 2–3.
144. See id. at 4.
145. See, e.g., id. at 245–46 (statement of Richard M. Nixon, former Vice President of the
United States); Feerick, supra note 122, at 470.
146. S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 9 (1964).
147. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 1.
148. H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 14 (1965); S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 14 (1965); S. REP. NO. 881382, at 13; see also 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 217 (statement of Professor
Rossiter) (“I think that we should go against this problem today and solve it, except in the
most ghastly and unforeseen of circumstances, by providing a dignified, open and conclusive
means of filling the Vice Presidency whenever it has been vacated.”).
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As President Johnson said in his Message to Congress, “[i]n these times”
the statutory line of succession was “no substitute for an office of
succession.”149
4. Separation of Powers/Checks and Balances
The framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment adopted solutions that
incorporated basic principles of separation of powers and checks and
balances.
The commitment to separation of powers ideas, which
emphasize, in part, protection of institutional boundaries, was primary.150
Concerns relating to checks and balances, which focus on limiting
governmental power and promoting governmental accountability, were
secondary.
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment rested on the premise that solutions to
continuity problems should respect the institutional integrity of the
executive branch and protect the President. As such, it prevented Congress
from imposing a Vice President the President did not want and it structured
inability procedures to create a substantial presumption in favor of the
President’s entitlement to his office.
Separation of powers ideas influenced the approach to filling a vice
presidential vacancy. Although nominally the Vice President was President
of the Senate, the framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment recognized that
the Vice President had increasingly become an executive official, a role
they repeatedly emphasized.151 Accordingly, the framers gave the
President the sole power to nominate the Vice President. They rejected
approaches that would have allowed Congress to elect a Vice President or
choose from a slate of nominees.152 Congress should not be able to impose
on the President an unwanted Vice President.
Similarly, they devised methods for handling presidential inability that
were extremely sensitive to the institutional integrity of the executive
branch generally and to the particular interests of the President. Only
members of the executive branch could initiate a transfer of power—the
President, under the voluntary transfer process of Section 3, and the Vice
President and Cabinet, under the involuntary procedures of Section 4.
Section 4 was crafted so that “no door is opened for undue pressure on the
executive branch” from other branches of government,153 explained Herbert
Brownell, whose ideas influenced the Amendment. Testifying for the
American Bar Association (ABA), Lewis Powell, Jr., its president-elect,
149. Special Message to the Congress on Presidential Disability and Related Matters,
1 PUB. PAPERS 100, 102 (Jan. 28, 1965).
150. See, e.g., 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 241, 253 (statement of former Att’y
Gen. Brownell); 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 4–5, 66 (statement of Sen. Bayh);
id. at 70–71 (statement of Sen. Roman Hruska); id. at 133–34 (statement of Professor
Freund); 111 CONG. REC. 3269 (1965) (statement of Sen. Roman Hruska).
151. See Goldstein, supra note 140, at 529–32.
152. See Feerick Memorandum, supra note 120, at 280.
153. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 241 (statement of former Att’y Gen.
Brownell); see also 111 CONG. REC. 7952 (1965) (statement of Rep. Byron Rogers) (Cabinet
will be “hesitant” to declare the President disabled); BROWNELL, supra note 14, at 279.
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thought that the “independence of the executive branch must be preserved,
and a President who has regained his health should not be harassed by a
possibly hostile Congress.”154 Although Congress could replace the
Cabinet with some other body,155 until it did, only presidential appointees
could displace the Chief Executive. “[W]e must take every precaution to
safeguard the President from unwarranted usurpation of his power,” said
Bayh.156 “The point” behind the disability provisions was “to safeguard the
President—to give him every advantage in any action or contemplated
action.”157
Even if Congress replaced the Cabinet with some other body, the Vice
President remained a crucial actor under Section 4, thereby giving one
executive officer an effective veto in any event. Indeed, the Senate-House
conference added language “to make crystal clear that the Vice President
must be a party to any action declaring the President unable to perform his
powers and duties.”158 The design was intended to protect the President
from the threat of “unwarranted usurpation of his power” by assigning the
primary roles to the President and his close political allies; Congress could
intervene only to resolve an irreconcilable dispute in the executive
branch.159 Section 4 required that the House and Senate adjudicate a
154. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 93; see also id. at 152 (statement of Feerick,
scholar of presidential succession). The position of Senator Eugene McCarthy that Congress
should be able to initiate an inability determination was rejected. 111 CONG. REC. 15,586
(1965) (statement of Sen. Eugene McCarthy); id. at 15,383; see also id. at 15,590 (statement
of Sen. Ervin) (reporting his initial view, now changed, that Congress should initiate an
inability determination).
155. Such a change would, of course, be subject to a presidential veto in which case the
“other body” would only supersede the Cabinet if each house overrode the president’s veto
by a two-thirds majority vote. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have
passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be
presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he
shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall
enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such
Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together
with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if
approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the
Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons
voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If
any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it
shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had
signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall
not be a Law.”).
156. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 4 (statement of Sen. Bayh).
157. Id. at 4–5.
158. 111 CONG. REC. 15,379 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh). Ironically, the Senator
most troubled by that addition was Albert Gore, Sr., father of a subsequent Vice President.
See also id. at 15,383–84 (stating the Vice President is a necessary actor under Section 4
with the Cabinet or other body Congress creates). But see id. at 15,586 (statement of Sen.
McCarthy) (arguing that the Vice President should have been excluded); id. at 15,588
(statement of Sen. Albert Gore) (labeling the participation of the Vice President in an
inability determination “to say the least, debatable”); id. at 15,590 (statement of Sen. Ervin)
(reporting his prior view that the Vice President should not be involved).
159. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 4–5 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (“In the
question of Presidential inability, we must take every precaution to safeguard the President
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disability dispute within twenty-one days; the time limit was imposed “to
place a safeguard around the President.”160 Finally, the Amendment
incorporated the requirement that each house of Congress conclude by a
supermajority vote that the President was unable to perform the powers and
duties of his office. Unless each house agreed that he was disabled within
the twenty-one day period, the President was entitled to resume the exercise
of those functions.161
In reserving to members of the executive branch the exclusive right to
initiate a transfer of presidential power under Sections 3 and 4, the TwentyFifth Amendment ran the risk that the President’s allies might conceal a
disability. Its authors believed that course posed a lesser danger than a
regime that would allow Congress to wield a disability determination as a
weapon against the executive branch. This resolution reflected a bias in
favor of protecting the executive branch generally, and the President
specifically, from legislative intrusion in this matter. It also represented a
judgment that executive officials would be most likely to recognize
presidential inability and transfer power if they were authorized to initiate
the process and determine when the disability had ended. Thus, a President
who voluntarily transferred power under Section 3 could reclaim it
immediately without review.162 And the Cabinet was associated with the
Vice President in Section 4 to provide some political cover for someone
history suggested would otherwise be reluctant to initiate a disability
The framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
determination.163
emphatically rejected a medical commission in part because they thought a

from unwarranted usurpation of his power. . . . The point of this is to safeguard the
President—to give him every advantage in any action or contemplated action.”). The
framers rejected the approach proposed by Senator Sam Ervin, Jr. to have Congress initiate
and decide inability through a procedure like that of impeachment. See 1964 Senate
Hearings, supra note 6, at 254–56 (describing Sen. Ervin’s approach); see also 111 CONG.
REC. 7938 (1965) (statement of Rep. Celler) (“Throughout all these sections are thrown in
that if there is any doubt the President is favored without doubt. The resolution shall always
be in favor of the President because he is the elected representative of the people, the first
officer of the land, and he shall be favored without doubt.”); 110 CONG. REC. 22,995 (1964)
(statement of Sen. Bible). Some thought Section 4 did not go far enough to protect the
President since it provided that in case of a dispute between the President and Vice
President-Cabinet, the Vice President would remain in power until Congress resolved the
matter. See 111 CONG. REC. 7948 (1965) (statement of Rep. Lindsay); id. at 7949–50
(statement of Rep. Arch Moore); id. at 7958 (statement of Rep. Richard C. White).
160. 111 CONG. REC. 15,385 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
161. Either house could unilaterally restore the President to power in a shorter period of
time by an earlier vote to resolve the inability dispute, which did not produce a two-third
super majority in support of the Vice President’s position. Id. at 15,379.
162. Language was added to Section 3 in conference to make this point explicit. See id. at
15,378.
163. See, e.g., 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 129 (statement of Professor
Freund) (stating the Vice President “should be spared the task of shouldering the
responsibility alone” since “the very appearance of self-interest might impel him to refrain
from a decision which by objective standards ought to be taken”).
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divided vote among medical experts regarding the President’s capacity
would degrade presidential power.164
Notwithstanding the emphasis on separation of powers ideals, the
framers also included checks and balances features. A vice presidential
nominee only took office if each house of Congress approved, thereby
affording a check against an improvident appointment. Significantly, they
chose bicameral approval of a nominee by the houses of Congress instead
of Electoral College review.165 The latter approach would have imposed no
meaningful check since electors have become party functionaries, not
independent discretionary actors.
Similarly, Section 4 designated Congress the referee if the President
contested the inability determination of the Vice President and Cabinet.166
Congress’s role provided some check against an incapacitated President
trying to resume power and against usurpation of the Chief Executive’s
position by others.
The predominance of separation of powers thinking, over that of checks
and balances, becomes more evident when the disability provisions in
Section 4 are contrasted with the Constitution’s impeachment arrangements.
These two procedures are linked in offering the only constitutional
processes to remove a President permanently from office in the case of
impeachment, and at least temporarily from exercising the powers and
duties, in the case of the disability.
The two constitutional remedies follow quite different models. Whereas
Congress initiates and concludes presidential impeachment, with the House
impeaching and the Senate deciding whether to convict and remove,167
Congress is assigned a more passive role regarding presidential inability. It
cannot initiate a disability determination and it only has a role in the
somewhat unlikely event that the President finds himself in an
irreconcilable public conflict with the Vice President and Cabinet regarding
his ability to discharge the powers and duties. Congress’s role as umpire
serves as a disincentive to usurpation by a Vice President and Cabinet as
well as to the President’s improvident return. By virtue of the bicameral
supermajority requirement, which is a prerequisite for the Vice President
continuing to act as President, Congress acts as a check on the Vice
President and Cabinet more than on the President.
164. See, e.g., 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 241–42 (statement of former Att’y
Gen. Brownell).
165. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 233–34.
166. 111 CONG. REC. 15,379 (1965) (statement of Sen. Hruska) (stating that Congress
was reduced to “an appellate body” under Section 4); see also 1965 House Hearings, supra
note 5, at 47 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (stating that Congress provides a check against
usurpation of presidential power); id. at 241 (statement of former Att’y Gen. Brownell)
(stating that the Cabinet provides a check on the Vice President); 1964 Senate Hearings,
supra note 6, at 5 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (discussing the importance of checks and
balances since the President is fallible).
167. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (“The House of Representatives shall chuse their
Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.”); id. art. I, § 3,
cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that
Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation.”).
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The two models diverge in another significant respect. The conflict of
interest concerns that inform the Impeachment provisions are absent from
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Whereas the Constitution specifically
precludes the Vice President from presiding over the Senate when trying a
presidential impeachment,168 it makes the Vice President a necessary
initiator (or co-initiator) of disability decisions. Rather than sidelining the
Vice President, the Amendment explicitly sanctions his or her participation.
Although the Amendment specifically allows Congress to replace the
Cabinet as a necessary co-actor under Section 4, Congress cannot replace
the Vice President by statute. Indeed, the Cabinet (or other body) was
included as much to provide cover for the Vice President against the charge
of self-aggrandizement as to check ambitious vice presidential behavior.
5. Democratic Pedigree
The framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment thought it important that
the presidential successor have a democratic pedigree. They were not
prepared to allow Congress to elect the new Vice President outright, an
approach which would have undermined the continuity, vice presidential
vision, and separation of powers concerns. They did seek, however, to
introduce a democratic element into the process in a manner consistent with
those objectives.
They saw the submission of the nomination to the people’s
representatives as consistent with the “democratic system” in which they
operated.169 Confirmation by Congress would give “the people of the
United States a voice through their elected representatives.”170 The
inclusion of the House reflected an effort to make the confirmation process
a surrogate for an election.171 Congress would “consider this serious
responsibility and act as the voice of the people.”172 “What better
opportunity is there for the people to express their wishes than through
those who serve in Congress?” Bayh asked rhetorically.173
They also thought that Congress’s democratic character well-positioned
it to umpire a disability dispute between the President and Vice President.

168. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.
When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of
the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted
without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.” (emphasis added)).
169. 110 CONG. REC. 22,988 (1964) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
170. id. at 22,994 (statement of Sen. Bible); see also 111 CONG. REC. 3252 (1965)
(statement of Sen. Bayh); id. at 3255; 110 CONG. REC. 22,996 (1964) (statement of Sen.
Bayh).
171. See 111 CONG. REC. 3252 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (comparing bicameral
confirmation to election); 110 CONG. REC. 22,994 (1964) (statement of Sen. Bible).
172. 110 CONG. REC. 22,996 (1964) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
173. Id.; see also id. at 23,060 (“[I]t guarantees to the people that their representatives in
Congress, those who are most responsive to the wishes of the people at any given time, will
be able to express the voice of those whom they represent.”). But see 111 CONG. REC. 7950
(1965) (statement of Rep. Charles Mathias, Jr.) (criticizing Section 2 as not sufficiently
democratic).
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Congress was given that role “because it is believed that, as the elected
representative of the people, they share the greatest trust of the people.”174
6. Accountable Decision Making
The Amendment emphasized accountability as an important attribute in
decision making on presidential continuity. This ideal required that public
officials make decisions regarding presidential continuity and that their
actions be transparent. These features were thought critical to producing
public confidence in the decisions reached.175 This preference was
particularly evident in the design of Sections 2 and 4, and, in a lesser way,
Section 3.
The reliance on the House and Senate, rather than the Electoral College,
to consider a vice presidential nominee reflected the ideal that decision
makers should be accountable public figures. Among the disadvantages of
the Electoral College was the fact that “[m]uch of the general public has no
earthly idea who their State’s electors are.”176 Accordingly, the public
“would be understandably hesitant to allow any such unknown quantity to
make an important decision” like confirming a Vice President177 and its
decision would not “command the requisite respect and support of the
people.”178 Bayh thought the public “would wonder what in the world was
being perpetrated upon them if we brought in members of the electoral
college whom they did not know from Adam.”179
The framers thought the Vice President and Cabinet were preferable to a
medical commission to decide inability in part because of their
accountability.
Similarly, they rejected the proposal of President
Eisenhower that a high-level commission180 resolve disputes regarding the
President’s fitness to reclaim his powers and duties. “Commissions are not
174. 111 CONG. REC. 7943 (1965) (statement of Rep. McCulloch); see also id. at 7955
(statement of Rep. Dante Fascell) (praising Section 4 as providing “fully democratic
procedures and safeguards”); id. at 7957 (statement of Rep. Tenzer) (confirmation by
Congress “would tend to create public confidence in the selection”).
175. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 47 (statement of Sen. Bayh).
176. Id. at 5.
177. Id.; see also id. at 60 (statement of Sen. Moss); 110 CONG. REC. 22,996 (1964)
(statement of Sen. Bayh).
178. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 94 (statement of Powell, president-elect,
American Bar Association); see also 110 CONG. REC. 22,994 (1964) (statement of Sen.
Bible) (noting that the Electoral College is “not subject to the direct will of the people”
outside an election year); Feerick Memorandum, supra note 120, at 280 (noting that the
Electoral College should be rejected since it would not “command the respect and support of
the people”).
179. 111 CONG. REC. 3274 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh). The Senate rejected by
voice vote an amendment offered by Senator Strom Thurmond which would use the
Electoral College to fill a vice presidential vacancy. Id.
180. Eisenhower proposed that the Commission consist of three senior members of the
Cabinet, the Speaker and Minority Leader of the House, the President pro tempore and
minority leader of the Senate, and “four medical personnel recognized by the American
Medical Association as competent in their fields” who would advise the others. 1964 Senate
Hearings, supra note 6, at 232 (statement of Sen. Bayh, quoting a letter from former
President Eisenhower).
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responsive, and they do not have to, of course, account to the electorate,”
explained Nixon.181
Even the requirement that the President notify the Speaker and President
pro tempore of his or her inability by letter reflected a concern with
accountability. This method provided a transparent way to announce the
beginning and end of a voluntary transfer of power, thereby shielding
against a situation where a Vice President claimed authority based on a
letter he or she generated.182
7. Deliberative Decision Making
The Amendment also reflected a belief that decision making should be
based on data and deliberation. The Electoral College was unsuited for a
role in considering a vice presidential nominee because, unlike Congress, it
was not chosen “to exercise any considered judgment or reasoning.”183 It
was not “equipped . . . to conduct hearings on the qualifications of [a]
nominee.”184
The Cabinet was included in disability deliberations because it was
thought to have valuable information regarding the President. The framers
thought that working with the President on a regular basis would afford
insight into his or her fitness to serve.185 Nonetheless, they clearly thought
that a decision should be informed by medical expertise and specifically so
stated in conspicuous places in the legislative history.186
181. Id. at 241 (statement of former Vice President Nixon).
182. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 53–54 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (discussing
letters transmitted in Sections 3 and 4 to the President pro tempore of the Senate, not the
President of Senate, to avoid the Vice President transmitting letter to himself and to avoid
transmittal of letter to party in interest); 111 CONG. REC. 15,378 (1965) (statement of Sen.
Bayh) (same).
183. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 5 (statement of Sen. Bayh).
184. Id.; see also 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 66 (statement of Sen. Bayh)
(stating that the extent of deliberations would be related to the identity of the vice
presidential nominee).
185. S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 13 (1965) (stating that involvement of the Vice President and
Cabinet “would enable prompt action by the persons closest to the President, both politically
and physically, and presumably most familiar with his condition”); see H.R. REP. NO. 89203, at 13 (1965) (same); S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 11–12 (1964) (same); see also 1965 House
Hearings, supra note 5, at 56 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (referring to close working
relationship between the Vice President and Cabinet); 111 CONG. REC. 7941 (1965)
(statement of Rep. Poff) (citing the Vice President’s and Cabinet’s knowledge of the
President’s health); id. at 7942 (statement of Rep. McCulloch) (citing Cabinet’s “intimate
contact” with the President as reason for entrusting it with disability decision); id. at 7954
(statement of Rep. Gilbert) (stating Section 4 “would enable prompt action by the persons
closest to the President”); id. at 3262 (statement of Sen. Fong) (noting that the President’s
proximity to the Vice President and Cabinet equip them to assess the President’s capacity).
186. S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 13 (“It is assumed that such decision would be made only after
adequate consultation with medical experts who were intricately familiar with the
President’s physical and mental condition.”); see H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 13 (same); S.
REP. NO. 88-1382, at 12 (same); see also 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 46
(statement of Sen. Bayh) (anticipating that Congress might call medical witnesses); id. at
251 (statement of former Att’y Gen. Brownell) (referring to medical input); 1964 Senate
Hearings, supra note 6, at 71–73 (statement of Sen. Hruska) (discussing access to medical
information and personal knowledge of President); id. at 119 (statement of Sen. Bayh); id. at
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8. Preferring Procedures
Those who drafted the Twenty-Fifth Amendment believed that
procedures for office-holders to use, rather than predetermined solutions,
could best address the presidential continuity problems the drafters
confronted. Sections 2, 3, and 4 of the Amendment each provide a
procedure rather than a self-executing solution. Section 2, for instance,
empowered a President to nominate a replacement Vice President who
would take office upon confirmation by each house of Congress. Section 3
provided that a President could voluntarily transfer to the Vice President,
and then resume, presidential powers and duties by transmitting an
appropriate letter to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
President pro tempore of the Senate. Section 4 created a mechanism
whereby the Vice President and a majority of the Cabinet (or of such other
body as Congress might designate) could transfer power to the Vice
President by declaring a President disabled in situations where the President
did not voluntarily transfer power. It further provided that the President
could resume powers unless the Vice President and the aforesaid majority
challenged that right within four days, in which case the houses of Congress
would resolve the issue.
This emphasis on procedures departed from past efforts to address
problems of presidential continuity. Although neither the Constitution nor
statutes had previously done more than mention disability as a possible
contingency, past responses to presidential vacancy had designated a
successor, or line of successors, rather than propose a process to fill a
position.187 To be sure, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment addressed different
problems—filling a vice presidential (not presidential) vacancy188 and
handling presidential inability—than had those earlier measures. Yet the
procedure-based remedy also responded to a belief in the value of decision

156–57 (statement of Feerick, scholar on presidential succession); 111 CONG. REC. 7938–39
(1965) (statement of Rep. Durward G. Hall); id. at 7939 (statement of Rep. Poff) (“Surely,
the decisionmakers, whoever they may be, would not undertake so critical a decision without
first consulting the experts in the field, namely the gentlemen of the medical profession.”);
id. (statement of Rep. Clark MacGregor) (expressing an expectation that the Vice President
and Cabinet would not act “without a consultation with the very finest medical brains which
were available to them here in the Nation’s Capital”); id. at 7954 (statement of Rep. Gilbert)
(Section 4 decision would presumably “be made only after adequate consultation with
medical experts”); id. at 3278 (statement of Sen. Hruska) (discussing possibility of
psychiatric examination of the President); id. at 3279 (statement of Sen. Philip Hart)
(assuming receipt of medical testimony to resolve a dispute between the President and Vice
President).
187. See also 111 CONG. REC. 7946 (1965) (statement of Rep. Edward Hutchinson)
(arguing that the Speaker should be automatically elevated to become Vice President).
Section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment authorizes both approaches. See U.S. CONST. amend.
XX, § 3 (“Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a
Vice President elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the
manner in which one who is to act shall be selected . . . .”).
188. Cf. 111 CONG. REC. 3279 (1965) (statements of Sen. Bayh and Sen. Ross Bass)
(explaining omission of the requirement that Congress act “immediately” under Section 2 as
relating to lesser urgency of filling Vice Presidency than Presidency).
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making by interested officials able to assess and react to the political
context when a continuity issue arose.189
In establishing procedures rather than prescribed outcomes, the
Amendment reflected an implicit bias in favor of flexible, rather than rigid,
approaches. It gave discretion to future decision makers acting within the
context of an event rather than imposing a solution in advance for all times.
Rather than identify someone to become Vice President when that position
fell vacant, it opted for a method of choosing a new Vice President. Its
framers rejected electing a second Vice President because that idea would
interrupt the development of the Vice Presidency into a more robust
institution and would attract “men of small political stature and
questionable qualifications.”190 They also resisted suggestions to provide
bright-line tests for inability,191 defining it only in broad terms.192 Rather
than dictating certain circumstances when presidential power would be
transferred, voluntarily or involuntarily, to the Vice President, they
specified officials to determine when the President was unable to discharge
the powers and duties of the office. Rather than resolve a dispute
automatically in favor of the President or Vice President, they entrusted that
issue to Congress to decide by a supermajority. In essence, the TwentyFifth Amendment placed extensive discretion in specified decision makers
who would be confronted with subsequent vice presidential vacancies or
presidential inabilities rather than attempting to dictate future results from
their mid-1960s vantage point.
9. A Government of Laws
The reliance on procedures reflected a faith in the utility of rules to shape
conduct. The framers of the Amendment attributed the failure of past
government decision makers to act during prior presidential inability crises
to the lack of clear guidelines.193 They believed that rules could provide
clarity and accordingly channel official conduct. Sections 2, 3, and 4
furnished a road map through certain succession crises. Moreover, the
framers thought prior Vice Presidents had not acted during past presidential
inabilities for fear that under the Tyler Precedent, recognizing and acting
189. Id. at 3256 (statements of Sens. Ervin and Bayh) (arguing that Section 2 procedure is
more likely to produce a qualified President than designating a particular officer); see id. at
7949 (statement of Rep. Cohelan) (decisions “must be based on the facts of the time”); id. at
7952 (statement of Rep. Seymour Halpern) (“We should leave room for human judgment.”).
190. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 5 (statement of Sen. Bayh).
191. 111 CONG. REC. 7941 (1965) (statement of Rep. Poff) (arguing against defining
disability to avoid “rigidity” and unworkability); see id. at 15,381 (statement of Sen. Bayh)
(arguing that decision makers at the time would need to judge the severity of disability and
national problems).
192. Id. at 3282 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (defining “inability” and “unable” as the
President being “unable either to make or communicate his decisions as to his own
competency to execute the powers and duties of his office”); see id. at 15,381 (statements of
Sens. Robert F. Kennedy and Bayh) (“It involves physical or mental inability to make or
communicate his decision regarding his capacity and physical or mental inability to exercise
the powers and duties of his office.”); see also id. at 15,380–81, 3282–84.
193. See Feerick, supra note 122, at 490–91.
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upon a President’s disability would permanently transfer the office.194 The
framers thought clarifying those ambiguities would eliminate the
disincentives to declaring a President disabled. They thought involving the
Cabinet would provide the Vice President with political cover.195 They
thought the norms that these new constitutional duties suggested would
encourage effective response.
10. A Government of People Within Those Laws
This emphasis on procedures assumed that officials charged with
responsibility would respond appropriately when contingencies arose.196
The framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment thought the risk of future bad
conduct was less severe than the hazard of trying to prescribe specific
outcomes for times and circumstances they could not foresee. They had
more confidence in the decisions of future generations acting in context
than in those they could impose in advance.
The framers of the Amendment assumed that public officials would act
with a proper sense of “‘constitutional morality,’”197 that they would not
allow personal ambition or partisanship to interfere with their obligation to
act in accordance with the constitutional values implicit in the Amendment.
Absent this “sense of ‘constitutional morality’”198 no procedure could work.
Regarding vice presidential vacancy, Bayh thought one needed to assume
future Congresses would be composed of “reasonable” people who would
give “reasonable consideration” to a presidential nominee.199 Senator Sam
Ervin put it more strongly: “God help this Nation if we ever get a House of
Representatives, or a Senate, which will wait for a President to die so
someone whom they love more than their country will succeed to the
Presidency.”200 The committee reports of the proposed Twenty-Fifth
Amendment articulated this faith regarding inability determination:
Without such a feeling of responsibility there can be no absolute
guarantee against usurpation. No mechanical or procedural solution will
provide a complete answer if one assumes hypothetical cases in which
most of the parties are rogues and in which no popular sense of
constitutional propriety exists. It seems necessary that an attitude be

194. See, e.g., 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 162–63 (statement of Sen. Bayh).
195. Id. at 162 (statement of Professor Ruth C. Silva) (predicting that clarifying the status
and tenure of the President would resolve eighty to ninety percent of the problem).
196. See 111 CONG. REC. 15,380 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (stating that the
“perfection” of the Amendment “is based upon the ability of the men living at the time when
the measure must be used to cope successfully with the problems and contingencies with
which they are confronted”).
197. H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 13 (1965); S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 13 (1965); S. REP. NO. 881382, at 11 (1964).
198. H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 13; S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 13; S. REP. NO. 88-1382, at 11.
199. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 50 (statement of Sen. Bayh).
200. 111 CONG. REC. 3281 (1965) (statement of Sen. Ervin.).
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adopted that presumes we shall always be dealing with ‘reasonable men’
at the highest governmental level.201

These conclusions did not reflect simply an optimistic assessment of
human nature. They also rested on a belief that certain institutional
constraints would promote good behavior. Legal scholar Paul A. Freund
suggested that conferring “a solemn constitutional responsibility” on the
Vice President and Cabinet regarding presidential inability would “impel”
them to act objectively.202 Brownell assumed that crisis would prompt
good behavior from decision makers and, if it did not, public opinion
would.203 Rep. Richard Poff staked his faith that
the American form of government with its system of checks and balances
is so structured, that the freedom of the American press is so secure, and
that the conscience of the American electorate is so sensitive and its
power so effective that rogues in public office are foredoomed to
exposure and swift retribution.204

To be sure, Poff said, “[W]e want a government of laws and not of men, but
somewhere in the process of administration of the laws, we must commit
our fate to the basic honesty of the administrators. Somewhere, sometime,
somehow, we must trust somebody.”205 Bayh thought “a strong voicing of
public opinion” and a tradition of deference to the President in high
executive appointments would discourage misbehavior.206
This faith in public officials also influenced the discussion of whether
some time limit should restrict the period during which Congress could
deliberate on a disability dispute. Bayh reported a Senate consensus against
such a limit since “the obedience to and implementation of any law depends
201. H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 13 (1965); S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 13 (1965); S. REP. NO. 881382, at 11 (1964). Brownell was essentially the source of this idea and language; it came
almost verbatim from his testimony before the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments in 1964. See 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 136; see also 1965 House
Hearings, supra note 5, at 242 (statement of former Att’y Gen. Brownell); 111 CONG. REC.
7942 (1965) (statement of Rep. Poff) (“If one assumes that the Vice President and most of
the members of the President’s Cabinet are charlatans, revolutionaries and traitors, we are
foolish to attempt any solution.”); see id. at 15,591–92 (statement of Sen. Dirksen) (arguing
that disability decision makers would act in a forthright manner); 110 CONG. REC. 22,995
(1964) (statement of Sen. Bible).
202. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 131 (statement of Professor Freund).
203. See 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 241, 243 (statement of former Att’y Gen.
Brownell); see also 111 CONG. REC. 3275 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh) (“I have more
faith in the Congress acting in an emergency in the white heat of publicity, with the
American people looking on. The last thing Congress would dare to do would be to become
involved in a purely political move.”); id. at 3279 (statement of Sen. Ervin) (predicting
Congressmen would “exercise intelligence and patriotism in a time of national crisis”); id. at
3280 (statement of Sen. Saltonstall) (arguing that “commonsense” of future Congressmen
would prevent them from filibustering a disability dispute); 110 CONG. REC. 23,001 (1964)
(statement of Sen. James Pearson) (“[R]eason in a time of crisis will prevail.”).
204. 111 CONG. REC. 7942 (1965) (statement of Rep. Poff).
205. Id.; see also 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 42 (statement of Professor
James C. Kirby, Jr.) (arguing that the partisan rejection of nominees would arouse public
outrage).
206. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 48 (statement of Sen. Bayh); see also id. at
65 (referring to “glare of publicity and public opinion”).

140

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

ultimately upon the good will of the vast majority of our governmental
leaders at all levels.”207 “Somewhere along the line, in our form of
government, trust must be placed in men to obey and implement the letter
and spirit of the law.”208
11. Conclusion
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment reflected the foregoing constitutional
ideals and principles regarding presidential continuity. In some cases, these
ideals simply reinforce well-established structural principles like separation
of powers, accountable decision making, and democratic process. In other
instances, the ideals may not have been entrenched in the Constitution or
only dimly suggested. The importance of party continuity in succession
provides a prime example of the Amendment giving constitutional
dimension to an idea that previously lacked such stature. As will be
suggested in Part IV below, many of these ideals can usefully inform
discussions of successors after the Vice President.
B. Legislative Principles
In addition to the constitutional values it represents, the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment offers a useful case study in successful reform regarding
presidential continuity. Its ratification represented an enormous legislative
accomplishment.
Consider the particulars. Congress proposed, and the states ultimately
ratified, a constitutional amendment that addressed the major gaps
regarding presidential continuity. If, as David Mayhew has argued, most
congressmen are motivated largely by a desire to win re-election,209 the
general topic of presidential continuity would not normally engage their
attention since the topic offers few obvious electoral benefits. Moreover,
the topics, vice presidential vacancy and presidential inability, posed
institutional disincentives. The Amendment required Congress to approve
arrangements that ceded prominence and initiative to the executive,
reserving for Congress only a reactive and reduced role. Whereas in two of
the three succession laws Congress had preferred legislative to executive
figures,210 the Twenty-Fifth Amendment asked Congress to reduce greatly
the stature of its leaders in the line of succession.
Two decisions the Amendment’s framers made further complicated their
task. First, they elected to pursue a constitutional amendment, which
required supermajorities in each house and from the states,211 rather than a
statutory solution.
In part, they reasoned that doubts regarding

207. Id. at 42.
208. Id.
209. DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 13–17 (1974).
210. See supra notes 43, 45 and accompanying text.
211. See U.S. CONST. art. V (generally requiring that constitutional amendments be
proposed by two-thirds votes of the House of Representatives and Senate and ratified by
three-fourths of the states).
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congressional power to address presidential continuity should be resolved in
favor of a constitutional amendment.212 Although some believed that
Congress could address by statute vice presidential vacancy, presidential
These were
inability,213 or both,214 countervailing views existed.
particularly strong regarding filling a vice presidential vacancy since the
Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution prescribed a different procedure for
choosing the Vice President through the Electoral College or, if need be, the
contingent election in the Senate. There also were serious doubts as to
whether Congress could by statute provide a means to address presidential
inability.215 The framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment concluded that
divided opinion counseled in favor of the more onerous course of amending
the Constitution. They reasoned that a statute “would be open to criticism
and challenge at a time when absolute legitimacy was needed” and
concluded that “[w]e must not gamble with the constitutional legitimacy of
our Nation’s executive branch.”216
Having determined to pursue the onerous challenge of amending the
Constitution, the architects of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment also decided to
offer a proposal laden with procedures rather than one which would simply
empower Congress to legislate later. There were strategic reasons to follow
the path chosen. In part, Bayh and others thought state legislatures might
be more reluctant to accept an empowering amendment that would
212. H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 8–9 (1965); S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 8–9 (1965); S. REP. NO.
88-1382, at 7–8 (1964).
213. 111 CONG. REC. 3253–54, 3257 (1965) (statement of Sen. Allen Ellender); see id. at.
7944 (statement of Rep. Basil Whitener); id. at 7945–46 (statement of Rep. Hutchinson).
214. Id. at 15,585 (statement of Sen. McCarthy).
215. The most common constitutional problem stemmed from the language in Article II,
Section 1, Clause 6 of the Constitution empowering Congress to decide legislatively what
officer would act as President following the death, resignation, removal or failure to qualify
of both the President and Vice President. Some argued that the explicit grant of power to
Congress in the event of a double vacancy implicitly denied Congress power to legislate
regarding a single vacancy. (In answer to this expressio unius argument, it might be
suggested that the express power regarding double vacancy may have simply been intended
as a constitutional reminder to future Congresses of this potential gap needing further
action.) In addition, if one thought, as some did, that the Vice President implicitly had
power to decide whether a presidential inability existed, and if that power was rooted in the
Constitution, creating an alternative procedure in which others (e.g., the Cabinet) would
share that power would require a constitutional amendment. Finally, if one believed that
repeated practice had given the Tyler Precedent constitutional dimension so that the Vice
President became President following a presidential death and that the text of the
Constitution mandated the same result following presidential removal, resignation, or
inability, an amendment was required to allow a Vice President to act as President
temporarily when presidential inability occurred.
216. H.R. REP. NO. 89-203, at 11, 12; S. REP. NO. 89-66, at 11, 12; S. REP. NO. 88-1382,
at 9, 10; see also 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 3–4 (statement of Sen. Bayh)
(arguing for need to eliminate constitutional doubt); id. at 128–29 (statement of Professor
Freund) (arguing for constitutional amendment); id. at 135 (statement of Herbert Brownell,
former Att’y Gen. of the United States) (arguing that constitutional amendment was
necessary); 111 CONG. REC. 7940 (1965) (statement of Rep. Poff); id. at 7942 (statement of
Rep. McCulloch); id. at 7947 (statement of Rep. Robert McClory); id. at 3254 (statement of
Sen. Bayh) (“Should we not reconcile such doubt once and for all by inserting in the
Constitution an amendment which would provide for these contingencies?”); 110 CONG.
REC. 22,993 (1964) (statement of Sen. Fong).
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essentially give Congress a blank check to legislate in the future.217 The
course also guarded against the possibility, perhaps likelihood, that
Congress would never act to address the specific problems under an
Finally, some thought a constitutional
empowering amendment.218
amendment would afford more protection to the President.219 Yet the
procedurally laden approach meant that Congress had to reach agreement
on specific matters rather than defer the difficult work.
Although circumstances contributed to the success of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment, that accomplishment also resulted from decisions regarding its
content and the strategic and skillful manner in which it was shepherded
through the legislative process. Although some of those decisions may
have been context dependent, others may suggest approaches that would be
useful in fashioning future reforms regarding presidential continuity.
1. Seize the Moment
A confluence of events made the mid-1960s a propitious time to address
long-standing problems relating to presidential continuity. The Eisenhower
disabilities, the Kennedy assassination, the nuclear age, and the rise of the
Vice Presidency were among the factors that made the times ripe for
reform. “Let us stop playing Presidential inability roulette,”220 implored
Representative Celler in his opening remarks during the House’s 1965
debate; these factors helped that sentiment resonate.
Although contemporary events, especially the Kennedy assassination,221
made presidential continuity a salient issue in the mid-1960s, the
heightened interest in the topic did not guarantee a favorable outcome.
Earlier periods had presented crises that had not produced constructive
change.222 And the events of 9/11 raised the specter of a much more
serious continuity crisis without corresponding legislative response. On
that day, one plane hit the Pentagon and another was headed for either the
White House or Capitol Building.223 It was not difficult to imagine events
217. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 132–33 (statement of Professor Freund).
218. BIRCH BAYH, ONE HEARTBEAT AWAY: PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND SUCCESSION
35 (1968); see e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 4 (amendment empowering Congress to
provide for death of presidential or vice presidential candidate in contingent election before
House or Senate, which has yet to prompt congressional action).
219. 111 CONG. REC. 7940 (1965) (statement of Rep. Poff); see BAYH, supra note 218, at
29–30, 34 (presenting criticisms of empowering amendment based on usurpation of
presidential position).
220. 111 CONG. REC. 7936 (1965) (statement of Rep. Celler); see id. at 7938 (urging
action “lest a catastrophe find us unprepared once again”).
221. See Arthur Krock, In the Nation: Presidential Disability, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1965,
at E11 (attributing final impetus to action to Kennedy assassination).
222. For instance, the Lincoln assassination included efforts to eliminate other leading
figures. The Garfield assassination left the President incapacitated for eighty days and the
Wilson strokes did the same for a lengthy period. Franklin Roosevelt’s death in 1945
occurred on the eve of the nuclear age, and it took nearly a decade after Eisenhower’s last
disability to accomplish change.
223. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11 COMMISSION
REPORT 45 (2004) (stating that United 93 may have attacked the White House or Capitol
Building had passengers not intervened).
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that would have compromised America’s arrangements for assuring
presidential continuity. Clearly, the executive branch got the message.
Vice President Cheney retreated to “undisclosed locations” as a means to
insure continuity of government.224 Yet no legislative change occurred to
address gaps in governmental continuity, which in some respects were more
serious than those addressed in the mid-1960s.225
Significant reform occurred in the mid-1960s, unlike these other
occasions, in part because the principal advocates of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment recognized the opportunity history had provided and crafted an
effective strategy to capitalize on it. They understood that President
Kennedy’s assassination presented a relatively narrow window in which to
accomplish reform.226 The impetus to act would dissipate as memory faded
and attention became diverted.227 They exploited the situation to convert
opportunity into constructive action.
2. Sticking with the Conventional
Although the framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment embraced the
more arduous constitutional approach instead of a statutory remedy, in other
respects they opted for conventional, rather than novel, solutions. The
Twenty-Fifth Amendment boldly tackled problems which prior generations
had ignored, yet its success owed to the fact that it borrowed heavily from
existing institutions and practices rather than pushing new or exotic
approaches. To a great extent, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment simply
codified common law developments in governmental operation that practice
had made familiar. Its genius lay in part in its willingness to offer
conventional, not threatening, solutions to vexing problems.
224. Goldstein, supra note 1, at 84; see NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE
U.S., supra note 223, at 39–40.
225. The greatest problems relate to Congress, not the Presidency. An attack that killed
or disabled a large portion of the House of Representatives could prevent government from
operating as the Constitution prescribes. Although most states allow the governor to fill a
Senate vacancy pending a special election, see U.S. CONST. amend. XVII, the Constitution
does not allow for such appointments to the House of Representatives pending a special
election. See id. art. I, § 2, cl. 4 (“When vacancies happen in the Representation from any
State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.”);
cf. id. amend. XVII (“When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the
Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such
vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to
make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature
may direct.”). For a comprehensive discussion, see CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra
note 7; Howard M. Wasserman, Continuity of Congress: A Play in Three Stages, 53 CATH.
U. L. REV. 949 (2004).
226. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 1 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (stating that
continuity issues “have a ringing urgency today with the tragedy of our martyred President
so fresh in our memory”); id. at 150 (statement of Feerick, scholar on presidential
succession) (“On November 21, 1963, this problem was all but forgotten by the Congress
and the public. On November 22 it almost caused a national crisis.”).
227. Feerick, supra note 122, at 498; see also 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 1
(statement of Rep. Celler) (“The recent tragic death of President Kennedy has served to
arouse public interest in the problem. We cannot permit this interest to languish into apathy
again.”).
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Section 1 simply gave textual sanction to the Tyler Precedent with
respect to death, resignation, or removal of the President. In those
instances, the Vice President would become President (rather than simply
assuming the powers and duties of the office), a practice that had been
followed eight times between 1841 and the Kennedy assassination on
November 22, 1963.228
Although Section 2 created a novel procedure,229 by design, that
arrangement mirrored the practice that had developed since 1940 that the
presidential nominee chose his or her running mate.230 That pattern, and
the migration of the Vice Presidency to the executive branch,231 lent logic
to allowing the President to initiate the Section 2 selection. The
confirmation by the House and Senate drew upon the use of the Senate to
advise and consent to presidential nominees,232 the involvement of the
House and Senate in selecting a President and Vice President under the
contingency election feature of the Constitution, and the fact that together,
the House and Senate essentially reflected the size of the Electoral College
(less the District of Columbia, which had three electoral votes but no voting
representation in Congress). Thus, Section 2 tracked the manner in which
vice presidential candidates were chosen and in which Vice Presidents were
selected.
Sections 3 and 4 resembled, to a great extent, prior understandings
regarding inability determinations. Attorneys General Brownell, William
Rogers, and Robert F. Kennedy had all concluded that the President could
temporarily transfer his power to the Vice President,233 and the agreements
that Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson reached with their
potential successors had included such provisions.234 Section 3 anchored
that interpretation and procedure in the constitutional text.
The Attorneys General had also concluded that the Vice President, as the
person charged to act in the event of a presidential inability, implicitly had
power to determine its existence.235 The presidential agreements had
empowered the Vice President to make that decision after such consultation

228. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
229. 111 CONG. REC. 7955 (1965) (statement of Rep. Rodino) (calling Section 2 “a very
marked departure from anything that we have heretofore known”).
230. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 90 (statement of Rep. McCulloch) (noting
that presidential nominee chooses running mate); 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 4
(statement of Sen. Bayh) (noting that presidential candidate has “great influence” in choice
of running mate); id. at 137 (statement of former Att’y Gen. Brownell) (observing that
political conventions ask presidential nominee to choose running mate); Feerick, supra note
122, at 489 (“The presidential candidate now selects his running mate so that such a
nomination would be consistent with present practice.”).
231. See generally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 134, 140–42, 146–50; Goldstein, supra
note 140, at 525.
232. 111 CONG. REC. 3256 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
233. See, e.g., Presidential Inability, 42 Op. Att’y Gen. 69 (1961) (stating opinion of
Robert F. Kennedy).
234. See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text.
235. See Presidential Inability, supra note 233, at 88–89.
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as he deemed appropriate.236 Section 4 began with that premise but added
checks on vice presidential and presidential behavior. The inclusion of the
Cabinet or such other body as Congress might create provided a check on
the Vice President (although it also provided political cover for him); the
ability of the Vice President and Cabinet to challenge the President’s
determination that he was fit to resume was a check on the President. The
provisions governing a disability dispute reflected, with some modification,
a proposal that Attorney General Rogers made for the Eisenhower
Administration in early 1958 and that the Senate Subcommittee on
Constitutional Amendments endorsed in 1958 and 1959.237 The ABA
conference in January 1964 also essentially favored the approach that
became the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.238
The familiarity of the procedures in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment made
them more palatable. Novel though it was, the Amendment essentially gave
constitutional imprimatur to accepted practice or to familiar proposals from
credible sponsors. It simply imported common sense into the Constitution.
3. Something Is Better Than Nothing
The principal advocates of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment made
substantial progress, not perfection, their goal. They proceeded on the
assumption that many possible outcomes would improve the status quo.
They did not insist on any particular fix, just some solution. As Senator
Jacob K. Javits put it, after submitting a different proposal than that which
was adopted, “[a]ny action in this within the range presented . . . is almost
better than no action, which is the way the situation stands today.”239 It was
not important, said private citizen (and future President) Richard M. Nixon,
that Congress adopt his proposals but that it take some action to address
inability and succession.240 Senator Robert F. Kennedy had misgivings
about Section 4’s reliance on the Cabinet but thought the dangers of
inaction were “greater still.”241
The architects of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment did not make perfection
the enemy of the good. Representative Celler acknowledged that the
proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment was “by no means . . . a perfect bill.

236. Agreement Between the President and the Vice President as to Procedures in the
Event of Presidential Disability, PUB. PAPERS 196 (Mar. 3, 1958); see supra notes 18–19 and
accompanying text.
237. See FEERICK, supra note 8, at 240–42.
238. See AM. BAR ASS’N, CONSENSUS ON PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY AND SUCCESSION,
JANUARY 20 AND 21, 1964, reprinted in 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 6–7. The
ABA consensus differed from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment in two relatively minor
respects. It would have provided that in the absence of a Vice President the person next in
line could act in his stead under the presidential inability procedures and that the Vice
President would be confirmed by a joint session of Congress. See id.
239. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 55 (statement of Sen. Jacob K. Javits).
240. Id. at 234, 238, 244, 250 (statement of former Vice President Nixon).
241. 111 CONG. REC. 15,380 (1965) (statement of Sen. Robert F. Kennedy); see also id. at
15,382 (describing Amendment better than status quo notwithstanding remaining problems).
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No bill can be perfect. Even the sun has its spots. The world of actuality
permits us to attain no perfection.”242
Similarly, they reconciled themselves to the fact that they could not hope
to address “every conceivable situation.”243 They understood they were
leaving some problems unsolved. They were aware of the possibility of a
double vacancy occurring in various ways244 and of the gaps in the electoral
system,245 for instance, but thought that trying to solve those more remote
events would impede achieving agreement on more likely problems. When
Poff asked whether “it would complicate matters greatly” if the Amendment
included a provision empowering the next in line to initiate action declaring
the President disabled in the absence of a Vice President, Bayh replied that
since the next in line was the Speaker of the House such a provision would
open up “the whole can of worms.”246 Brownell conceded that Sections 3
and 4 did not cover every imaginable contingency but argued that they
addressed at least ninety percent of the foreseeable problems and on that
basis deserved adoption before further mishaps occurred.247
The framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment focused on the principal
problems even at the cost of abandoning features to which some were
242. Id. at 7936 (statement of Rep. Celler); see also 110 CONG. REC. 22,995 (1964)
(statement of Sen. Bayh).
243. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 94 (statement of Powell, president-elect,
American Bar Association); see also 111 CONG. REC. 7937 (1965) (statement of Rep. Celler)
(referring to the impossibility of addressing “every conceivable contingency”).
244. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 5 (statement of Rep. McCulloch) (raising the
possibility of simultaneous disabilities of the top two officers, a disabled President in the
absence of a Vice President, and a double vacancy before inauguration); 1964 Senate
Hearings, supra note 6, at 19–21 (statement of Sen. Samuel Ervin, Jr.) (“[I]t is quite
conceivable in this day of nuclear weapons and even in long-range rifles that you might have
had a situation where both the Vice President and President died simultaneously or about the
same time . . . .”); 111 CONG. REC. 3253 (1965) (statements of Sens. Bayh and Hruska)
(discussing the possibility of a double disability or presidential disability and vice
presidential vacancy); id. at 3266, 3268 (statement of Sen. Dirksen) (discussing possibility of
a double disability, vice presidential disability, or presidential disability and vice presidential
vacancy); see also 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 57 (statement of Rep. Peter
Rodino) (raising possibility of disability of Acting President); id. (statement of Sen. Bayh)
(noting possibility of death of President-Elect and Vice President-Elect); id. at 78
(statements of Rep. Richard Poff and Sen. Bayh) (raising possibility of presidential disability
absent Vice President).
245. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 31–35 (statement of Sen. Mike Monroney);
see also 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 57 (statement of Sen. Bayh) (noting
possibility of death of President-Elect and Vice President-Elect); id. at 78 (statement of Rep.
Poff and Sen. Bayh). In his message asking Congress to approve the proposals offered by
Bayh (Senate Joint Resolution 1) and Celler (House Joint Resolution 1) dealing with
presidential inability and vice presidential vacancy, President Johnson proposed a separate
constitutional amendment addressing continuity issues relating to death of a President-Elect
or Vice President-Elect between the November election and the inauguration. See Special
Message to the Congress on Presidential Disability and Related Matters, 1 PUB. PAPERS 100,
102 (Jan. 28, 1965); Felix Belair, Jr., Senators Speed Disability Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2,
1965, at 15 (reporting Bayh’s plan to submit separate constitutional amendment regarding
pre-inauguration contingencies and stating that issue was separated to expedite Senate Joint
Resolution 1).
246. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 78.
247. Id. at 242 (statement of former Att’y Gen. Brownell).
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strongly committed, such as restoring a Cabinet line of succession or
addressing pre-inaugural problems.248 Some contingencies were left
unaddressed because
the more complicated you make a constitutional amendment, quite
frankly, the more contingencies for which you provide, the more difficult
it is to get it passed. . . . What we tried to do is provide for the most likely
eventualities and hope we can get it through, feeling we would have most
of these things covered.249

4. Compromise
Consistent with the realization that the status quo was unacceptable, the
architects of the Amendment understood progress depended on their
willingness to compromise. Feerick sounded this theme when he told the
Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments that “[t]he time has
come for those who are genuinely interested in the safety of this Nation to
stop emphasizing those points on which they differ and to start emphasizing
those points on which they agree.”250 The framers of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment believed that failure to reach consensus had, in the past,
prevented reform.251 By word and deed, they successfully cultivated a
spirit of compromise and the Amendment Congress ultimately proposed
reflected a series of compromises.252 For instance, their formulation for
filling a vice presidential vacancy fell somewhere on the middle of the
spectrum of the proposals Congress considered. It gave the President
greater control over the selection of a Vice President than did Senator
Ervin’s proposal that Congress elect a new Vice President,253 or that of
Senator Frank Church that Congress choose a Vice President from two to
five candidates that the President nominated,254 but less control than the
proposal former Vice President Nixon and others offered that would have
allowed the President to nominate someone for consideration by the
Electoral College.255 They added language to Section 4 to allow Congress
to replace the Cabinet with some other body in order to address the
preference of some, that the entire issue be left to Congress to resolve

248. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 48–49 (statements of Sen. Bayh and
Professor Kirby).
249. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 57 (statement of Sen. Bayh); see also Krock,
supra note 221 (explaining that proponents of Senate Joint Resolution 1 feared a
comprehensive amendment would “invite a mass attack”).
250. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 150 (statement of Feerick, scholar on
presidential succession).
251. 111 CONG. REC. 3255 (1965) (statement of Sen. Bayh); id. (statement of Sen. Ervin).
252. Id. at 7940 (statement of Rep. Poff); 110 CONG. REC. 22,997 (1964) (statement of
Sen. Ervin); see also Editorial, The Disability Amendment, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1965, at E8
(praising disability provisions for charting “middle course”); Senators Would Let President
Fill Vice-Presidential Vacancy, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1964, at 45 (quoting Senator Keating
as willing to support Senate Joint Resolution 139 if his proposed modification was rejected).
253. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 19–21 (statement of Sen. Ervin).
254. 110 CONG. REC. 22,997 (1964) (statement of Sen. Frank Church).
255. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 233–34.
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through legislation.256 That approach tried “to make the best of both
worlds.”257 The time limits in Section 4—that the Vice President and
Cabinet had four days to challenge the President’s declaration that he was
able to discharge the duties of the office, that Congress would assemble
within forty-eight hours to decide a disability dispute between the President
and Vice President, and that Congress would decide such a dispute within
twenty-one days—were all products of compromises, and in some instances
of multiple compromises, within the House and Senate and between the two
branches.258
5. Dedicated Leadership
Congress would not have proposed the Twenty-Fifth Amendment but for
the dedicated leadership of Bayh and others. For a freshman senator in the
first third of his term, chairing the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments provided a rare and precious early opportunity to demonstrate
leadership in the Senate. Following the death of the prior chair, Senator
Estes Kefauver, and less than two months before the Kennedy
assassination, Senator James Eastland, chair of the Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, acceded to Bayh’s request that he allow him to chair that
subcommittee rather than closing it as planned.259
That decision, fortuitous in multiple ways, represented a turning point.
Passing a constitutional amendment addressing presidential continuity
became Bayh’s mission. He offered his proposal, Senate Joint Resolution
139, on December 12, 1963, less than three weeks after the Kennedy
assassination, and announced that his subcommittee would conduct
comprehensive hearings on presidential succession and inability the
following month.260 He helped formulate and articulate the strategic
decisions reflected above—choosing the constitutional route, sticking with
conventional solutions, pushing for some reform, and making compromises
even when they meant leaving some areas untouched. But he also focused
on the problem in a single-minded way, which a more senior senator with
other responsibilities would not have done. He skillfully accessed the
talents and resources of others to lend clout to the effort—enlisting Senator
Ervin as a principal Senate advocate, using Brownell to obtain help from
former President Eisenhower and from Representative Celler, the chair of

256. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 84–85 (statement of Sen. Bayh); id. at 253
(statement of former Att’y Gen. Brownell); 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 46
(statement of Professor Kirby).
257. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 132 (statement of Professor Freund).
258. See also 111 CONG. REC. 15,594–95 (1965) (statement of Sen. Ervin) (attributing
success of effort to Bayh’s willingness to compromise). See generally BAYH, supra note 218;
FEERICK, supra note 48, at 83–110; E.W. Kenworthy, Conferees Back Succession Plan, N.Y.
TIMES, June 25, 1965, at 1 (discussing Senate-House compromises).
259. BAYH, supra note 218, at 28–29; see also Krock, supra note 221 (crediting Bayh’s
leadership).
260. John D. Morris, Study of Succession Is Planned in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13,
1963, at 1.
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the House Committee on the Judiciary,261 and lobbying friends at the White
House to obtain a presidential endorsement of his proposal.262
Bayh was not the only leader in the effort. Celler had been interested in
the issue since the mid-1950s263 and had then articulated some of the basic
principles that later became the basis for the Eisenhower-Nixon agreement
and part of Sections 1, 3, and 4.264 He was disposed to shepherd House
Joint Resolution 1 through the House. Brownell had also played a critical
role in developing the ideas behind Sections 1, 3, and 4 as Eisenhower’s
attorney general and resumed his involvement with the issue following the
Kennedy assassination.265 The ABA convened a conference of twelve
prominent attorneys to consider the issue two months after Kennedy’s
assassination; it released its consensus report of guiding principles in
January 1964.266 Those principles largely tracked Bayh’s proposal, Senate
Joint Resolution 139, and the eventual Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Senior
Senate colleagues—Ervin, Everett Dirksen, Roman Hruska, Javits, John
Stennis, John Sherman Cooper, Mike Mansfield—and some in the House,
most notably Representative Poff, in addition to Celler, played constructive
roles at important junctures. But without Bayh’s commitment to moving
the measure, it would not have emerged.
6. Percolating Ideas
Contextual factors, particularly the Eisenhower disabilities and Kennedy
assassination, had drawn attention to problems of presidential continuity.
Yet scholars and a few public officials played an important role in keeping
the problem and the search for solutions on the national radar screen. Celler
had reached out to many in the academic community in 1955 in a search for
solutions.267 Brownell and then Rogers offered proposals regarding
presidential inability in the late 1950s that foreshadowed Sections 1, 3, and
4.268 These ideas and others were explored in hearings in both houses of

261. BAYH, supra note 218, at 61–62, 75–77, 119–24, 162–63.
262. Id. at 95, 137, 163–68, 173–79; Interview by Paige E. Mulhollan with Birch Bayh,
U.S. Senator from Ind., in Austin, Tex. (Feb. 12, 1969), at 2 [hereinafter Bayh Interview] (on
file with the Lyndon Baines Johnson Library Oral History Collection), available at
http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/archives.hom/oralhistory.hom/Bayh-B/Bayh.PDF.
263. Celler had directed the staff of the House Judiciary Committee to study presidential
inability before Eisenhower’s heart attack in September 1955. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 52.
It subsequently published the responses of an interdisciplinary assortment of scholars on the
topic. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 84TH CONG., PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY
(Comm. Print 1956) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL INABILITY]; see also 1965 House Hearings,
supra note 5, at 238 (statement of former Att’y Gen. Brownell) (discussing Celler’s and his
prior roles).
264. See, e.g., Representative Emanuel Celler, Chairman, House Comm. on the Judiciary,
The Problem of Presidential Inability—A Proposed Solution (Aug. 2, 1956), in 19
F.R.D. 153.
265. BROWNELL, supra note 14, at 273–79.
266. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 59–61.
267. See STAFF OF H. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, supra note 263, at 2.
268. See e.g., BROWNELL, supra note 14, at 277–79; FEERICK, supra note 48, at 52–56;
FEERICK, supra note 8, at 227–29, 238–42.
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Congress during the late 1950s and early 1960s.269 Prior to the Kennedy
assassination, Feerick, then a young lawyer, published an influential
scholarly examination of the subject in the Fordham Law Review.270
Following the assassination, Feerick wrote several other articles, which
pointed out the importance of the problem and made the case for the
proposals set forth in Senate Joint Resolution 139 and Senate Joint
Resolution 1.271 The esteemed constitutional law scholar, Paul A. Freund,
made important contributions and Bayh drew from the testimony of some
eminent academics, even those who had misgivings regarding some aspects
of his proposed solutions, such as presidential scholars Clinton Rossiter and
Richard Neustadt.272
The discussion of the issue, among public officials, scholars, lawyers,
and others over a period of time273 helped create a broad-based
commitment to the importance of achieving some reform. Moreover, a
consensus developed around the merits of Bayh’s proposal, which
essentially reflected the recommendations of the ABA conference on the
subject.274 Even those who offered different proposals viewed Bayh’s
proposal as a reasonable approach and a substantial improvement on the
status quo. The endorsement of experts lent credibility to the enterprise.
7. Mobilized Support
The Amendment succeeded in part because of the broad support it
attracted, at an elite and grass roots level. Its proponents enlisted the help
of some who had been intimately involved with problems of presidential
succession and inability. Presidents Eisenhower and Johnson both spoke
publicly in support of the proposed Amendment or its central ideas as did
269. See generally FEERICK, supra note 48, at 52–57; FEERICK, supra note 8, at 238–42.
270. Feerick, supra note 17. Two days after President Kennedy’s assassination, Feerick’s
article was praised as among the “best studies” of presidential inability in a comprehensive
story about constitutional issues relating to presidential continuity. Arthur Krock, The
Continuum, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1963, at E9. Feerick also wrote a letter on November 8,
1963, which the New York Times published on November 17, 1963, five days before the
assassination of President Kennedy, in which he discussed the need for action regarding
presidential inability. See John D. Feerick, Letter to the Editor, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1963,
at E8. Feerick said that Congress had “consistently failed the American people” by not
addressing presidential inability issues. Id. Other scholars and officials had discussed the
issues during the 1950s and early 1960s. See e.g., RICHARD H. HANSEN, THE YEAR WE HAD
NO PRESIDENT (1962); RUTH C. SILVA, PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION (1951); Herbert Brownell,
Jr., Presidential Inability: The Need for a Constitutional Amendment, 68 YALE L.J. 189
(1958).
271. See e.g., Feerick, supra note 122; John D. Feerick, Problem of Presidential Inability:
The Problem and a Solution, 50 A.B.A. J. 321 (1964); John D. Feerick, Proposed
Amendment on Presidential Inability and Vice-Presidential Vacancy, 51 A.B.A. J. 915
(1965); John D. Feerick, The Problem of Presidential Inability—It Must be Solved Now, 36
N.Y. ST. B.J. 181 (1964); John D. Feerick, The Proposed Twenty-Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution, 34 FORDHAM L. REV. 173 (1965); John D. Feerick, Vice Presidential
Succession: In Support of the Bayh-Celler Plan, 18 S.C. L. REV. 226 (1966).
272. See 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 128, 166, 214.
273. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 238 (statement of former Att’y Gen.
Brownell) (referring to hearing as “climax” of ten year study); id. at 245 (same).
274. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 65.
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former Vice President Nixon.275 Former Attorney General Brownell was
an active and effective voice and some of his successors also played helpful
roles.276 Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach ultimately abandoned his
earlier support for an amendment empowering Congress to act to endorse
Senate Joint Resolution 1.277
Bayh involved the ABA in his push for a constitutional amendment in
December 1963. It had previously favored the empowering amendment,
which Senator Keating championed.278 Beginning in January 1964, the
ABA held a variety of public and private sessions on the topic and endorsed
and lobbied in its favor at a national and local level. A blue ribbon ABA
group endorsed a consensus approach, which largely coincided with Bayh’s
proposal in January 1964.279 Bayh spoke to the ABA House of Delegates,
after which it voted to endorse his plan.280 ABA Presidents Walter Craig
and Lewis Powell testified in support of Bayh’s proposals and wrote and
spoke on the topic. Powell pledged that the ABA would “‘throw our full
weight’” behind the Bayh-Celler proposal in January 1965,281 and ABA
staff worked to lobby members of Congress and to develop support around
the country. When the Senate and House conferees were unable to reach
agreement on the last sticking point, ABA President Powell met with Celler
to urge him to persuade his colleagues to compromise. The media ran any
number of stories on the proposed measure and it received widespread
endorsement. The ABA also worked to persuade states to ratify the
proposed amendment.282 From inception to ratification, the ABA played a
critical role in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment.283
8. Something for Everyone
The Amendment’s prospects were enhanced by its inclusive nature.284
The measure won the support of the executive branch in part because it
rejected approaches—congressional nomination of a Vice President,
congressional initiation of inability proceedings—which would have
intruded on presidential turf. Sections 3 and 4 paralleled proposals of
Eisenhower’s Attorneys General and were accepted by the Johnson White
275. See e.g., Russell Baker, Nixon, in Capitol, Essays 2 Roles, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1964,
at 15; Eisenhower Lists Succession Views, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1964, at 25; Krock, supra
note 221 (citing importance of Johnson’s support in House of Representatives).
276. BROWNELL, supra note 14, at 279.
277. Bayh Interview, supra note 262, at 3.
278. BAYH, supra note 218, at 36, 42–50.
279. Id. at 171–73.
280. Id. at 62–63.
281. Felix Belair, Jr., Capitol Hearings Set on Succession, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 1965, at
15 (quoting Powell).
282. BROWNELL, supra note 14, at 279.
283. See, e.g., BAYH, supra note 218, at 42–43, 45–46, 50, 52, 62–63, 336; Kenworthy,
supra note 258, at 16 (citing Bayh’s acknowledgement of the ABA’s role); Bayh Interview,
supra note 262, at 3.
284. See, e.g., Fred Graham, What Kind of Amendment on Disability?, N.Y. TIMES, July
4, 1965, at E4 (crediting Bayh with pasting together provisions “borrowed” from powerful
sources).
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House and Justice Department. Congress was given roles in Sections 2 and
4. Although the framers wanted to elevate vice presidential confirmation
beyond the normal advice and consent procedure and to mimic in some
respects the size of the Electoral College, they also recognized that a
confirmation procedure which included both houses was more likely to win
bicameral approval than one which, like the normal advice and consent
procedure, only involved the Senate.285 The provision giving Congress the
option of replacing the Cabinet with an “other body” made the Amendment
more palatable to those who thought Congress should have a greater role.286
9. Navigating Around Personal Sensitivities
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment was ratified in part because the framers
were able to navigate away from proposals that were seen as disparaging
powerful figures who were in the line of succession. In particular, much
discussion regarding the need to change the system as it existed following
Kennedy’s assassination focused on the common perception that neither
McCormack nor Hayden provided an acceptable successor.287 Some of
McCormack’s allies regarded Section 2 as an affront and the perceived
insult to McCormack made House action impossible until the election of a
new Vice President removed that innuendo.
Bayh took four steps to numb any insult. First, he dropped from the
original version of his proposal provisions that would have changed the line
of succession following the Vice President to run through the Cabinet as a
matter of constitutional law.288 Second, he consistently emphasized that the
need for a Vice President was independent of the identity of the Speaker.
The inherent nature of the Vice President, as the office had developed,
made it ideally suited to serve as the successor while the possibility that the
Speaker would belong to the opposite party and his ongoing duties made
him ill-suited for the role.289 Third, Bayh felt compelled to rebut frequently
the suggestion that McCormack was not up to acting as President, as in his
opening statement at the 1964 hearings290 and on other occasions.291 There

285. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 163 (statement of Sen. Bayh).
286. 1965 House Hearings, supra note 5, at 253 (statement of former Att’y Gen.
Brownell).
287. See, e.g., BAYH, supra note 218, at 40–42; supra note 22.
288. Change Doubted in Succession Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 1964, at 40 (quoting
Bayh as planning to drop proposal to change succession law to avoid perceived rebuke to
McCormack); see also 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 156 (statement of Feerick,
scholar on presidential succession). McCormack favored retaining a legislative line of
succession after the Vice President. See Ike, Truman Differ on Line of Succession, CHI.
TRIB., Jan. 9, 1964, at 17 (quoting McCormack reaffirming his support for the existing
presidential succession law placing the Speaker of the House of Representatives after the
Vice President); McCormack For Succession Law But Would Not Obstruct Change, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 9. 1963, at 1 (quoting McCormack’s preference for legislative line of
succession).
289. BAYH, supra note 218, at 40–42 (describing conversation with McCormack).
290. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 2 (praising McCormack).

2010] LESSONS IN ENSURING PRESIDENTIAL CONTINUITY

153

was no question about McCormack’s “capabilit[ies],” Bayh asserted.292
The issue went beyond “the age or personality of the Speaker.”293 There
were problems relating to separation of powers, whether a Speaker would
resign his or her seat to act as President if the Chief Executive were
disabled, the possibility of shift in party control of the Presidency, and the
competing burdens of running the House of Representatives and
understudying the President.294 Finally, Bayh reconciled himself to the fact
that the House would not move on an amendment which included a
provision to fill a vice presidential vacancy until a new Vice President was
inaugurated following the 1964 presidential election.295
10. Building Momentum
Several events, some serendipitous, some the product of sound strategy,
helped Bayh develop a consensus to propel his proposal forward. Bayh’s
subcommittee reported Senate Joint Resolution 139 unanimously in 1964
with the understanding that Keating and others could seek to replace it with
their different proposals on the floor.296 When the Senate Judiciary
Committee met to consider whether to report Senate Joint Resolution 139 to
the Senate, some sentiment favored reporting several competing proposals
out, a course almost followed. Bayh prevented that result by arguing that
such a move would prevent any action and by agreeing that others could
offer their proposals as amendments on the floor. Since the committee
members knew Congress would not act until the next session, some saw
little risk in acceding to Bayh’s request.297
Bayh had asked majority leader Mike Mansfield to schedule the topic for
floor debate during the fall of 1964 even though there was no prospect of
the House acting.298 Since Section 2 pivoted on the Vice Presidency,
discussion of it provided a vehicle for Democrats to emphasize the
comparative advantage of the Democratic vice presidential candidate,
Hubert H. Humphrey, over his Republican rival, Representative William E.
Miller (who Barry M. Goldwater admitted he had chosen because “he
drives Johnson nuts”299). Mansfield ultimately scheduled debate on
291. 110 CONG. REC. 22,991 (1964); BAYH, supra note 218, at 40–42; see also 110 CONG.
REC. at 22,993 (1964) (statement of Sen. Saltonstall); id. at 22,996 (statement of Sen. Bayh);
id. at 23,000 (statement of Sen. Jacob K. Javits).
292. 1964 Senate Hearings, supra note 6, at 2.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 2, 63 (statement of Sen. Bayh); id. at 63–65 (statement of Sen. Moss); id. at
167 (statement of Richard Neustadt, Professor of Government, Columbia University)
(praising McCormack but criticizing legislative succession).
295. BAYH, supra note 218, at 40–42, 95–96; Bayh Interview, supra note 262, at 2
(recounting President Johnson’s advice that the House would not act until a Vice President
was elected).
296. BAYH, supra note 218, at 127–28; see also Senators Would Let President Fill VicePresidential Vacancy, supra note 252, (quoting Sen. Keating as willing to support Senate
Joint Resolution 139 if his proposed modification was rejected).
297. BAYH, supra note 218, at 130–35.
298. Id. at 137–38.
299. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 20, at 81.
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September 28, 1964, and much of the discussion, by Democrats and
Republicans alike, addressed the importance of the second office. The
Senate passed the proposed amendment by a voice vote with relatively few
members on the floor.300
The following day, to Bayh’s chagrin, Senator Stennis objected that the
Constitution should not be amended by voice vote.301 Accordingly, a roll
call vote was held at which Bayh’s Senate Joint Resolution 139 passed
sixty-five to zero.302 Senators knew the House would not act, which
lessened the significance of their votes; some perhaps did not scrutinize the
proposal as much as they might have. Still, the revote put sixty-five
Senators on record in favor of Bayh’s proposal and thereby strengthened his
hand in the next Congress.303 The favorable Senate action in 1964 enabled
the Senate to act on the proposal early during the next Congress before
other measures crowded its calendar.304
The election of Johnson as President and particularly, of Humphrey as
Vice President, removed some of the sensitivity from the issue. Celler, the
chair of the House Judiciary Committee, agreed to introduce in the House a
resolution (House Joint Resolution 1) parallel to that Bayh offered in the
Senate (Senate Joint Resolution 1). The White House called for action on
presidential continuity in Johnson’s State of the Union305 and Johnson
followed with a message to Congress calling for action on presidential
inability and vice presidential vacancy and endorsing Bayh’s approach.306
The ultimate votes were almost anticlimactic.307
11. Conclusion
To be sure the historic context contributed to the ratification of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Yet it is a mistake to attribute the Amendment
to the temper of those times to the exclusion of all else. On other occasions,
continuity crises have not produced action. Events did not make the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment inevitable. Rather, the Amendment occurred

300. BAYH, supra note 218, at 156.
301. Id. at 157–58.
302. 110 CONG. REC. 23,061 (1964).
303. BAYH, supra note 218, at 159.
304. Id. at 202.
305. Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union, 1 PUB. PAPERS 1, 8 (Jan.
4, 1965) (“I will propose laws to insure the necessary continuity of leadership should the
President become disabled or die.”). Johnson’s formulation led some to believe he did not
support the Bayh-Celler plan but would offer a different proposal. Johnson rebutted that
misconception twenty-four days later. See infra note 306 and accompanying text.
306. Special Message to the Congress on Presidential Disability and Related Matters, 1
PUB. PAPERS 100, 102 (Jan. 28, 1965).
307. Senate Joint Resolution 1 passed 72–0 in the Senate on February 19, 1965. 111
CONG. REC. 3286 (1965). In amended form, it passed 368–29 in the House on April 13,
1965. Id. at 7968–69. After conference, during which contention centered around the
timetable for congressional action under Section 4, the House approved the proposed
amendment by voice vote. Id. at 15,216. The Senate did so in a 68–5 vote on July 6, 1965.
Id. at 15,596.
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because of the manner in which Bayh and others responded to the
circumstances they encountered.
Some of the decisions they made may have little bearing on the issues
that remain today. Others, however, may provide guidance for those
interested in bringing further reform.
III. THE MODERN CONTEXT
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment represented a major advance in ensuring
presidential continuity. Its framers made a necessary strategic choice to
focus their efforts on remedying the principal problems rather than to
pursue a quixotic quest for a comprehensive fix. Accordingly, proposals to
address disability determinations absent a Vice President, the line of
succession after the Vice President, and pre-inauguration problems were
deferred.
Forty-five years after Congress acted on the Twenty-Fifth Amendment,
those gaps remain. They do so, however, in a different context than that in
which the framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment acted.
Two
developments since 1967 make the system of ensuring presidential
continuity stronger than it was the day the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was
ratified. Three other developments add urgency to moving toward further
reform.
This part briefly discusses the way in which the enhanced role of the
Vice Presidency and precedents under the Twenty-Fifth Amendment
contribute to presidential continuity. It then identifies several developments
since the ratification of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment that suggest that
continuity issues merit further attention and action.
A. Exceeding Expectations: The Vice Presidency Transformed
The recent transformation of the Vice Presidency has enhanced the
ability of the system to respond to presidential continuity problems. The
Twenty-Fifth Amendment reflected a new and optimistic vision of the Vice
Presidency.308 The development of the office has, however, as Yogi Berra
remarked in an entirely different context,309 more than exceeded those
expectations. That vision had not become reality when the Amendment
was proposed or ratified,310 and the following decade made clear remaining
limitations of the office. Johnson mistreated Humphrey, his able Vice
President,311 and Richard Nixon abused Spiro T. Agnew, his not

308. See Goldstein, supra note 140, at 509, 526–40.
309. When asked whether Don Mattingly had exceeded expectations, Yogi Berra replied,
“I’d say he’s done more than that.” YOGI BERRA, THE YOGI BOOK 98 (1998).
310. Goldstein, supra note 140, at 543–44.
311. See HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, THE EDUCATION OF A PUBLIC MAN: MY LIFE AND
POLITICS 314, 327, 328–30 (1976); Joel K. Goldstein, More Agony than Ecstasy: Hubert H.
Humphrey as Vice President, in AT THE PRESIDENT’S SIDE: THE VICE PRESIDENCY IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 67, at 103, 103–23.
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particularly able and corrupt Vice President.312 Gerald Ford liked, but
dumped, Nelson Rockefeller from his 1976 ticket; before Ford’s term
ended, some respected scholars of American government were calling for
dumping the office.313
The Vice Presidency of Walter F. Mondale constituted the “big bang”
which brought the Vice Presidency into line with the vision implicit in the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment.314 Mondale became Jimmy Carter’s senior
adviser and troubleshooter and gained a range of resources that his
successors have retained. Every Vice President, beginning with Mondale,
has had one of the principal offices in the West Wing near the Oval Office;
has had daily access to the President; has been included on the White House
distribution list; and has participated, either personally or through staff, on
all significant policy making councils. Vice Presidents and their staffs now
are integral parts of White House decision making. In addition, Vice
Presidents perform significant troubleshooting.
The level of vice
presidential influence varies depending on the mix of a number of factors,
yet vice presidential significance is now inevitable.315
In addition, the quality of Vice Presidents has increased. Virtually all of
those who have served as Vice President since Mondale have been among
the ablest public figures of their times,316 and institutional changes provide
candidates incentive to choose well. Most questionable choices are made
by those far behind in the polls whose options are limited or who need to
take some dramatic step to shake up the race.
The transformation of the office has important implications for ensuring
presidential continuity. The enhanced role of the Vice President better
prepares that officer to succeed in the event of presidential vacancy by
keeping him engaged in decision making. The status of the Vice President
as an integral part of the President’s team, not an outsider, makes it more
312. See JULES WITCOVER, VERY STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: THE SHORT AND UNHAPPY
MARRIAGE OF RICHARD NIXON & SPIRO AGNEW (2007); John Robert Greene, “I’ll Continue
to Speak Out”: Spiro T. Agnew as Vice President, in AT THE PRESIDENT’S SIDE: THE VICE
PRESIDENCY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, supra note 67, at 124, 127–28, 130–31.
313. See, e.g., Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., On the Presidential Succession, 89 POL. SCI. Q.
475, 478 (1974); see also ERIC F. GOLDMAN, THE TRAGEDY OF LYNDON JOHNSON 240 (1969)
(favoring caretaker government followed by special election); Richard Neustadt, On The
Threshold of the White House, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, July 1974, at 63, 72 (agreeing with
Schlesinger). See generally ALLAN P. SINDLER, UNCHOSEN PRESIDENTS: THE VICEPRESIDENT AND OTHER FRUSTRATIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION 49–50, 112–13 (1976)
(discussing proposal to abolish vice presidency).
314. See generally Joel K. Goldstein, The Rising Power of the Modern Vice Presidency,
38 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 374 (2008).
315. See generally Joel K. Goldstein, Cheney, Vice Presidential Power, and the War on
Terror, 40 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 102, 104 (2010); Goldstein, supra note 314. For
additional commentary on vice presidential influence, see also PAUL C. LIGHT, VICE
PRESIDENTIAL POWER: ADVICE AND INFLUENCE IN THE WHITE HOUSE (1984); Michael
Nelson, Background Paper, in A HEARTBEAT AWAY: REPORT OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
FUND TASK FORCE ON THE VICE PRESIDENCY 37 (1988) (stating Vice Presidency “came into
full flower” under Mondale).
316. Joel K. Goldstein, Resolved, The Vice Presidency Should Be Abolished: Con, in
DEBATING THE PRESIDENCY: CONFLICTING PERSPECTIVES ON THE AMERICAN EXECUTIVE 179,
182–84 (Richard J. Ellis & Michael Nelson eds., 2d ed. 2010).
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likely that Presidents or their associates will use the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment to transfer power from an incapacitated President when
appropriate. Accordingly, there is reason to believe succession under
Section 1 will achieve the Amendment’s continuity goals and that Sections
3 and 4 will be implemented more often and more effectively than might
have been the case when the Amendment was proposed or ratified.317
B. Twenty-Fifth Amendment Precedents
The implementations of the various provisions of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment since 1967 have established some helpful precedents. I will
not repeat the earlier discussion other than to underscore several significant
features. First, the confirmations of Ford and Rockefeller provided a set of
precedents involving presidential decision making and congressional
conduct.318 In each case, a Congress in which Democratic majorities
controlled both houses overwhelmingly confirmed a Republican nominee.
They helped establish an expectation that a President is entitled to
confirmation of a presidential Vice President and that Congress is
responsible to make a thorough investigation under the circumstances and
to act in a manner generally free of partisanship. Second, Presidents have
established the pattern of transferring power when they undergo anesthesia
and have developed other protocols for handling unexpected inabilities.319
C. Wake Up Calls
These positive changes do not, however, justify complacency or the
relative inaction in this area since 1967. Three quite different developments
suggest further action is needed.
First, although circumstances have never required anyone other than a
Vice President to discharge presidential powers following a presidential
vacancy, conditions post 9/11 increase the possibility of a continuity crisis
involving multiple vacancies. America narrowly avoided a double vacancy
even before the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. The specter of such an event
increases in an age of terrorism in which extraordinary weapons are
becoming more readily accessible to non-state actors whose ultimate
professed ambition is to injure seriously the United States. Government
buildings were among the actual and intended targets on 9/11. Vice
President Cheney’s subsequent practice of working from undisclosed
locations reflected the perceived need to disperse the nation’s top two
officers to upset any plans to create a continuity crisis. The possibility of an
attack that would kill or disable multiple leaders cannot be dismissed.
Second, since 1967, presidential health has attracted increased attention.
Scholars have produced studies that provide a greater awareness of the
variety and complexity of situations that might occasion presidential

317. Goldstein, supra note 110, at 165, 205.
318. See supra Part I.D.2.
319. See supra Part I.D.3.
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inability and the difficulty of addressing it in certain situations.320 We now
know that Franklin Pierce and Calvin Coolidge were depressed for much of
their time in office following the death of their sons and that, in Coolidge’s
case, the trauma transformed his performance,321 that Franklin Roosevelt’s
health was failing before he ran for a fourth term,322 and that John F.
Kennedy’s medical problems were more severe and his drug abuse more
reckless than anyone could have imagined in 1967.323 Some close aides of
Lyndon B. Johnson questioned his sanity,324 and Richard M. Nixon’s
mental state in the last weeks of his Presidency was sufficiently precarious
to cause some close associates to take extraordinary precautions.325
Research on presidential health has disclosed that various Presidents
suffered from serious ailments, which, to varying degrees, compromised
their ability to serve.
Similarly, events have reminded us of the mortality of existing Presidents
and Vice Presidents. Ford was the target of two assassination attempts,
Reagan was shot, and other efforts to kill various Presidents have been
foiled. Reagan was diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease some years after
leaving office. Some suspected, both while he was in office and thereafter,
that he was impaired to an extent, which questioned his ability to serve.326
George H.W. Bush had one heart-related episode as President; Cheney had
several as Vice President.
Finally, the 2000 presidential election provided a contemporary version
of a failure of the presidential electoral system to produce a clear winner. It
raised the specter that vote counting issues could impede the ability of the
presidential electoral system to produce a victor, educated many to the fact
that counting ballots may sometimes become a subjective exercise, and
introduced the possibility that presidential elections could become the
subject of litigation so that judicial decisions as well as electoral counts
could shape the outcome. Moreover, the absence of reform following the
Bush election rebutted the common expectation that election of a President
without an electoral vote majority would sound the death knell of the
Electoral College. In fact, the Bush election, based on a disputed electoral
vote majority despite receiving more than 500,000 fewer popular votes than
Vice President Al Gore,327 made reform, which would have been difficult
320. See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 48, at 197–200. See generally MANAGING CRISIS:
PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY AND THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT, supra note 96;
MCDERMOTT, supra note 21.
321. See ROBERT E. GILBERT, THE TORMENTED PRESIDENT: CALVIN COOLIDGE, DEATH,
AND CLINICAL DEPRESSION 250 (2003).
322. See GILBERT, supra note 113, at 53–60.
323. MCDERMOTT, supra note 21, at 118–56.
324. See GILBERT, supra note 113, at 199.
325. See generally MCDERMOTT, supra note 21, at 157–96.
326. See Jerrold M. Post, Behavioral Disorders, in PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY: PAPERS,
DISCUSSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT AND ISSUES OF
INABILITY AND DISABILITY AMONG PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 52, 56–57 (James F.
Toole & Robert J. Joynt eds., 2001).
327. David Stout, The Final Tally: Gore’s Lead in the Popular Vote Now Exceeds
500,000, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2000, at A11.

2010] LESSONS IN ENSURING PRESIDENTIAL CONTINUITY

159

in any event, impossible since it committed the Republican party to
preserving the institution so as not to impeach Bush’s entitlement to the
Presidency.
One would have hoped that the confluence of these events would have
produced appropriate reform. It has not. Some private groups have studied
these problems,328 and the Continuity of Government Commission has
engaged in a comprehensive review.329 No legislative progress has
resulted.
IV. AFTER THE VICE PRESIDENT
A. Introduction: Succession After the Vice President
The Vice Presidency does not provide protection against all presidential
continuity contingencies. Some line of succession after the Vice President
must exist to address a double vacancy which occurs, whether before or
after the inauguration. It must address a variety of contingencies—death,
resignation, removal, inability, and failure to qualify—which could produce
that double vacancy. This list understates the complexity of the challenge
since some labels (e.g., inability, failure to qualify) summarize multiple
precipitating causes.
Moreover, vacancies may present different
considerations depending on whether they create the need for a successor
on a permanent or temporary basis. Finally, there are no formal procedures
for declaring a President disabled absent a functioning Vice President.
A series of gaps mar the system for assuring presidential continuity after
the Vice Presidency. Four general points are worth considering at the
outset. First, although these gaps involve contingencies that are seemingly
remote, they cannot be dismissed, especially in an age of terrorism and
proliferating nuclear weapons. In some cases, they would prove very
difficult to resolve if they did occur. This could prove especially true
regarding the line of succession after the Vice President in a situation where
the electoral system fails to produce a President.330
Second, these problems are, to a great extent, interrelated. For instance,
the identity of the person(s) next in line behind the Vice President will
affect the handling of presidential inability absent a functioning Vice
President. Although pre-inaugural and post-inaugural contingencies
implicate different constitutional provisions, a consideration of who should
follow the Vice President must address both time periods.
Third, solving some of these problems may be complicated if, as seems
likely, Congress resists changing two overarching features of the existing
landscape. In particular, Congress is likely to be disposed to perpetuate the
current method, which places legislative leaders atop the line of succession.
328. See e.g., MILLER CTR. COMM’N NO. 4, supra note 85; PRESIDENTIAL DISABILITY:
PAPERS, DISCUSSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT AND
ISSUES OF INABILITY AND DISABILITY AMONG PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, supra note
326.
329. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 4.
330. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 69–70, 72–73.
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Moreover, the existence of the Electoral College system has residual
support even though it complicates some pre-inaugural contingencies.
Finally, to the extent Congress has acted in this area, its approach has
suffered badly from its tendency to adopt formulaic, one size fits all
remedies rather than tailoring solutions to the problems presented. In short,
the Presidential Succession Law of 1947, which in some sense addresses
these gaps, tries to solve several different problems with responses not well
tailored to many, perhaps most, of the situations that might arise.
Although Section 2 substantially reduced the significance of the line of
succession after the Vice President by dramatically decreasing the
likelihood that such a person would ever be first in line,331 it did not
eliminate the problem. Succession after the Vice President presents two
central dilemmas. The conventional problem is simply that a presidential
vacancy or disability could still occur when the Vice Presidency is
unoccupied (prior to nomination or confirmation of a new Vice President
under Section 2) or the President and Vice President could die or be
disabled, or the offices could otherwise fall vacant, simultaneously. Who
should be number three, after the President and Vice President? Who
should be two heartbeats away from the Presidency?
The second problem involves the possibility of a catastrophe, most likely
from a nuclear or terrorist attack that eliminates or disables many in the line
of presidential succession. The question it raises is not who should be third
(or fourth) in line, but how should the line be drawn at its more remote
links, what direction should it take, and what points should it connect?
Whereas the conventional problem raises the question of who should
immediately follow the Vice President, the mass catastrophe problem faces
the quite different challenge of constructing a line likely to leave someone
left who is equipped to act as President if a common disaster eliminates the
heartbeats of a number of presidential successors.
Pursuant to the power conferred in the original Presidential Successors
Clause,332 Congress has passed legislation which has alternated between
three approaches—a legislative approach in 1792, a Cabinet line in 1886,
and a combined legislative-Cabinet line of succession after the Vice
President in 1947.333 Although the Constitution empowers Congress to
designate what “Officer” shall act as President following a double vacancy,
Congress has always created a line after the Vice President with anywhere
from two to seventeen persons in it. Notwithstanding the text’s use of the
singular, no one seems inclined to apply the clause literally in this regard
and longstanding practice coupled with pragmatic considerations would
seem to make a long line firmly entrenched. The current line begins with
the Speaker of the House and then the President pro tempore of the Senate,
331. See supra text accompanying note 82.
332. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (“[T]he Congress may by Law provide for the Case of
Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring
what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.”).
333. See supra notes 43–45 and accompanying text.
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followed by the Cabinet with the departments listed according to when
created.334 The 1947 law provides that a person must resign his or her
position to act as President335 and that the Speaker or President pro tempore
can “bump” or supplant a Cabinet officer who is acting as President.336
The last two laws, in 1886 and 1947, attempted to address both the
conventional and the mass catastrophe problems. They identified an
immediate successor, the Secretary of State and Speaker of the House,
respectively, and created lines consisting of seven and initially eleven after
the Vice President.337 Although both the two heartbeats away and mass
catastrophe problems involve the question of how to provide a legitimate
and able presidential successor, they basically raise analytically distinct
issues that merit separate treatment.
B. Who Should Be Two (or Three) Heartbeats Away? Some Constitutional
Considerations
The current line places the Speaker of the House and President pro
tempore of the Senate two and three heartbeats away. Congress adopted
this line in response to Truman’s June 1945 proposal predicated on his
belief that it was inappropriate for him, as President, to appoint his
successor.338 Sam Rayburn, himself a vice presidential contender in 1944,
was Speaker of the House, and the Speaker had come from the President’s
party for forty-three of the last fifty years. Truman pointed out that the
House was “[u]sually . . . in agreement politically with the Chief
Executive.”339 By the time Congress acted, however, the Republicans had
won control of the House and Senate in the 1946 elections.340
Of course, anyone assessing or recommending congressional action must
first be satisfied that the Constitution gives Congress power to adopt the
measure under consideration. Although no serious argument has been
advanced against the constitutionality of Cabinet succession, a number of
able scholars have challenged the constitutionality of legislative
succession,341 and their position probably represents the academic
334. See 3 U.S.C. § 19(a), (b), (d)(1) (2006).
335. Id. § 19(a), (b), (d)(3).
336. Id. § 19(d)(2).
337. See id. § 19; Act of Jan. 19, 1886, ch. 4, 24 Stat. 1 (repealed 1947). The 1886 Act
named seven Cabinet officers after the Vice President. The 1947 Act initially listed the
Speaker of the House, President pro tempore of the Senate, and nine Cabinet officers; as new
executive departments were created, the principal officer was added to the list.
338. Special Message to the Congress on the Succession to the Presidency, PUB. PAPERS
128, 129 (June 19, 1945).
339. Id.
340. FEERICK, supra note 48, at 44–45.
341. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION 170–73, 452–53 (2005);
SILVA, supra note 270, at 174–75; Akhil Reed Amar & Vikram David Amar, Is the
Presidential Succession Law Constitutional?, 48 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1995); Fortier &
Ornstein, supra note 1, at 996; Ruth C. Silva, The Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 47
MICH. L. REV. 451, 463–64 (1949) (arguing the Speaker of the House and President pro
tempore do not qualify as officers and therefore are constitutionally ineligible for
presidential succession); Howard M. Wasserman, Structural Principles and Presidential
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consensus today. During the last sixty-five years, much of the discussion
regarding the merits of legislative versus Cabinet succession has turned on
constitutional analysis that has been informed largely by interpretivist
arguments based primarily on the constitutional text and the intent of the
framers of the original Constitution.
If legislative succession is generally unconstitutional, the menu of
options narrows, and the discussion shortens considerably. In my view,
however, the case against legislative succession based on these sort of
interpretivist arguments is not convincing, nor are the more persuasive
arguments against legislative succession based on the structure of the
original Constitution decisive.
Article II empowers Congress, in the absence of a functioning President
or Vice President, to designate an “Officer” to act as President.342 The
word “Officer,” some argue, is intended to be synonymous with “Officer of
the United States.”343 An earlier draft at the Constitutional Convention had
used the longer formulation but a Committee of Style, which had
jurisdiction over form but not substance, shortened it to the one word that
appears in the Constitution.344 The term “Officer of the United States” and
similar phrases used elsewhere in the Constitution345 exclude legislative
leaders, who are not commissioned, cannot be impeached, and may serve in
Congress notwithstanding the Incompatibility Clause.346
Further evidence suggests that the drafters of the Constitution intended
“Officer” to be a shorthand for “Officer of the United States.” James
Madison, the father of the Constitution, argued in 1792 that Congress could

Succession, 90 KY. L.J. 345 (2002) (arguing that legislative succession violates structural
principles of the Constitution). But see John D. Feerick, Commentary, A Response to Akhil
Reed Amar’s Address on Applications and Implications of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, 47
HOUS. L. REV. 41, 61–63 (2010) (stating in part that the issue “is not free from doubt”).
Regardless of the propriety of legislative succession generally, the current presidential
succession law has a number of problematic features a discussion of which is beyond the
scope of this Article. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 1, at 27–28, 31–32; William F. Brown &
Americo R. Cinquegrana, The Realities of Presidential Succession: “The Emperor Has No
Clones”, 75 GEO. L.J. 1389, 1435–46 (1987).
342. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6 (“[T]he Congress may by Law provide for the Case of
Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring
what Officer shall then act as President . . . .”).
343. See SILVA, supra note 270, at 131; Amar, supra note 1, at 12; Amar & Amar, supra
note 341, at 114–17.
344. See Feerick, supra note 17, at 85–86.
345. See, e.g., Emoluments Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“No Senator or
Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil
Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the
Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time . . . .”); Incompatibility
Clause, id. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“[N]o Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be
a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.”); Commission Clause, id. art.
II, § 3 (“[The President] shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.”);
Impeachment Clause, id. art. II, § 4 (“The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of
the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”).
346. See supra note 345.
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not place a legislative leader in the line of succession for this reason,347 and
most of the very few members of the Second Congress who had been
delegates to the Constitutional Convention seemed to share that view.348
But the arguments based on text and intent of the framers are not
unequivocal. There is no evidence that the drafters’ apparent intent was
known to the ratifiers or to the population at large. The drafters may have
equated “Officer” with “Officer of the United States” but the text as ratified
empowered Congress to name an “Officer,” not an “Officer of the United
States.” Ratifiers may have interpreted the distinction as significant,
particularly since the Speaker and arguably the President pro tempore were
referred to elsewhere in the Constitution349 as “Officers.”350 Moreover, just
three years after the Constitution went into effect, the Second Congress
adopted the initial succession law that placed the President pro tempore of
the Senate and Speaker of the House in the line of succession, two and three
heartbeats away. Its members presumably had some understanding of how
the term was used. Alexander Hamilton, himself a significant Framer,
favored that law and George Washington, President of the Constitutional
Convention, signed it as President of the United States.351 Of course,
Hamilton’s antipathy to Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson may have
dictated his interpretation,352 but Madison’s friendship and political
association with Jefferson may have influenced his own view.353
Washington might have been expected to veto a law that unconstitutionally
infringed on the executive branch; he did not, and his motives were, at least
according to national myth, pure.
The textual and originalist arguments strike me as inconclusive,
particularly when one considers that they did not persuade a contemporary
Congress and President (and not just any President, George Washington).
Marbury v. Madison354 reminds us, of course, that even an early Congress
could be deemed to have acted unconstitutionally.355 Yet we should be
more willing to accept Chief Justice Marshall’s view that his coevals
misunderstood what the Constitution meant than we should be to credit
similar judgments by our contemporaries regarding the original Framers’
intent.
Especially since text and originalist arguments do not settle the matter, as
they generally do not, it is appropriate to consider other types of
constitutional reasoning to construe a Constitution intended “to endure for
347. AMAR, supra note 341, at 170–72; Amar, supra note 1, at 23, 27, 31; Amar & Amar,
supra note 341, at 116.
348. Feerick, supra note 122, at 471–74 & nn.90–94.
349. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5 (“The House of Representatives shall chuse
their Speaker and other Officers . . . .”); id. art. I, § 3, cl. 5 (“The Senate shall chuse their
other Officers, and also a President pro tempore . . . .”).
350. See John F. Manning, Not Proved: Some Lingering Questions About Legislative
Succession to the Presidency, 48 STAN. L. REV. 141, 144–45 (1995).
351. Goldstein, supra note 1, at 86–87.
352. Feerick, supra note 122, at 474.
353. Goldstein, supra note 1, at 86.
354. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
355. Id. at 176.
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ages.”356 Longstanding practice regarding institutional arrangements helps
shape constitutional meaning357 and legislative succession commands
substantial support from that interpretive mode. After all, for 157 years of
American history since 1792, the line of succession as established by
Congress has placed legislative leaders behind the Vice President. Cabinet
succession was in place for only sixty-one years, from 1886 to 1947, and
was imposed in 1886 to avoid a situation in which no legislative leaders
existed.358
The most powerful constitutional arguments against legislative
succession come from the structure of the Constitution.359 Legislative
succession allows Congress an unlimited right to choose a President. That
resembles parliamentary government, which our Constitution emphatically
rejected. The creation of the Electoral College to choose the President
reflected a commitment that Congress should not choose the Chief
Executive and that, unless impeached and convicted, he or she should enjoy
a tenure of office independent of its control. That was one aspect of the
separation of powers. The Incompatibility Clause reflected another in its
prohibition against legislators holding office.360 If legislative leaders retain
their seats and offices in Congress while acting as President, they violate at
least the spirit of the Incompatibility Clause. Moreover, they would be
subject to removal, and accordingly control, by their constituents and the
house in which they serve. That would create a strange situation in which
an acting President was politically accountable not to the nation but to a
geographic subunit, and to one house of Congress. If they resign those
positions, they may not be “officers” as envisioned by the Constitution.
Finally, legislative succession presents some perverse incentives. If the
leader of the House or Senate is next in line to the Presidency, legislators
may have a disincentive to confirm a vice presidential nominee or may have
an incentive to impeach a President or Vice President.361
These structural arguments, which derive largely from the architecture of
the original Constitution, raise more serious objections to legislative
succession. Yet a subsequent amendment to the Constitution introduces

356. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
357. Id. at 401; see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 678–79 (1981);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (describing how longstanding practice adds gloss to constitutional meaning).
358. When Vice President Thomas Hendricks died in 1885, Congress was not in session
and no Senate President pro tempore or Speaker of the House existed. FEERICK, supra note 8,
at 141. Accordingly, there was no successor to President Grover Cleveland. Since the
House was not a continuing body and did not meet until the winter following a presidential
inauguration and since the Senate President pro tempore was not a continuing position in an
age when the Vice President generally presided over the Senate, this situation often existed
at the beginning of a presidential term.
359. See Amar & Amar, supra note 341, at 114 (“Our most important reasoning is
structural . . . .”); Goldstein, supra note 1, at 87–88; see also Wasserman, supra note 341, at
348–52 (discussing structural principles).
360. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 2 (“[N]o Person holding any Office under the United
States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.”).
361. Amar & Amar, supra note 341, at 124; see also Goldstein, supra note 1, at 87–89.
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additional evidence that merits consideration in assessing the strength of
these arguments.362
If neither a President-Elect nor Vice President-Elect qualifies, the
Twentieth Amendment authorizes Congress to determine what “person”
shall act as President or to identify a means to select such a person.
Although Section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment363 is poorly crafted,364 the
legislative history makes it clear that Congress’s power to designate such a
“person” or system extends to a situation in which Congress fails to choose
a President and Vice President365 or in which both die or they fail to qualify
for any other reason.366 The designated “person” serves only until a
President or Vice President qualifies.
“Person” is, of course, broader than “Officer of the United States” or
even “Officer” and accordingly Congress might designate as acting
President under a Twentieth Amendment contingency someone who would
not fall within those other terms, such as the most recent former President
of the United States or the Dean of the Fordham Law School. The use of
“person” avoids the textual and originalist arguments that have been made
against legislative succession based on the argument that “Officer” means
“Officer of the United States” in the Presidential Succession Clause. Yet
362. See generally Goldstein, supra note 1, at 89–90 (presenting similar argument).
363. It provides in part:
If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of
his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice
President elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified; and the
Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a
Vice President elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President,
or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall
act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified.
U.S. CONST. amend. XX.
364. The separate reference in the first clause of Section 3 above to situations in which a
President is not chosen or a President-Elect fails to qualify suggests that the former concept
(failure of election) is not included in the latter (failure to qualify). Since the Amendment
authorizes Congress to designate a “person” to act as President when neither a President nor
Vice President qualifies but is silent regarding a failure to elect, one might conclude that
there is no constitutional provision for the failure to elect situation.
365. See H.R. REP. NO. 72-633, at 3–4 (1932) (conference report adopting the broader
formulation of failure to qualify in the House’s proposed amendment); H.R. REP. NO. 72345, at 2 (1932) (“Congress is given power to provide for the case where neither a President
nor a Vice President has qualified before the time fixed for the beginning of the term,
whether the failure of both to qualify is occasioned by the death of both, [by the failure to
elect], or by any other cause . . . .”); id. at 4 (“Under our present Constitution there is no
provision for the case where the House of Representatives fails to choose a President and the
Senate fails to choose a Vice President. Section 3 of the proposed amendment authorizes
Congress to provide for this situation. Power is given to Congress to provide by law who
shall act as President in such case or the manner of selecting a person to act as
President . . . .”); S. REP. NO. 72-26, at 5 (1932) (“Section 3 of the proposed amendment
gives Congress the power to provide by law who shall act as President in a case where the
election of a President has been thrown into the House of Representatives and the House has
failed to elect a President . . . .”).
366. See H.R. REP. NO. 72-345, at 2 (“Congress is given power to provide for the case
where neither a President nor a Vice President has qualified before the time fixed for the
beginning of the term, whether the failure of both to qualify is occasioned by the death of
both, [by the failure to elect], or by any other cause . . . .”).
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the “person” designated would be subject to other constitutional
qualifications—age, residency, natural born citizen367—and the
arrangement would be subject to considerations based on constitutional
structure, too. In other words, the structural principles that would impeach
legislative succession could also be deployed against legislative succession
in the failure to qualify context.
In fact, the Presidential Succession Law of 1947 identifies the Speaker,
then the President pro tempore, as the “person(s)” who act as President in
failure to qualify situations.368 Yet many of the structural arguments that
seemed forceful when discussed in the post-inauguration context369 would,
if valid, undermine the Speaker’s succession here, too. Congress would be
electing the acting President, thereby resembling parliamentary
government, and, at least when the failure to qualify was due to the failure
of the House and Senate to elect a President and Vice President,
respectively, either house could abbreviate his or her tenure by electing a
President or Vice President. The Incompatibility Clause arguments would
also apply. If a legislative leader acted as President, his or her presence at
both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue would seem to violate the clause. And
the houses of Congress might have less incentive to elect a President or
Vice President in the contingency election since it could instead have the
Speaker act as Chief Executive. The Speaker would owe her status as
acting President to the House, or at least the majority who elected her. The
House (or the Senate) would be able to remove her for actions of which it
disapproved by electing a President or Vice President.370
Yet some form of legislative succession seems virtually inevitable in a
Twentieth Amendment scenario. There are no other dependable options.
Succession of Cabinet officers here is generally not a feasible choice. The
only Cabinet is likely to be that which served with the prior President. Its
members may have been appointed eight years earlier by a President whose
positions might have become widely unpopular. Absent the remote case in
which a President and Vice President were re-elected and then died before
the inauguration, succession of a Cabinet member would defy many of the
principles implicit in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment—continuity,
accountability, and democratic pedigree. If the electoral system failed to
produce a President, elevating someone from the prior Cabinet would make
little sense for all of these reasons. If the President-Elect died after
defeating the incumbent President, succession from the outgoing Cabinet
would turn the executive branch over to the team that had just been ousted,
an even more outrageous result! Continuing the outgoing President would

367. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (“No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a
Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible
to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not
have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the
United States.”).
368. See 3 U.S.C. § 19 (a)(1), (d)(1) (2006).
369. See supra text at notes 359–61.
370. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 91.
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seem even more anomalous, especially if he or she had just been defeated
by a President-Elect who had then died.
If these structural arguments from the original Constitution are deal
breakers as against the Speaker it is hard to imagine who might be a
plausible President in a double “failure to qualify” situation.371 But that
cannot be the proper resolution. The Constitution, Chief Justice Marshall
said in McCulloch v. Maryland,372 was designed to succeed, not fail, and,
where possible, it should be interpreted in a manner to facilitate that goal.373
That recognition might lead one to conclude that these structural
considerations must yield in the failure to qualify situation. Yet it would
seem anomalous to conclude that the structural arguments preclude
legislative succession when a double vacancy occurs post-inauguration but
can be brushed aside in the event of a double failure to qualify.374
Alternatively, one might conclude that these structural considerations
reflect important, but not absolute, constitutional values which sometimes
must be weighed against, and even yield to, other considerations. The
double failure to qualify scenario presents one such situation but a postinaugural double vacancy may present another. This approach does not
mean that these structural arguments should be disregarded but simply that
they should be considered as part of a mix of arguments in reaching an
acceptable resolution in the post- and pre-inaugural settings.375
Moreover, the constitutional arguments regarding the merits of legislative
and Cabinet succession need not rely simply on conventional implications
from the structure of the original Constitution. The Twenty-Fifth
Amendment presents additional structural considerations with reference to
the double vacancy situation. The values implicit in the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment included the need for a smooth succession of a new leader who
was conversant with the activities of the executive branch. Succession of
the Speaker or President pro tempore would be disruptive even when it
371. Other possibilities (e.g., a former President, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
the most senior governor, etc.) present self-evident problems. Instead of designating a
“person” to act as President, Section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment allows Congress to
designate “the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected.” U.S. CONST. amend.
XX. Congress could, for instance, empower itself (or one of its chambers) to elect an acting
President from all of those who would be constitutionally eligible. This procedure might
facilitate the selection of a presidential stand-in but would not escape some of the other
problems of legislative election, and, in a failure to elect situation, would add yet another
contingent election to the burden on Congress.
372. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
373. See id. at 415.
374. Of course, legislative succession does not need to overcome the textual and
originalist arguments related to “Officer” in the failure to qualify situation since the
Twentieth Amendment allows Congress to designate a “person.” Yet unless one views these
arguments as dispositive, and many of those who advance them do not, see, e.g., Amar &
Amar, supra note 341, at 114 (describing structural arguments as most significant); Feerick,
supra note 341, at 61–64 (describing controversy regarding textual and originalist arguments
but expressing willingness to accept “legal risks” of legislative succession but for
“compelling policy reasons” against legislative succession), ultimately the constitutionality
of legislative succession turns on structural constitutional arguments.
375. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 91–92.
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would not change the party control of the executive branch. For different
reasons, either would be hard-pressed to play the understudy role
envisioned by the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. If the double (or triple
vacancy) happened simultaneously or in rapid sequence, there would be no
time for a legislative leader to become conversant with deliberations on
matters of concern.
Disability determinations would be complicated, especially regarding
short-term situations. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment was premised on the
belief that, when an unexpected injury or illness mandates a transfer of
presidential power, it must occur immediately without any hiatus or
uncertainty. The 1947 law, however, requires resignation of the legislative
leader, and some conclude that the Incompatibility Clause or other
considerations mandate that a legislative leader, though not a Cabinet
officer, relinquish his or her prior office to act as President.376 This
requirement could create a situation in which a Speaker or President pro
tempore might wish to collect information regarding the expected length of
the incapacity and the risks the country faces to decide whether to act as
President or let the responsibility pass to the next in line.
Moreover, enthusiasm for the Vice President as successor was premised
in part on the close relationship she would have with the President. That
frequent contact would provide information regarding the President’s
condition, which a Speaker, particularly one from the opposite party, would
lack. Sections 3 and 4 assumed that the President and Vice President would
have a largely shared political destiny, a circumstance that would facilitate
inability transfers. That would not be true of the President and a Speaker,
especially a President and a cross party Speaker.
Sections 3 and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment were predicated on the
belief that the executive branch should initiate disability determinations.
Even if Congress replaced the Cabinet with some other body, the Vice
President, a close presidential associate, would remain a necessary actor and
hold an effective veto over such proceedings. Legislative succession would
jeopardize, and perhaps undermine that basic premise. In the absence of a
Vice President, it would deny the executive branch the power to control the
initiation of a transfer of power.
Although legislative succession in general runs afoul of some principles
implicit in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, Cabinet succession does as well,
although in less severe ways. The earlier discussion showed why Cabinet
succession is not a feasible approach in most failure to qualify situations.
376. The general view of scholars is that the Presidential Succession Clause intended the
“Officer” who acts as President to retain her current office. See, e.g., FEERICK, supra note 8,
at 268; Amar & Amar, supra note 341, at 119–21. This presents problems for a legislative
leader, based upon the Incompatibility Clause and the doctrine of separation of powers. I am
not convinced that the Constitution requires that an acting President retain their prior office.
The use of the word “Officer” may simply designate the status of those who are eligible to
serve as acting President when they assume the discharge of presidential powers and duties
without requiring that they retain that position. Indeed, if a Secretary of State were called
upon to act as President for an extended period of time, she might well wish to relinquish
that position in order to enlist a full time Secretary of State.
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Moreover, a Cabinet member may lack the democratic pedigree that the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment envisions for a presidential successor. Although
he or she may, in a sense, reflect the outcome of the presidential election
and would have attained office based on the advice and consent of the
Senate, a Cabinet member would not have undergone the more rigorous
Section 2 process and perhaps would never have run for office. A
legislative leader does not stand on the same sort of national electoral
foundation as a President, but he or she has at least been elected multiple
times by constituents and by party members in the House or Senate who
have recognized his or her political leadership.377
Further, a Cabinet member could encounter one difficulty in disability
determinations that a legislative leader would not experience. A President
might be able to prevent an adverse decision under Section 4 by removing
the Cabinet member who was first in line after the Vice President if that
member expressed concerns regarding the President’s capacity. He or she
could not do so with a legislative leader.
Structural arguments that are implicit in the Twentieth and Twenty-Fifth
Amendments, as well as those from the original Constitution, expose some
of the obstacles to legislative succession. Cabinet succession encounters
problems, too, although to a lesser degree. Although I would not be
prepared to conclude that either is always unconstitutional, both, in their
generic versions, present constitutional challenges. Legislative succession
as currently constructed poses two additional problems that violate basic
principles implicit in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. These deserve further
discussion.
1. The Perils of Cross-Party Succession
Legislative succession could work a shift in party control of the White
House, a situation that would cause unique upheavals in the system of
government. The current system of legislative succession runs a significant
risk of cross-party transfer of power. Since 1969, the President and Speaker
of the House have come from opposite parties, twenty-eight of the fortytwo years or two-thirds of the time.378 Six of the eight Presidents during
this time (i.e., all but Carter and Barack Obama) served all or part of their
Presidency with a Speaker from the opposite party.379

377. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 93 (discussing political pedigree of legislative
leaders).
378. See infra tbl. 1. These calculations run through January 2011 or the first two years
of the Obama term.
379. See infra tbl. 1.
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Table 1: Presidents and Speakers of the House, 1969–2011380
Years

President (Party)

Speaker (Party)

1969–1974

Nixon (R)

1974–1977
1977–1981
1981–1989

Ford (R)
Carter (D)
Reagan (R)

1989–1993

Bush (R)

1993–1995
1995–2001

Clinton (D)
Clinton (D)

2001–2007
2007–2009
2009–2011

Bush (R)
Bush (R)
Obama (D)

McCormack (D),
Albert (D)
Albert (D)
O’Neill (D)
O’Neill (D),
Wright (D)
Wright (D),
Foley(D)
Foley (D)
Gingrich (R),
Hastert (R)
Hastert (R)
Pelosi (D)
Pelosi (D)

A cross-party succession of a Speaker would present unprecedented
challenges, which would violate any number of the principles that animated
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Any succession of a Speaker would be an
anomalous event that would almost certainly occur in a time of significant
national trauma. The dislocation associated with a presidential succession
that shifted party control of the executive branch would increase
exponentially. Some would question the legitimacy of such a turnover of
party control, which, in contemporary times, would produce a dramatic
change in the ideological orientation as well as partisan composition of the
executive branch. Such legitimacy concerns would be particularly acute in
those cases where party control shifted after a presidential election that was
won decisively, as would have been true following the presidential elections
of 1972, 1980, 1984, 1988, and 1996.381
Although a time of national trauma might cushion partisan impulses, the
change in the party and policy orientation of the person discharging
presidential powers would likely work an upheaval of executive personnel.
One exercising presidential powers and duties would wish to surround
himself with subordinates whose judgment he trusted, whose loyalty to him
was clear, and whose worldview was compatible. It is hard to imagine
acting President Tip O’Neill retaining Reagan’s associates or Tom Foley
380. The information in this Table was compiled from publicly available sources. See
Speakers of the House, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/house_history/speakers.html (last visited Oct. 7, 2010);
The Presidents, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/about/presidents (last visited
Oct. 7, 2010).
381. See
Presidential
Elections,
THE
AM.
PRESIDENCY
PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/elections.php (last visited Oct. 7, 2010) (providing election
results).

2010] LESSONS IN ENSURING PRESIDENTIAL CONTINUITY

171

keeping George H.W. Bush’s appointees in place or Nancy Pelosi
governing with those George W. Bush had chosen. Nor could one envision
Newt Gingrich or Denny Hastert retaining the Clinton Cabinet and White
House personnel. The lack of any built-in transition period would
exacerbate the problem. Whereas most new Presidents have ten weeks
between election and inauguration (and a longer period in which transition
planning occurs), a Speaker who replaces a President of the opposing party
would have no advance time to plan for such a turnover.
It is unlikely that a cross-party Speaker would have had a desirable level
of preparation. Even if she received briefings, it is hard to imagine the prior
administration bringing an opposing party’s Speaker into deliberations on
sensitive policy matters.
Finally, a cross-party situation would introduce new complications into a
disability situation. One would expect a President or those around the
President to be more hesitant to transfer powers to a Speaker from the other
party.
The prospect of a cross-party succession accordingly presents
complications that offend a number of values that are implicit in the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Rather than achieving governmental continuity
by elevating the President’s chosen successor, it installs the legislative
leader of the opposing party. Rather than elevating a successor whose
relationship with the President was likely to foster benefits flowing from
intimate involvement in the pursuit of governmental policies, it dispenses
with those advantages by promoting a leading opponent. Rather than
facilitating disability determinations, it exacerbates them. In all of these
ways, cross-party succession conflicts with principles inherent in the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment.
2. Succession of the President Pro Tempore: An Unpresidential Acting
President
Placement of the President pro tempore of the Senate in the line of
succession is even more offensive to ideas implicit in the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment. It presents the same risks of succession of a Speaker,
especially a cross-party Speaker. Cross-party control of the Senate has been
a less common, but still frequent, recent condition, having existed twentythree and a half of the last forty-two years, or fifty-six percent of the
time.382
Succession of the President pro tempore of the Senate violates a second
basic principle of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment—the idea that a successor
should be presidential. That requirement which the Amendment imposed
for a Vice President would also seem to be applicable to a President pro
382. Since 1969, the Presidency and Senate have been controlled by different parties from
1969–77, 1987–93, 1995–2001, June 6, 2001–November 12, 2002, 2007–2009. See Party
Division
in
the
Senate,
1789–Present,
U.S.
SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm (last visited
Oct. 15, 2010); supra tbl. 1 (providing dates of presidential service).
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tempore who would necessarily act as President under unprecedented
circumstances.
Two criteria govern selection as President pro tempore of the Senate—
membership in the Senate majority party and seniority. Whereas the
Speaker has been chosen to lead the House of Representatives and its
majority party, the President pro tempore is an honorific position. Since
Nixon’s inauguration, ten men have served as President pro tempore. Their
names, dates of service, and age at the beginning of each stint, are presented
in Table 2.
Table 2: Ages of Senate President Pro Tempores, 1969–2011383
President pro tempore

Dates of Service

Richard B. Russell
Allen J. Ellender
James O. Eastland
Warren G. Magnuson

1/3/1969–1/21/1971
1/22/1971–7/27/1972
7/28/1972–12/27/1978
1/15/1979–12/4/1980
12/6/1980–1/4/1981
12/5/1980
1/5/1981–1/6/1987
1/4/1995–1/3/2001
1/20/2001–6/6/2001
1/6/1987–1/2/1989
1/3/1989–1/3/1995
1/3/2001–1/20/2001
6/6/2001–1/3/2003
1/4/2007–6/28/2010
1/3/2003–1/4/2007
6/28/2010–1/2011

Milton R. Young
Strom Thurmond

John C. Stennis
Robert C. Byrd

Ted Stevens
Daniel K. Inouye

Age at Beginning
of Term
71
80
67
73
75
82
78
92
98
85
71
83
83
89
79
85

It is hard to imagine that many Senators who voted to elect these ten men
as President pro tempore would have wanted them to serve as President,
especially during a time of crisis. Of the group, only Russell and Thurmond
had ever run for President,384 Russell more than sixteen years before he
became President pro tempore, and Thurmond, as a third-party candidate,
thirty-two years before he first became President pro tempore. Indeed,
383. The information in this Table was compiled from publicly available sources. See
Complete
List
of
Presidents
Pro
Tempore,
U.S.
SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/President_Pro_Tempore.htm#
5 (last visited Oct. 7, 2010); Congressional Biographical Directory, U.S. CONGRESS,
http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch.asp (last visited Oct. 7, 2010) (providing
biographies, including dates of birth, of members of Congress).
384. See Paul P. Kennedy, Russell of Georgia to Run Regardless of Truman Decision,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 1952, at 1; 1948 Presidential Election, THE AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showelection.php?year=1948 (last visited Oct. 6, 2010).
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Thurmond was still serving as President pro tempore more than one half
century after he ran for the Presidency! None of the ten, in their prime or
when they served as President pro tempore, ever had any chance to win his
party’s presidential nomination.385
Inasmuch as seniority is the crucial credential to become President pro
tempore, not surprisingly virtually all of those who have held the office
since 1969 were from non-competitive states not known for producing
presidential or even vice presidential candidates.386 Virtually all were
beyond the age at which Presidents have been elected; Thurmond served at
ninety-eight, Byrd at ninety-two, and five others served in their eighties.387
Russell, Ellender, and Byrd died in office, and Thurmond and Byrd had
significant health problems. Magnuson was defeated for re-election.
Eastland, Young, and Stennis retired as, or within a month of serving as,
President pro tempore. Stennis could not hear and had lost a leg to cancer.
The placement of the President pro tempore of the Senate after the Vice
President and Speaker of the House puts three heartbeats from the
Presidency someone who is inherently unpresidential. Such an arrangement
is simply unconscionable if one takes seriously the possibility of the
simultaneous deaths or inability of higher ranking officials.388
C. Mass Catastrophe Problems: The Need for and Perils of a Long Line
Although the Constitution empowers Congress to designate an “Officer”
to act as President in case of a double vacancy,389 Congress has always
designated multiple successors. The current line, eighteen persons long
beginning with the Vice President, places the members of the Cabinet after
the Speaker and Senate President pro tempore based upon the date of
creation of the various Cabinet offices. Prudence, of course, dictates a long
line especially in an age of nuclear weapons and terrorism.
The logic of an eighteen person line is to guard against a mass
catastrophe. Yet a long line does not assure presidential continuity,
especially if all of those in line live or work near each other. Everyone in
the current line works in Washington, D.C. within a few miles of each
other. It is not difficult to imagine a disaster that would eliminate all or
most of them.390 The current line, long though it is, does not serve its basic
mission in part due to its geographic concentration.
385. Russell, however, might have been a plausible running mate for Adlai Stevenson in
1952; Byrd had been elected majority leader and Stevens, minority whip.
386. The nine states that produced the ten Presidents pro tempore since 1969 have
provided one President (Jimmy Carter, 1976) and two unsuccessful vice presidential
candidates (Henry Davis, 1904; and Sarah Palin, 2008) since the twentieth century began.
387. See supra tbl. 2.
388. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 4, at 40; Feerick, supra note 341, at
63–64; Goldstein, supra note 1, at 94.
389. A strict constructionist might complain that Congress has exceeded its powers by
designating multiple people when the Constitution empowers it to name a single “officer.”
Any such challenge seems frivolous.
390. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 4, at 39; FEERICK, supra note 8, at
275 (“It is conceivable that, since all of those persons who are presently in the line of
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In addition, the current arrangement also presents a “what’s my line?”
problem. A premise of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was that not any
successor would do. Although it would be unduly optimistic to expect
those in remote positions in the line of succession (or even those near its
top) to have the attributes of a Vice President, it is not unreasonable to think
that some of the principles implicit in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment would
be reflected in constructing the line. Yet the current line includes many
offices that are filled with able public servants who are ill-suited to act as
President, particularly under the circumstances in which such service might
be required. Would the typical Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development or of Transportation or of countless other departments really
be equipped to make the sort of immediate national security judgments that
a down-line successor would almost inevitably be called on to make? The
lack of expertise and unfamiliarity with basic concepts and vocabulary in
that area would make such a successor largely dependent on whatever
bureaucratic and military advisers remained.
Moreover, most Americans probably would not recognize, and could not
name, those manning most positions in the line of succession. Would such
figures have the credibility to command public support under the sort of
unprecedented circumstances that would occasion their succession? And
would they have the political experience and skills?
The current long line was drafted in a formulaic manner that was not
sensitive to its fundamental mission, to produce an able acting President
following some mass catastrophe. The current line owes its length and
composition to the simplistic practice of including the head of every
Cabinet-level department.391 This formal approach to decision making
ignores basic points like the common vulnerability of those in the line to an
attack on Washington or the lack of suitability to be President of most in
line, particularly under the extenuating circumstances under which such a
person might be called upon to act as President.
D. The Disability Gap
Since Sections 3 and 4 of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment refer specifically
to the Vice President as the recipient of presidential powers and duties and,
under Section 4, co-decider of presidential inability, the absence or
succession spend much time in Washington, D.C., the whole line could be wiped out in a
nuclear attack on that city. Hence, in view of this possibility, it would be advisable for
Congress to give some consideration to extending the line of succession to persons in widely
separated parts of the country.”); MCDERMOTT, supra note 21, at 218 (calling for
arrangements which recognize the possibility of attack on Washington, D.C.).
391. Some have suggested that the Presidential Succession Act of 1947, 3 U.S.C. § 19
(2006), would allow an acting Secretary to claim a place in line after the secretary leaves
office. It lists the Cabinet positions chronologically, see id. § 19(d)(1), and provides that it
“shall apply only to officers appointed, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate,
prior to the time of the death, resignation, removal from office, inability, or failure to qualify,
of the President pro tempore.” Id. § 19(e). The Continuity of Government Commission has
concluded that “the language clearly permits acting secretaries to be placed in the line of
succession.” See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 4, at 34.
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incapacity of that officer would compromise those provisions. There is no
stated procedure to declare a Vice President disabled or to declare a
President disabled absent a functioning Vice President. Although the Vice
President now performs important duties in the executive branch, the
purpose of declaring him or her disabled is not to transfer those ongoing
duties to someone else, something the President could, to some extent,
accomplish by formal or informal order.392 It is rather to allow a President
to be declared disabled without transferring the powers to the disabled Vice
President and without his or her participation.
Congress has power to provide by statute for a double vacancy due to
some combination of presidential and vice presidential death, resignation,
removal, and inability.393 It could legislate procedures, like those in
Sections 3 and 4, to handle a presidential disability when the Vice
Presidency was vacant. Absent such legislation, the President and the
person next in line, currently the Speaker, could enter into a letter
agreement regarding a voluntary or involuntary transfer of power when the
second office was vacant. The Tyler Precedent should not complicate this
matter since Tyler made a claim on behalf of a Vice President in a situation
in which the Constitution was ambiguous. The Constitution clearly states
that any officer after the Vice President simply acts as President, but does
not assume the office, and that the President resumes power when the
disability ends. The agreement between President Johnson and Speaker
McCormack would provide some precedent for this arrangement.394
A disabled Vice President could present a greater predicament. Since the
point of declaring the Vice President disabled is to facilitate a transfer of
power from a disabled President or to direct presidential powers and duties
to someone other than the disabled Vice President, Congress would seem to
have power under Article II, Section I, Clause 6 to construct a means to
declare the Vice President disabled. Sections 3 and 4 might serve as a
general guide even though the relationships between a Vice President and
the person next in line, and between the Vice President and Cabinet, differ
in some material ways from the relationships between the President and the
officials those provisions empower.
As suggested previously, the
placement of the Speaker next in line introduces difficulties. Moreover, the
complications regarding disability determinations proliferate in a mass
disaster event.395
392. Even so, the Vice President would remain the President of the Senate and thereby
entitled to preside over the Senate and break any tie votes. The specter of a deranged Vice
President insisting on performing these tasks, which all Vice Presidents routinely ignore,
seems somewhat far-fetched. The Constitution provides for a Senate President pro tempore
to preside in the Vice President’s absence and perhaps the Senate could, by rule, govern a
Vice President’s ability to preside in such situations, a question beyond the scope of this
discussion.
393. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 6.
394. See Goldstein, supra note 1, at 71–72.
395. A mass catastrophe could leave some members of the line de facto disabled. That
contingency could present problems in identifying the acting President (a problem which
could also exist if many were killed). Moreover, the death or disability of many in the line
of succession would make it difficult to declare a President disabled or, assuming Section 4
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E. Failure To Qualify
“Failure to qualify” covers several contingencies, each of which poses a
distinct problem. A double failure to qualify396 would include the death of
the President-Elect and Vice President-Elect, the failure to elect someone to
either office, or any other failure of a President-Elect and Vice PresidentElect to meet the qualifications that are prerequisites for taking office. Each
presents a remote risk,397 yet they raise contingencies that are more
susceptible to resolution before the immediate partisan consequences of
different solutions become apparent.398

were extended to disability of the Vice President or others who might act as President, to
declare those officers disabled. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 4, at 17–24,
41. If the catastrophe affected Congress, as it very well might, Sections 3 and especially 4
might also be impacted. Although most states allow governors to make temporary
appointments to fill Senate vacancies, vacancies in the House of Representatives can only be
filled by election. See generally CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 7.
396. Failure to qualify only of the President-Elect would produce the succession of the
Vice President-Elect. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3.
397. A double failure to elect would seem unlikely. Although the contingent election in
the House is structured so that deadlock is conceivable—voting is by states (with each state
casting a single vote) among the three highest Electoral College finishers with a majority
required, see id. amend. XII (“[A]nd if no person have such majority [of electoral votes],
then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those
voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the
President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the
representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a
member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be
necessary to a choice.”)—the Senate is likely to elect a Vice President since each Senator
casts an individual vote for one of the highest two vice presidential electoral vote recipients.
See id. (“[I]f no person have a majority [of electoral votes], then from the two highest
numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose
shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole
number shall be necessary to a choice.”). The double failure to elect would require no
presidential or vice presidential candidate to receive an Electoral College majority followed
by failure of the House and Senate to elect a President and Vice President, respectively. Yet
a double death or some combination of death and failure to elect could occur.
398. There is a range of continuity problems that could arise during the pre-inauguration
period which are beyond the scope of this paper. These include acts or events (terrorism,
natural disasters, etc.) which might disrupt the presidential campaign or deaths or disabilities
of presidential or vice presidential candidates. The existence of the Electoral College
introduces other complications in part because it postpones identification of the PresidentElect and Vice President-Elect. The death of a President-Elect-to-be between election day
and the meeting of the Electors may produce a different result than the death of the
President-Elect after the Electors meet or the votes are counted. Finally, although the
Constitution empowers Congress to provide for the death of one of the candidates in a
contingent election for President or Vice President, see U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 4 (“The
Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the
House of Representatives may choose a President whenever the right of choice shall have
devolved upon them, and for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the
Senate may choose a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon
them.”), Congress has not done so. For a discussion of some of these issues, see Amar,
supra note 1, at 12–16, 24–26; Akhil Reed Amar, Presidents, Vice Presidents, and Death:
Closing the Constitution’s Succession Gap, 48 ARK. L. REV. 215 (1995); Goldstein, supra
note 1, at 72–77.
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Although, as previously discussed, a legislative line of successors seems
virtually inevitable in these situations,399 the double failure to elect and
double death contingencies still raise some quite different concerns. In a
double death situation, the current regime of legislative succession presents
a serious risk that the successor would not be viewed as a legitimate head of
the executive branch if a Speaker from the party that had just lost the
presidential election was installed for a four-year term.400 Elevation of a
cross-party Speaker would infringe the party continuity principle of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment. That basic objective would not be offended if a
Speaker from the prevailing party were designated.
In a failure to elect situation, party continuity diminishes or vanishes as a
concern since, by definition, no party has prevailed in the election. This
contingency presents different problems. Any acting President will serve
only until a President or Vice President qualifies. Accordingly, the tenure
of the acting President could depend upon his or her willingness to
accommodate congressional preferences; failure to do so might cause the
acting President to be “bumped” from the Presidency. Congressmen would
bargain with the acting President (and candidates for President and Vice
President) with the Presidency itself part of the political currency.
Members of the House from deadlocked or closely divided states and
Senators would have leverage and could barter their vote in the contingent
election for concessions. The corrupting stench of rampant political pork
would not be the only negative consequence. This situation would
introduce features of parliamentary government that are at odds with the
principles of separation of powers that generally influence the structure of
government. Whereas normally Congress can remove a President only
through impeachment, which requires action by each house (with a
supermajority needed in the Senate) based on a violation of a constitutional
norm, here either house could unilaterally terminate an acting President.
The situation would resemble a parliamentary system except the acting
President would be even more at risk since members of the House or Senate
could replace the acting President without putting their own positions in
immediate jeopardy.
This vulnerability to “bumping,” and the associated pressures, is not
unique to legislative successors. It is part of the constitutional design to
which any acting President would be subject in a failure to elect situation.
Under the Twentieth Amendment, the term of an acting President, pending
election of a President or Vice President, ends when a President-Elect or
Vice President-Elect qualifies.401 Nonetheless, legislative succession raises
distinctive concerns in the failure to elect situation. It allows the House and
399. The current law which governs succession generally applies also to failure to qualify
situations. See 3 U.S.C. § 19 (2006).
400. Decisive presidential victories in 1972, 1980, 1984, 1988, and 1996 each were
accompanied by the other party (the Democrats in the first four elections, the Republicans in
the fifth) maintaining control of the House and Speakership. Accordingly, in those
instances, death of the President-Elect and Vice President-Elect would have installed an
acting President from the party just rejected in the presidential balloting.
401. U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 3.

178

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 79

Senate respectively to determine unilaterally the identity of the person who
provides the alternative to the candidates for President and Vice President
that the Electoral College provides. Moreover, elevation of the Speaker
would create some perverse incentives. It would diminish the interest of the
House to elect a President from the three who had received the most
electoral votes.
Public opinion would presumably remain as a check in this situation.
Political figures who misbehaved would be politically vulnerable. At some
point, the framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment reasoned, public
officials must be trusted to act in a proper, rather than wholly partisan,
fashion in order for any set of procedures to succeed.402 In these situations,
the sense of “constitutional morality” and the political sanction of the
outrage of an engaged citizenry might afford the most efficacious restraints.
Bumping problems would not exist in the double death situation. The
legislative leader designated to act as President would not be vulnerable to
being supplanted since the two figures higher on the ladder, the PresidentElect and Vice President-Elect, were deceased. There would be some
question regarding the wisdom of having someone act as President for four
years without being able to trace his or her position directly to a national
election.403 The case for a special presidential election seems strongest in
the pre-inaugural double death situation.404
F. Changing the Line
The foregoing discussion suggests several conclusions regarding the
system for ensuring presidential continuity after the Vice Presidency. First,
the current regime contains any number of accidents waiting to happen.
Although the contingencies are each relatively remote, many could present
formidable challenges if they did occur.
Second, the current system to handle succession after the Vice President
offers simplistic solutions to complicated problems. It offers blunt
instruments to address a range of entirely different contingencies with little
regard to whether those remedies are designed to handle the assignment
given. The various problems do not lend themselves to a single fix. The
current system rests on three fallacies: the single solution fallacy, the idea
that the same legislative (or Cabinet) line of succession should apply to
each of the quite different contingencies that could create a double vacancy;
the symmetry fallacy, the idea that if the presiding officer of one house is
included in the line of succession that of the other house should be, and that
if some Cabinet members are included, all should be; and the strength in
numbers fallacy, the idea that if a line is long enough it does not matter that
it never leaves Washington, D.C. The formulaic nature of the current
approach—the Speaker succeeds in all contingencies, the line gets its length
402. See supra Part II.A.10.
403. See Fortier & Ornstein, supra note 1, at 1009–10.
404. The failure to elect situation is somewhat similar, except one might wonder about the
wisdom of trying to resolve an inconclusive election with another nationwide vote.
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by adding each Cabinet member—is easy to conceive and apply but
produces bad solutions in many instances. In so doing, it conflicts with the
approach of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment, which reflected a strong
preference for flexibility and for tailored responses to specific problems
based on deliberation and data assessment. Unlike those who drew the
current line of successors after the Vice President, the framers of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment thought that presidential continuity was not a
function of simply providing a successor but one who was knowledgeable
regarding the central challenges he or she would face, presidential, in
harmony with the President, and possessed with some legitimacy.405
Third, neither legislative nor Cabinet succession yields an entirely
satisfactory solution. Legislative succession offends the separation of
powers concerns and often, the party continuity principle of the TwentyFifth Amendment; Cabinet succession may advance someone lacking in
democratic sensibility.
Fourth, many of the problems are interrelated and solutions must go
beyond simply creating a legislative or Cabinet line. The ability of the
system to address the disability of a Vice President or presidential inability
absent a Vice President, depends in part on the identity of those in the line
of succession. Disability and death cannot entirely be separated because the
former may lead to the latter. Similarly, pre-inaugural and post-inaugural
approaches must be synchronized and must account for timing issues.
Whereas legislative leaders can be identified when Congress convenes in
early January, Cabinet members must be nominated by the President and
confirmed by the Senate and accordingly do not take office until after the
inauguration.
On balance, Congress would meet many of the goals of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment by replacing the current legislative-Cabinet line of succession
with a modified Cabinet line except in the failure to qualify context where,
for reasons stated earlier, Cabinet succession is impractical. The continuity
and separation of powers objectives more likely would be achieved in a
system of Cabinet succession. Part of the logic behind involving the
Cabinet in the disability determination was the perceived identification of
its members with the President and their knowledge of, and commitment to,
his or her goals and programs. That rationale also speaks to their
credentials to be in the line of succession. Presidents might be more likely
to choose presidential persons with a democratic pedigree for senior
Cabinet positions if such a line were adopted although there are no
guarantees.406

405. See supra Part II.A.1–2.
406. A Cabinet line would be preferable to creating an Assistant Vice President to follow
the constitutional Vice President. The framers of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment wisely
rejected a two Vice Presidents solution, in part because they did not want to arrest the
development of the existing office by creating a competitor and in part because they feared
that the second Vice Presidency would attract lesser figures. Inasmuch as the Vice
Presidency is now one of the success stories of American political institutions, it would be
ill-advised to threaten its trajectory by creating by statute an Assistant Vice President.
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A shift to Cabinet succession would, of course, require congressional
approval. History suggests that such a change is unlikely. Congress has
generally favored legislative succession. Indeed, it only passed the 1886
Succession Law to avoid the risk a legislative line posed that a presidential
or vice presidential death while Congress was not in session could leave the
nation without any presidential successor. That precarious situation had
occurred twice in five years during the 1880s and those crises forced
Congress’s hand.407 Nor did Cabinet succession gain traction when Bayh
proposed it in the mid-1960s. Far from it. If the past is prologue, Congress
is likely to prefer legislative succession, either based on the principled
position that its leaders have a democratic pedigree, stature, and political
skill or simply because it does not wish to abandon the successor role for its
leaders. If Congress’s past behavior anticipates its future disposition, an
insistence on a Cabinet line of succession might preclude any reform.
That would be unfortunate. It would leave in place two indefensible
features of the current regime: the threat it often poses to party continuity
of the executive branch and the risk of succession of an unpresidential
successor in the Senate President pro tempore. Those glaring defects
offend principles implicit in the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Remedying
them should be matters of absolute priority.
Here, the strategic teachings from the Twenty-Fifth Amendment offer
lessons worth learning. The Amendment succeeded in part because its
proponents were committed to the proposition that achieving partial, but
significant, reform better served the nation than pursuing a more
comprehensive, but politically unpalatable, package. First they trimmed
their goals, postponing some objectives (e.g., addressing the electoral
problems and the line of succession after the Vice President) to remedy the
most glaring defects. Then, they were willing to strike compromises to
reach agreement. Those steps were crucial in transforming Bayh and his
colleagues from advocates of Senate Joint Resolution 139 (or Senate Joint
Resolution 1 or House Joint Resolution 1) to framers of a constitutional
amendment.
Consistent with that example, modern reformers might focus on these
two paramount problems even at the cost of leaving some system of
legislative succession in place. An alternative approach to Cabinet
succession would maintain a legislative-Cabinet line but modify it by
placing the leader of the president’s party in the House atop the line of
successors, not necessarily the Speaker when from the opposite party. Such
an approach would address some of the central objectives implicit in the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment. In particular, the continuity objective would be
better served by eliminating the possibility that succession would change
party control of the executive branch.408 Replacing the Senate President
407. See FEERICK, supra note 8, at 130–32, 141–43 (discussing circumstances which
twice produced no successor under the legislative succession system when the Vice
Presidency was vacant).
408. See e.g., H.R. 3816, 107th Cong. (2002) (allowing the President to designate party’s
leader in the House and Senate instead of a cross-party Speaker or President pro tempore of
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pro tempore with the leader of the president’s party in the Senate would
advance continuity objectives as well as the goal of providing a successor
more likely to be presidential.
Such changes would, of course, require that those congressional leaders
be viewed as “officers” under Article II. As a practical matter, Congress
might enhance their standing by so designating them.409 This approach
would still encounter some of the structural constitutional issues as does the
current line, yet for the reasons stated earlier, these objections are not
dispositive. It seems likely that the Court would view a constitutional
challenge based on them as presenting a political question410 although the
Court’s resolution of Bush v. Gore411 reduces somewhat confidence in that
prediction. A bipartisan commitment to the merits of this compromise
approach at a time when no crisis loomed would enhance its prospects of
succeeding if it ever was tested.
This resolution of the two (and three) heartbeats question is not as
consistent with the principles behind the Twenty-Fifth Amendment as a
system of Cabinet succession would be. Yet it would represent a
substantial improvement on the status quo, which offends the party
continuity and presidential successor objectives of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment as well as its other defects.
If it makes sense to have a line of successors to guard against a mass
catastrophe (and of course it does), it also makes sense to draw that line in a
rational fashion. Most foreseeable contingencies that would implicate more
remote successors would present national and homeland security issues.
The line of successors should be redrawn in two respects. It should include
those Cabinet members with those sorts of expertise and involvement most
likely to pertain to the circumstances that would occasion their
succession—state, treasury, defense, justice, and homeland security—and it
should include some “Officers” outside of Washington.412 Congress might
designate certain officers whose work address is outside of Washington,
D.C.—the Ambassador to the United Nations and perhaps certain foreign
Ambassadors413—or it might create a number of new “Officers” and place
them after those Cabinet members who would be retained in the line.414
the Senate); see also Joel K. Goldstein, Succession Depression: If Anything Should Happen,
Guess Who’s in Charge, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 1, 1995, at 15 (recommending succession by
legislative leaders of president’s party).
409. As previously argued, the Twentieth Amendment which refers to “person” would be
even more hospitable to this approach as applied to the failure to qualify of a President-Elect
and Vice President-Elect.
410. See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi, The Political Question of Presidential Succession, 48
STAN. L. REV. 155 (1995).
411. 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam) (rejecting the argument that the contest over
Florida’s electoral votes in the 2000 presidential election was a political question).
412. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 4, at 45.
413. See, e.g., H.R. 540, 110th Cong. (2007) (proposing the addition of ambassadors to
the United Nations, Great Britain, Russia, China, and France at the end of the succession
line). Further consideration, however, should be given to the wisdom of placing in the line
of succession officers stationed abroad.
414. See CONTINUITY OF GOV’T COMM’N, supra note 4, at 45.
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Those figures might simply serve as wise men and women who would be
briefed, who would be available to advise the President and serve as
contingent successors.
If some of those designated lived outside
Washington, such a change would address the continuity concern from a
catastrophe, as well as providing a more presidential acting President
following such an event.
Failure to qualify contingencies also require tailored approaches.
Succession of the Speaker may be as good a solution as any in the failure to
elect scenario. Yet when the failure to qualify is due to a double death, the
legislative leader who succeeds should be from the same party as the
President-Elect (or person who would have been President-Elect based on
the election outcome). That contingency may provide a compelling case for
a special election.
CONCLUSION: THE TEACHINGS OF THE TWENTY-FIFTH AMENDMENT
The Twenty-Fifth Amendment represented a substantial contribution to
addressing long-standing and significant gaps in America’s system for
ensuring presidential continuity. The provisions it added to the Constitution
represented prudent accommodations of often competing principles. It has
worked well and there is no reason why it should not continue to do so.
Nonetheless, problems remain in existing arrangements. The persistence
of defects does not represent an oversight on the part of the framers of the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment or an indictment of it. They did not overlook the
gaps they left untouched but were constrained by the incremental nature of
the legislative process. They recognized that an attempt to address all
problems would solve none. They wisely elected to improve on the status
quo by addressing the most glaring issues while deferring action on others.
Although the line of succession after the Vice President remains
troubling in a number of respects discussed above, Congress has not
returned to the matter in any serious way during the more than forty-three
years since the Twenty-Fifth Amendment was ratified. It should do so.
In taking the next steps, Congress should draw from the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment. Like other parts of the Constitution, the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment reflects constitutional principles and purposes that transcend
its specific provisions. Many of those principles provide structural
constitutional arguments that should guide further action. Ratification of
the Twenty-Fifth Amendment also furnishes a case study with respect to
certain legislative strategies that proved effective. It became part of the
Constitution only after a lengthy period of intense consideration regarding
relevant principles relating to presidential continuity. Inasmuch as the
Amendment represents the most recent and most successful experience in
enhancing provisions to ensure presidential continuity, it is worth
considering those constitutional principles and legislative strategies in
assessing further measures.
There are, of course, limits to the value of this exercise. The context in
2010 differs from that in the mid-1960s. Public perceptions of our
institutions, including the Presidency, differ in at least some respects from
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the more generous views of the mid-1960s. The specific continuity
problems being addressed now differ somewhat from the paramount
challenges of that period, in part because the Twenty-Fifth Amendment is
now part of the constitutional architecture and some experience exists
regarding its operation. Nonetheless, the principles from, and story of, the
Twenty-Fifth Amendment should inform efforts to address remaining
continuity problems.
Remedying the remaining gaps presents an exercise in identifying
problems, imagining solutions, and considering how those fixes might be
accomplished. But the lessons of the Twenty-Fifth Amendment show that
the problem is much more difficult than these three steps suggest. Given
the general indifference to these matters, reformers face a formidable
challenge in attracting interest to address contingencies that seem to pose
only remote dangers, chronologically and in terms of their likelihood of
occurring. The Twenty-Fifth Amendment succeeded in part because it
followed discussion for a decade in some circles of many of the problems it
addressed. Education, of the public and of political elites, must precede any
chance of meaningful reform.
Imagining a menu of solutions is easier when each gap is viewed as a
discrete problem. In fact, ensuring continuity requires systemic thought.
The issues interrelate and solutions in one area may cause unanticipated
problems if care is not taken (and perhaps even if it is). For instance, as
previously discussed, moving away from a legislative line of succession has
appeal in order to promote the continuity objectives of the Twenty-Fifth
Amendment. Yet such a move would need to be carefully choreographed to
avoid introducing problems into the system for addressing pre-inaugural
continuity issues. The current succession law prescribes the same legislative
line for all events. Since Cabinet succession is not a feasible solution for
pre-inaugural problems, this approach to post-inaugural double vacancies
would require asymmetrical lines of succession after the Vice President.
Even if legislative succession is retained in the pre-inaugural context, the
Speaker as acting President may be more palatable in the failure to elect
scenario than in the double death situation after her party loses the
presidential election. These instances simply illustrate a more pervasive
problem of synchronizing reforms.
Although the issue of presidential continuity requires systemic thought,
legislative realities may dictate an incremental approach that addresses
some problems while postponing action on others. Moreover, reform will
depend upon proponents being willing to forego preferred solutions to
strike compromises. That can only occur in a culture of compromise in
which advocates measure success not in achieving a perfect solution but in
improving on the troubling status quo. The complexity of the mission is
suggested by the fact that, although the gaps have long been apparent and
although responses are easily imaginable, Congress has failed to exercise
power it has long had or has acted in problematic ways.
Reform will require constructing a package of measures to assure
presidential continuity that are acceptable to Congress and other decision
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makers, identifying leaders willing to pursue those objectives, mobilizing
broad-based interest in addressing a problem of contingent rather than
immediate consequence, and making the compromises and tactical choices
necessary to make progress. Those were among the accomplishments, and
teachings of, the Twenty-Fifth Amendment. Further reform efforts should
draw from its legacy and lessons to take the necessary next steps to help
ensure presidential continuity.

